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This dissertation constructs a structural theory of civil-military relations that identifies
security threats as the primary independent variable that influences the military
organization and its political role. My structural theory comprises two-stage causal
connections. In the first stage, security threats as an independent variable shape the
relative power of major domestic political actors: civilian leadership, military
organization, and civil society. In the next, interactions among these actors are
responsible for specific manifestations of the military’s political role, from domination
to total subordination. My thesis is that high threats provide the military with
favorable conditions to be politically influential, while low threats work against army
officers’ involvement in politics. At the same time, domestic political dynamics are
responsible for more nuanced aspects of the military’s political role. This dissertation
conducts a structured-focused comparative analysis of four Asian countries: South
vii
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The four cases are divided into four
historical stages: (1) the state-building period (1940s-1950s), (2) armed forces’
assumption of power (1960s-1970s), (3) the army’s withdrawal from politics (1980s-
1990s), and (4) civil-military relations in the post-democratization era. The empirical
analysis generates four major theoretical conclusions. First, high security threats bring
about the expansion of the military organization and its political influence, while low
threats weaken its political presence. Second, strong civilian leadership leads to stable
civilian control over the armed forces, while weak civilian leadership invites them into
politics. Third, a unified and professionalized army is conducive to stable civilian
control, while a factionalized military leads to the politicization of army officers.
Finally, a strong civil society with moderate ideology works against the armed forces’
intervention in politics, while weak or ideologically radical civil society groups
deteriorate security conditions, thereby bringing the military into politics. In addition
to giving deeper insights into the military’s political role, my structural theory
provides a good starting point for integrating international relations and comparative
politics in one theoretical model. As this study shows, security threats affect the
military’s domestic political position; at the same time, the military organization and
its political position may account for certain international security outcomes.
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Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, one of the most
significant political phenomena in developing areas was the rise and the fall of
democratic regimes. During that period, more than seventy countries experienced
democratization, but only a small number of them accomplished democratic
consolidation; most other countries still suffer from fragile and highly unstable
governance or have returned to military dictatorship.1 Many factors—inefficiency,
corruption, ill-functioning political institutions, and social unrest and violence—have
been responsible for aborted democratic regime transitions and consolidation. In
many cases, however, it was the armed forces that played a decisive role in the regime
transition process because the military organization could directly “replace the
government.”2 In this respect, newly democratized states will not endure, let alone
achieve democratic consolidation, unless they establish strong civilian supervision
over the armed forces.
In this dissertation, I explore the military’s domestic political role in four
Asian contexts. In doing this, I construct a structural theory of civil-military relations
that identifies external and internal security threats as the primary independent
variable that influences intervening and dependent variables at the domestic level. I
1 Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave over?” Journal of Democracy 7: 3 (1996), pp. 20-37.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968), p. 217.
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suggest that external and internal security threats set the basic parameters of civil-
military relations, determining the rise and fall of the armed forces’ relative influence
in domestic politics. More specifically, I contend that high security threats provide the
military with favorable structural conditions to expand its influence in domestic
politics, while low security threats create unfavorable conditions for it to be engaged
in politics. Therefore, security threats are largely responsible for the military’s
political influence.
The influence of security threats on the military’s political role, however, is
both indirect and indeterminate because intervening variables at the domestic level
also play a role in shaping a more specific manifestation of army officers’ political
role. The major intervening variables are military’s organizational unity, the strength
of civilian leadership, and the strength of civil society, which will be defined in
Chapter One. Security threats as an independent variable influence three major
domestic actors—the military, civilian political leadership, and civil society. The
interactions of the three political actors, in turn, determine a more specific aspect of
the armed forces’ role in domestic politics, such as military coup d’etat and direct
appropriation of political power, officers’ participation in governing process as junior
partners of an authoritarian ruler, the military’s exercise of veto power under
democratic leadership, and democratic control of the military.
The structural theory is tested against four empirical cases: South Korea,
Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. I explore the military’s domestic political role
in each of the four countries by dividing them into four historical stages depending on
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the armed forces’ domestic political role: (1) security threats and the military
organization during the state-building period (1940s-1960s), (2) the military’s seizure
of political power (1960s-1970s), (3) the withdrawal from politics during
democratization (1980s-1990s), and finally (4) security threats and the problem of
democratic control over the armed forces thereafter.
This dissertation brings theoretical and empirical significance to the study of
civil-military relations. First, by constructing a structural theory, my dissertation
overcomes inherent limitations of the institutionalist perspectives that have been
predominant in the study of civil-military relations. Second, this study engages the
subfields of both comparative politics and international relations by integrating
security threat variables and domestic variables into one theoretical model. Third, the
structural theory is tested against four significant Asian cases that have been
overlooked in rigorous and comparative analysis in the major scholarly literature.
Finally, this dissertation has empirical implications for other countries in which the
armed forces still play a substantial political role, but which may be expected to
undergo democratic regime transition in the near future.
This introduction is composed of three sections. The next section poses major
research questions that will be addressed throughout the dissertation. In section two, I
detail the theoretical and empirical implications of this dissertation project. The final
section briefly sketches chapter plans of my dissertation.
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I. Research Question
Contemporary Asia features a rich variety of civil-military relations,3 ranging
from (1) relatively long-standing democratic control of the military in Japan and India,
to (2) recent consolidation of democratic control in South Korea and Taiwan, to (3)
democratic regime transitions with a strong military influence in the political process
in the Philippines and Indonesia, to (4) control of the military by a one-party state in
China, Vietnam, and North Korea, and to (5) the armed forces’ direct control of
politics via coup d’etat in Thailand.4 In addition, these countries have experienced
vastly divergent historical paths of the military’s domestic political role for the second
half of the twentieth century.
In this dissertation, I analyze civil-military interactions in four of these
countries: South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The four cases are
different in almost every aspect of political and social way of life, so that the only
similarity among the cases seems to be the geographical proximity and identity as
“Asian” countries. One similarity among them, however, is that they faced the task of
establishing sovereign statehood at the end of World War II. And, in the state-
building processes, these countries had to cope with severe domestic and international
3 For general overview of civil-military relations in Asian context, see Muthiah Alagappa, ed.,
Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2001); Viberto Selochan, ed, The Military, the State, and
Development in Asia and the Pacific (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
4 In September 2006, Thailand returned to the military regime after the Royal Thai Army
staged a coup d’etat and replaced Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. With the coup, the
Thai military declared martial law, dissolved Parliament, and banned any political activities.
Shawn W. Chrispin, “Military Coup Tumbles Thailand’s Thaksin,” Asia Times (September
21, 2006).
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security threats with the onset of the Cold War and the expansion of communism
throughout the Asian continent.
For the last six decades, all four countries have experienced a huge expansion
of military organization and pervasive penetration of the armed forces into political
processes, even though the modes of officers’ involvement were very different. The
four countries have witnessed politicization of the armies and their political
intervention from the 1950s up until 1980s and the 1990s (in the case of Indonesia),
despite differences in the political role each of these militaries played during the
period. The armed forces in South Korea and Indonesia, for example, became
involved in politics via military coup d’etat and military dictatorship, while the
Philippine and Taiwanese militaries became deeply involved in politics under firm
civilian authoritarian leadership.
Furthermore, all four countries experienced democratic regime transitions in
roughly the same period. The Philippines set off democratization in 1986, followed
by South Korea in 1987, Taiwan in 1988, and Indonesia in 1998.5 The routes to
democratization and the military’s withdrawal from politics, however, were also
different. South Korea and Taiwan went through stable and more-or-less complete
democratization without serious backlash from politicized officers, while Indonesia
and the Philippines suffered from highly unstable and incomplete democratization as
politically assertive generals played influential roles during and after the regime
transition period. As a result of divergent paths of democratic regime transition, each
6
of the four countries displays different patterns of civil-military dynamics in the post-
democratization era: strong civilian control over the armed forces in South Korea and
Taiwan, and rather weak civilian control in Indonesia and the Philippines.
In this dissertation, I address the question of what determines the rise and fall
of the military’s relative influence in domestic politics. Under what conditions does
the military become politically influential and sometimes predominant, and vice
versa? In other words, how can we explain the similarities and differences in the
armed forces’ engagement in and withdrawal from domestic politics among the four
countries under study? Do we have a theory of civil-military relations that has
satisfactory theoretical parsimony and explanatory power over the overarching pattern
of the rise and fall of the military’s political influence, at the same time explaining
more specific manifestations of the military’s political engagement and withdrawal?
More specifically, I pose the following explicit questions to be addressed in this
dissertation.
1. How did the armed forces come to have the ability and opportunity to
become a dominant organization in a society and how did they evolve into
a highly politicized institution? As I will point out later, not all the military
organizations had the capacity to overwhelm a civilian administration from
the time of state-building. Rather, many countries that achieved sovereign
statehood had a small number of military personnel in the beginning, but
later witnessed a vast increase in the manpower of the military institution
5 In this dissertation, I conceptually differentiate between liberalization and democratization.
The definitions and measurement will be detailed in the “Research Design” section of Chapter
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under specific circumstances. Therefore, we need to identify the processes
in which a military organization small in size and politically neutral in its
orientation turns into a principal institution that overpowers other sectors in
society.
2. Once the armed forces rose to a predominant organization that has the
capacity to overwhelm civilian political arena, what accounts for the
different patterns of military officers’ engagement in politics in each of the
four cases? That is to say, how can we explain the army officers’ direct
seizure of political power via coup d’etat and establishment of military
dictatorship as was the case in South Korea (1961) and Indonesia (1965)?
On the other hand, why did the Taiwanese and the Philippine armed forces
remain under the civilian authoritarian guidance even when they possessed
the capacity to overshadow the civilian leadership and take over political
power? There is a large literature on the study of military coup and
praetorianism,6 but most of it is not connected with a broader historical and
structural context of the rise and fall of the military’s political influence.
One.
6 Some of the classical examples are, Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957);
Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of
New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Stanislav Andreski, Military
Organization and Society (London: Routledge, 1968); Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics:
Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977); Amos Perlmutter,
“The Praetorian State and Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations
in Developing Societies,” Comparative Politics 1: 3 (1969); Amos Perlmutter, The Military
and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
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3. How can we explain different modes of military disengagement from
politics during the democratic transitions of each country? Specifically,
what factors encouraged or motivated the South Korean and Taiwanese
armies to depoliticize and come under firm control by democratically
elected civilian leadership without significant military repercussion, while
at the same time politicized army officers in the Philippines and Indonesia
were unwilling to withdraw from politics, thereby making the
democratization highly unstable and incomplete? Addressing the role
military officers play during the democratization period should deepen the
understanding of democratic regime transition process because, as in the
four cases studied in this dissertation, the military plays a significant role in
deciding the course of political transition.
4. Finally, what determines the consolidation of democratic civilian control of
the military in each of the four cases? In other words, how have the armed
forces in South Korea and Taiwan come to be placed under firm civilian
control while the Philippine and Indonesian militaries still exert significant
amount of political influence even after the democratic transition and
formal withdrawal from politics? What constraints and opportunities will
civilian leaders have in establishing democratic control of the military in
the near future?
In attempting to answer all the questions posed above, we find it difficult to
uncover a well-established theory of civil-military relations that addresses all aspects
of it in one theoretical model. A large body of literature on civil-military relations
9
rests on a narrowly conceived institutionalist perspective that deals with only a part of
whole civil-military dynamics.7 To address all the questions, one needs a structural
theoretical model that encompasses not only major variables that the institutionalist
theories have identified, but also broader structural variables, i.e., security threats.8
II. Implications and Significance of the Study
This study has both substantial theoretical and empirical implications. First, I
construct a structural theory of civil-military relations by modifying and improving
upon Michael Desch’s recent theoretical construction.9 My structural theory of civil-
military relations tries to overcome the limitation of previous institutionalist theories
on civil-military relations that have dealt with only parts of the relationship, focusing
either on military intervention and coup d’etat, on the strength and duration of the
military rule, on military withdrawal from politics during democratization, or on
democratic control over security policy-making process. The institutionalist theories
have been satisfactory in explaining only part of the whole aspects of civil-military
relations. Instead, my structural theory of civil-military relations aims to attain
sufficient explanatory power over the wider range of civil-military relations, at the
same time not losing theoretical parsimony.
7 Andrew, Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forester, “The Second Generation
Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society
29: 1 (2002), p. 40.
8 The institutionalist body of literature is grouped into three major theoretical clusters
emanating from the classical works of the 1960s and 1970s: the “developmental” approach,
the “military-centric” approach, and the “synthetic” approach. A more detailed discussion of
these approaches will be made in Chapter One.
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Second, this study aims to further bridge the gap between international
relations and comparative politics by incorporating both international and domestic
variables into one theoretical model. A large body of literature on civil-military
relations has focused on several domestic factors to explain the armed forces’
domestic political role, largely ignoring the security threat variables.10 In turn,
international relations scholars have been interested in explaining the international
outcome of civil-military relations such as states’ foreign policy behavior and war
outcomes.11 While international relations scholars deal with the inside-out approach,
they have not been interested in the outside-in approach. I bridge this gap by adopting
the outside-in approach, which explains the impacts of international/internal security
threats on domestic civil-military relations.
Third, I test the structural theory of civil-military relations by conducting a
rigorous comparative analysis of four Asian countries that have received less attention
in the scholarly literature than other regions such as Eastern Europe, Southern Europe,
and Latin America. Most of the previous literature on Asian civil-military relations is
devoid of rigorous comparative analysis, focusing, instead, on detailed descriptions of
9 Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
10 Some of the exceptions are, Desch, 1999; Wendy Hunter, State and Soldier in Latin
America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (United States
Institute of Peace, 1996); Alfred Stepan C., Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the
Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Michael Desch, “War and
Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” International Organization 50: 2 (1996).
11 For example, see Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive,
1914 and 1984,” International Security 9 (1984); Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James, Civil-
Military Dynamics, Democracy, and International Conflict: A New Quest for International
Peace (New York: Palgrave, 2005); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson, “War
and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political
Accountability,” American Political Science Review 89: 4 (1995).
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historical developments in individual countries. This dissertation takes previous
research on the armed forces’ domestic political role in Asian countries one step
further by conducting a cross-national analysis with a parsimonious theory.
Finally, my study will provide insights into understanding and predicting some
changes in the armed forces’ domestic political role in other Asian countries in which
army officers are highly politicized and still play substantial political and domestic
security roles. Many Asian countries are still in the process of democratic regime
transition or might be in the near future, and in these countries, firm civilian control of
the armed forces will be one of the determining factors of democratic consolidation.
III. Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation is composed of five chapters. Chapter One develops a
structural theory of civil-military relations that identifies security threats as the
primary independent variable. Security threats have influence on three major
domestic actors: civilian leadership, military organization, and civil society. Dynamic
interactions among those domestic actors, in turn, determine the armed forces’ role in
domestic politics. The second half of the chapter presents a research design in which I
describe selection of cases, definition and measurement of variables, and data sources
and research methods.
Chapters Two to Five are empirical studies on the military’s domestic political
influence in the four Asian cases. The four empirical chapters are comprised of four
historical stages in terms of the military’s engagement in and withdrawal from
politics. In Chapter Two, I explain how external and internal security threats during
12
the state-building process in the 1940s and 1950s shaped the military organization and
its doctrine, the political incentives of civilian leaders, and the strength of civil society.
Each of the four countries’ security concerns since World War II was overwhelmed by
the problem of building sovereign statehood and the onset of the Cold War military
and ideological confrontations. Mounting security challenges in the four countries
brought about the expansion of military organization, increasingly authoritarian
civilian leadership that mobilized army officers into politics to govern society, and the
meager role of civil society in politics.
In Chapter Three, I explain how increasingly influential army officers
intervened in politics, via either coup d’etat and ensuing military dictatorship or as the
junior partner of authoritarian civilian leadership. This chapter explicates how
dynamic interactions among major domestic actors—civilian leadership, the military,
and civil society—created different modes of military intervention in politics. The
politically active officers staged coups and dominated the political arena when there
was a civilian leadership failure and when, at the same time, the popularity of the army
increased within a society.12 The armed forces submitted to civilian leadership rather
than overturn it when civilian leaders could maintain political order and security.
In Chapter Four, I focus on the dynamics of the military’s withdrawal from
politics during democratization (1980s-1990s). This chapter illustrates how security
threats in the four cases influenced the three major domestic actors and, in turn,
different modes of military disengagement from politics. Low level security threats
set favorable conditions for a stable and far-reaching regime transition, while high
13
threats impeded the transition process. More specifically, a combination of strong
civilian leadership supported by civil society and a unified military organization
induced the armed forces’ complete withdrawal from politics. On the contrary, a
combination of weak civilian leadership and a factionalized army institution made
democratization process high unstable. In this situation, moreover, politicized officers
were unwilling to withdraw from politics during and even after democratization.
In Chapter Five, I illustrate civil-military dynamics in four cases in the post-
democratization era. This chapter explains why South Korea and Taiwan were more
successful in establishing firm civilian control of the military and consolidating
democracy than Indonesia and the Philippines. Also, this chapter ponders how the
security threats of these countries may influence the armed forces’ domestic political
role in the near future.
In the Conclusions, I summarize my theoretical arguments and major empirical
findings. I compare the utility of my structural theory with other institutional and
structural theories. In addition, this chapter considers how this structural theory of
civil-military relations might be further elaborated and developed in future studies.
12 Finer, 1962, p. 21; Nordlinger, 1977, pp. 85-86.
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Chapter 1. Security Threats and the Military’s Domestic Political Role:
A Structural Theory of Civil-Military Relations
Introduction
As discussed in the Introduction, this dissertation addresses the factors
determining the military’s relative influence in domestic politics. In other words, I ask
under what conditions the military becomes politically influential and sometimes
predominant? In answering this question, I construct a structural theory of civil-military
relations that identifies security threats as the primary independent variable that shapes
relative power balance and political incentive structure among major political actors at
the domestic level. At the same time, I identify causal connections between these
domestic variables and the military’s domestic political role.
Before specifying my structural theoretical logic, however, I briefly review, in
section one, previous theoretical perspectives on civil-military interactions, including
institutional theories and Michael Desch’s structural theoretical logic. Based on the
critical review of theoretical literature, I develop, in section two, a structural theoretical
account of civil-military relations. The third section is a research design in which I
explain the selection of the cases, definition and measurement of variables, and research
methods and data sources.
15
I. Literature Review
1. Institutionalist Theories of Civil-Military Relations
Much of the existing literature on civil-military debates has focused on the
problem of praetorianism,13 military coup d’etat, and military dictatorial rule in
developing areas.14 When dealing with the problem of the armed forces’ intervention in
politics, moreover, scholars tend to rest on a narrowly conceived institutionalist
perspectives.15 This institutionalist body of literature can be grouped into three major
theoretical clusters emanating from the 1960s and 1970s literature in comparative
politics: the “developmental” approach, the “military-centric” approach, and the
“synthetic” approach.16
1) The Developmental Approach
13 According to Amos Perlmutter, praetorianism is one “which the military tends to intervene
and potentially could dominate the political system.” In a praetorian state, the military plays a
predominant role in governmental institutions and policymaking processes. For the discussion of
praetorianism, see Amos Perlmutter, ‘The Praetorian State and Praetorian Army: Toward a
Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Politics,” Comparative Politics 1: 3 (1969),
p. 384; Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977).
14 For a brief overview on the study of civil-military relations for the last five decades, see Peter
Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999), pp. 211-241.
15 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Forester, “The Second Generation
Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society
29: 1 (2002), p. 40.
16 In recent years, some works on civil-military interactions borrowed the rational choice
institutionalist perspective. Some of the prominent examples are, Peter Feaver, Armed Servants:
Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003);
Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Wendy Hunter, “Negotiating Civil-Military
Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile” International Studies Quarterly 42: 2
(1998).
16
The developmental approach looks at socio-political conditions as the primary
cause of military intervention in politics.17 This approach focuses on the problem of
weak and ill-functioning political institutions, faced with growing demands for political
participation from the general public. In many developing countries at the early stage of
the state-building process, weak political institutions were confronted with an
increasingly mobilized citizenry, which leads to a “participation crisis.”18 This
participation crisis occurs when newly established regimes have a low level of political
institutionalization. The lack of political institutionalization motivates diverse socio-
political actors including students, laborers, the masses, and especially the military, to
take over political power. The developmental approach contends that the military comes
to a decision to intervene in politics when the societal arena suffers from participation
crises and political turmoil. In particular, multiparty systems and mass political
participation in newly established countries destabilize the political system, increasing
the possibility of the political intervention of the armed forces.19
17 See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968); Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian
Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, Crises and Sequences in Political Development
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., Civilian Control of the
Military: Theories and Cases from Developing Countries (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1976); William R. Thomson, “Explanation of the Military Coup,” Comparative Politics 7:
4 (July, 1975); Claude E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Military Rule:
Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations (North Scituate: Dexbury Press, 1974); Egil Fossum,
“Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups d’Etat in Latin America,” Journal of
Peace Research 3 (Fall, 1967); Martin C. Needler, “Political Development and Military
Intervention in Latin America,” in John D. Martz, ed., The Dynamics of Change in Latin
American Politics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971).
18 Binder, et al., 1971; also see Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, “Review: Crisis and
Sequences in Collective Theory Development,” American Political Science Review 69: 3 (1975).
19 Huntington 1968; Myron Weiner and Joseph La Palombara, eds., Political Parties and
Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
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Closely related to the idea of the participation crisis, the developmental approach
notes that civilian leaders’ performance failure and subsequent loss of legitimacy create
favorable conditions for the army’s intervention in politics. According to Eric
Nordlinger, “One type of performance failure—the inability to maintain order—affects
the decision to intervene insofar as it may require the officers to act as policemen while
highlighting the government’s total dependence upon the military.”20 Civilian leadership
that suffers from a legitimacy crisis faces mounting pressure from the general public. In
this situation, civilian leaders consider the armed forces as the most attractive strategic
partner to maintain socio-political order. Extreme social unrest creates a situation in
which “civilian dependence on the military and the military’s popularity” coincide.21 In
sum, the developmental approach explains military intervention in politics by focusing on
social and political unrest generated by weak and inefficient political institutions,
increased social mobilization, civilian leadership’s performance failures, and the resultant
loss of legitimacy. According to this approach, therefore, the presence of a strong and
stable civilian leadership is the key to preventing the military’s political dominance.
2) The Military-Centric Approach
The military-centric approach finds the primary cause of army officers’
intervention in politics inside the military, such as the armed forces’ organizational
character, factional struggles, military doctrine, material or corporate interests, and
20 Nordlinger, 1977, p. 86.
21 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 72.
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individual officers’ political ambitions.22 According to Samuel Finer, the armed forces
possess massive political advantages over civilian leadership such as “a marked
superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of
arms.”23 In addition to the army’s political and organizational advantages, the existence
of competing factions within the military organization is considered to be detrimental to
civilian control of the military officers and breed their political intervention. As Morris
Janowitz suggests, factionalized militaries are more prone to plot coup d’etat.24 Also,
domestically oriented military doctrine and the army’s invested corporate interests are
considered to serve as major causes of military coup d’etat.25
Given the armed forces’ high level of organizational strength and control over
weapons, according to the military-centric approach, it is the military’s professionalism
that prevents it from intervening in the political arena. Huntington suggests that a
professionalized army tends not to intervene, as it accepts the norm of civil supremacy.
According to Huntington, a professional military will have “the lowest possible level of
military political power with respect to all civilian groups. A highly professional officer
22 For example, see, Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960);
Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1963); Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London:
Routledge, 1968); Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publication, 1972); Alfred Stepan, Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal
Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Armies and Politics in
Latin America (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976); Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in
Africa: Studies in Military Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Nordlinger, 1977.
23 Finer, 1962, p. 6.
24 Janowitz, 1964; also see Augustine J. Kposowa and Craig Jenkins, “The Structural Sources of
Military Coups in Postcolonial Africa, 1957-1984,” American Journal of Sociology 99 (1993).
25 Nordlinger, 1977, p. 64.
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corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate
authority within the state.”26
Furthermore, the military-centric approach suggests that the levels of military
professionalization are determined by what kinds of control mechanism civilian leaders
adopt against the army organization—either “subjective” or “objective” control, as
primarily conceived by Huntington.27 When civilian leadership adopts an objective
control, the military will sustain high levels of military professionalism and subordinate
themselves to civilian leadership in foreign and military-related decision-making
processes. In objective control mechanism, there is a clear functional distinction between
civilian leadership and the military, which assures institutional autonomy of the latter. In
subjective control, however, civilian leaders manage to control the top brass of the
military by politicizing them.28 Huntington’s idea of military professionalism, however,
led to theoretical and empirical debates on whether professionalization is the key to
preventing military intervention or professionalization itself breeds it.29
26 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 84.
27 Huntington, 1957.
28 More specifically, Huntington defines objective civilian control of the military as: 1) a high
level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their
professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political
leaders who are the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; 3) the recognition and
acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the
military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political
intervention in the military. Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” in
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 4.
29 For the discussion of military professionalism and intervention, see Bengt Abrahamsson,
Military Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Alfred C. Stepan, ed.,
Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Failures (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973);
Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1977).
20
Notwithstanding these debates, however, the military-centric approach shares the
core idea that the origin of military intervention in politics resides within the military
organization itself. This approach furthermore suggests that it is the armed forces’
organizational unity that discourages its political intervention.
3) The Synthetic Approach
Finally, the synthetic approach attempts to integrate both the developmental and
military-centric approaches into one theoretical model.30 This approach suggests that
both societal and military factors are responsible for military intervention in politics.
According to Samuel Finer, for example, the military intervenes in politics when a
society provides it with both the “disposition” and “opportunity” to intervene. Here, the
disposition refers to a “combination of conscious motive and a will or desire to act.” The
disposition is composed of the military’s “motive” and “mood” to intervene in politics.31
The presence of disposition itself is not a sufficient condition for the military intervention
until the societal arena provides army officers with an opportunity to intervene, such as
civilian leaders’ loss of legitimacy, their dependence on the armed forces to control
society, increasing social and economic crises, and most importantly a power vacuum in
civilian political leadership.
30 For example, Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform: Toward a
Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems,” American Political Science
Review 76: 4 (December, 1982); Nordlinger, 1977.
31 Finer, 1962, p. 23.
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In a similar context, Gary Wynia presents “push factors” and “pull factors” as the
cause of military’s political intervention.32 In his comparative study of the cause of
military intervention in Latin American countries, Wynia identifies the military’s
aspiration and belief regarding the nation’s modernization as the push factor, while social
conditions such as social disorder, economic crisis, weak political institutions, and the
influence of foreign actors as the pull factor.33
In this synthetic approach, military intervention in politics is the result of
interactions between the military’s disposition to intervene and social opportunity
structures, or the coexistence of the push and pull factors. Furthermore, the disposition
and opportunity structures (push and fall factors) are closely connected with the level of
development in political culture of a society. In a society with “low political culture” the
probability of military intervention in politics is far higher than in societies with “high
political culture.” According to Finer, a society has a high level of political culture that
hinders the military’s dominance in politics (1) when “the belief or emotion by virtue of
which the rulers claim the moral right to govern and be obeyed is generally accepted,” or
(2) where “the complex of civil procedures and organs which jointly constitute the
political system are recognized as authoritative,” or (3) where “public involvement in and
32 Gary W. Wynia, The Politics of Latin American Development (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), pp. 57-60.
33 For studies of Asian and African contexts, see J. Stephen Hoadley, Soldiers and Politics in
Southeast Asia: Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Schenkman
Publishing, 1975); Moshe Lissak, Military Roles in Modernization: Civil-Military Relations in
Thailand and Burma (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); Thomas H. Johnson, Robert O.
Slater, and Pat McGowan, “Explaining African Military Coups D’etat, 1960-1982,” American
Political Science Review 78: 3 (September, 1984).
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attachment to these civil institution is strong and widespread.”34 In sum, the synthetic
approach suggests that the military’s intervention in politics is an outcome of interactions
between social and military factors.
4) Limitations of the Institutionalist Perspectives
These institutional perspectives on civil-military relations have contributed to our
understanding of the rise and fall of the military’s domestic political role in developing
countries for the last half century. The synthetic approach, even though less theoretically
parsimonious than the other approaches, is particularly helpful in identifying key
variables and major actors in civil-military interaction. At the same time, however, the
institutional theories have several shortcomings that need to be overcome.
First, most of civil-military relations scholars who adopt the institutional
approaches have dealt with the problem of praetorianism, coup d’etat, and military
dictatorship in developing countries. Focusing on a coup or its absence, however, is less
theoretically and empirically appealing than it used to be, considering that the possibility
of military-dominant regime via coup is a less frequent political phenomenon.35 Instead,
a more useful theory of civil-military relations ought to have explanatory power not only
over coups and praetorian states, but also over more diverse manifestations of civil-
military dynamics, such as indirect military influence over politics and policy-making
34 Finer, 1962, p. 87.
35 For example, Hunter, 1997.
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processes, wielding a veto power against civilian leadership, and the military’s total
compliance to the civilian leaders.36
Second, most of the institutional perspectives have been designed to serve as a
snap-shot theory that accounts for only part of complex civil-military interactions. As
Finer pointed out, “what applies to military intervention . . . can also be played back to
explicate its extrusion.”37 Since Finer’s suggestion, however, little attempt has been
made to develop a theoretical framework that covers the political dynamics of both the
military’s engagement in and withdrawal from politics. There has been a plethora of
studies on the military intervention in politics. But less theoretical development has been
achieved in understanding the military’s withdrawal during democratization. A more
useful theory of civil-military relations ought to have explanatory power over the
dynamics of the rise and fall of the military’s influence in domestic politics.
Third, and most important, the existing literature has paid little attention to the
influence of international and domestic security threats on the military’s domestic
political role.38 With a few exceptions,39 most previous studies have largely focused on
36 For example, see Feaver, 1999, pp. 218-222.
37 Finer, 1962, p. 23.
38 Several scholars mentioned the security threats or foreign influence in the military’s political
intervention. None of these studies, however, identified the security threats as the primary
independent variable.
39 Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and
Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Bruce C.
Porter, War and the Rise of the Modern State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New
York: Free Press, 1994); Charles Tilly, “War Making and the State Making as Organized Crime,”
in Peter B. Evans, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1985); Harold Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46 (1941).
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domestic variables such as weak political institutions,40 military organization,41 ethnic
rivalries,42 and other domestic factors. This is a significant oversight because the military
is primarily a security organization that directly copes with the security threats of a state.
Therefore, changes in security threats will bring about changes in military organization,
doctrine, and its domestic political role. In this sense, domestic factors are not the
primary independent variables but rather intervening variables largely shaped by other
conditions—that is, security threats. In sum, works that ignore security threats in the
study of civil-military relations are bound to have limited explanatory power.
For instance, the institutionalist theories have scrutinized what Peter Feaver called
the “civil-military problematique,” which is a simple paradox: “the very institution
created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity.”43
Any society needs to be protected from outside predators by having strong military
organization, at the same time being protected from military intervention. All the
institutionalist scholars regarded this paradox as given in any society. Historically
speaking, however, not all military organizations were strong enough to dominate society
from the state-building period. South Korea and the Philippines, for example, used to
have very small militaries in the 1940s. But the two countries’ military organizations
40 Huntington 1968; Perlmutter, 1969; Robert W. Jackman, “The Predictability of Coup d’etat: A
Model with African Data,” American Political Science Review 72 (1978).
41 Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1971); Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing
Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Nordlinger, 1977.; Finer, 1962.
42 Jackman, 1978; Kposowa and Jenkins, 1993.
43 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 4; also see, Peter Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique:
Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23:2
(1996).
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were vastly expanded through the experiences of internal and external security
challenges, including interstate war and domestic insurgency movements. In many
developing countries, a predominant military institution is not a given, but one that
expands in size and strength under certain structural conditions.
In addition, it is true that the armed forces are likely to intervene in politics when
both the civilian leaders’ dependence on the military and the military’s popularity
coincide. However, we need to investigate the circumstances under which civilian
dependence on the military and the military’s popularity coincide. In sum, the domestic
variables that the institutionalist literature has identified are not independent variables in
themselves, but intervening variables that affect the military’s domestic political role.
2. Michael Desch’s Theory
I mentioned that several factors that the institutionalist perspectives have dealt
with are not independent variables in themselves but intervening variables that are
affected by other conditions. I suggest that international and internal security threats
ought to be treated as the prime independent variable that shapes the relationship among
major domestic political actors: the military organization, civilian political leadership,
and civil society. In turn, divergent interactions among these domestic actors result in
different manifestations civil-military relations.
Several scholars have studied the effects of security threat environments on
military organization and its domestic political role. Harold Lasswell, for example,
contends that severe external threats and war conditions create “garrison states” in which
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militaries that are specialized in violence become the most powerful groups in society.44
In garrison states, all the domestic resources and purposes are subordinate to war and the
preparation for it. During war, “The executive and the military gain power at the expense
of the legislative and civilian politicians.”45 Lasswell is right when he suggests that
extremely high external security threat environments engender the rise of the military’s
political influence. But he does not specify how the threat environments shape the power
relations among major domestic political actors, including civilian leaders, the military,
and the general public.
A more influential argument has been developed by Alfred Stepan. He focuses on
the military’s new professionalism in which the army considers the internal security role
as its primary mission in a society.46 In his work, the major concern is the presence of
internal security threat environments and their influence on the expansion of domestic
roles. Subsequently, several scholars have examined the relationship between decreasing
external and internal security threats with the end of the Cold War and the armed forces’
reduced influence in domestic political process and democratization.47 Even though
several scholars have pointed out the influence of security threat conditions on the
44 Lasswell, 1941, p. 457.
45 Huntington, 1957, p. 349.
46 Alfred C. Stepan ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973); also see, Alfred C. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the
Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 18.
47 For example, see, Robin Luckham, “Introduction,” in Viberto Selochan ed., The Military, the
State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); J. Mark Ruhl,
“Changing Civil-Military Relations in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 33
(1998).
In contrast, Aguero argues that the presence of high-level external threat conditions was an
important factor that was responsible for the successful democratic regime transitions from
authoritarian rule. See, Felipe Aguero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in
Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
27
military’s political influence, little attempt has been made to devise a clear and
parsimonious theory that explicates the influence of international and domestic security
environments on the armed forces’ domestic political role.
In this respect, Michael Desch’s recent work provides an appropriate starting
point for constructing a structural theory of civil-military relations that treats domestic
and international security threat environments as the primary independent variable.48
Desch constructs a theory of civil-military relations that specifies external and internal
security threats as an independent variable and domestic factors as intervening variables,
and explains when these variables become more or less important. Moreover, Desch’s
framework is sufficiently flexible to cover a wider range of civil-military interactions
than the institutionalist theories do.
Table 1-1: Security Threats and Civil-Military Relations49
High External Threats Low External Threats








Desch’s theory predicts that a state with a structural condition of low internal
threats and high external threats (Q3) will have the most desirable civil-military relations.
Under high external security threats, according to his logic, civilian leadership may
48 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Michael C. Desch, “Threat
Environments and Military Missions,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., Civil-Military
Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
49 Desch, 1999, pp. 11-16 for his theoretical construction.
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become experienced and knowledgeable about national security issues. In addition, high
external security threats will bring the “rally ‘round the flag” effect among domestic
audiences so that civilian leadership becomes stronger. And, in such a threat
environment, civilian leadership adopts an objective control mechanism over the military.
On the other hand, Desch predicts that a state with a structural condition of high
internal threats and low external threats (Q2) will have the worst civilian control of the
armed forces. In this structural condition, civilian leadership might be weak, divided, and
inexperienced in national security affairs. At the same time, the military doctrine focuses
on domestic security and other non-military missions. In this structural condition, the
armed forces are highly likely to dominate the civilian political arena. In the structural
conditions of Q2 and Q3, structural imperatives are so strong that security threat
environments directly shape the civil-military relations. On the other hand, in the
structural conditions of Q1 (high internal/external threats) and Q4 (low internal/external
threats), structural effects are indirect so that other factors at the domestic level,
especially military doctrine, play a more important role. In addition, the structural
conditions of Q1 and Q4 will produce mixed results in terms of civil-military relations.
Even though Desch’s theoretical framework provides a good starting point for
constructing a structural theory of civil-military relations, its causal mechanisms are less
convincing. First, one of Desch’s strongest theoretical cases is the causal relationship
between high external/low internal security threats and the most desirable civil-military
relations. In reality, however, it is extremely difficult to find many empirical cases that
are under high external threats and low internal threats. Considering the fact that most
modern wars and interstate conflicts have been related with territorial issues, and most
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wars were fought against neighboring states resulting in the territorial interpenetration,
high external threats in most cases are supposed to imply high internal security threats.
Thus, for a structural theory of civil-military relations to be more useful, it must have
explanatory power over the cases in which both high external and internal security threats
coexist.
Second, Desch’s proposition about high security threats and desirable civil-
military relations is problematic. He suggests that the presence of high security threats
will strengthen the civilian leadership by creating the “rally ‘round the flag” effect among
the general public.50 He does not consider, however, the fact that the same effect also
gives civilian leaders strong incentives and opportunities to be more authoritarian and
mobilize military personnel into politics. In addition, the presence of high-level security
threats in both international and domestic arenas are likely to lead to the expansion of
military organization compared with other sectors in society. This phenomenon has been
prominent especially in developing countries where a larger portion of resources was
devoted to military-related sectors. The direct outcome of war or the threat of war has
been the expansion of the military institution.
Third, in addition to the expansion of the military organization, the military’s
experiences of international war or domestic counterinsurgency influence the value or
perception of military personnel in a certain way. Wars of independence from colonial
powers, for example, make soldiers perceive themselves as the only state institution that
truly represents the national interest. This is especially true when civilian leaders provide
weak leadership due to the loss of legitimacy and factional infightings within the ruling
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circle. Thus, high external/internal security threats coupled with weak civilian leadership
set in motion the military intervention in politics, as the synthetic approach suggests.
Finally, the structural condition of extremely severe threats can easily justify
civilian leaders becoming more authoritarian and adopting more oppressive and coercive
measures in governance. In such a situation, increasingly authoritarian civilian leaders
have no choice but to invite military officers into political processes. In turn, when
security threats are high, the popularity of the military also rises. According to Finer,
“The military’s opportunities to intervene are maximized if both—civilian dependence on
the military and the military’s popularity—situations coincide.”51 Such a coincidence is
likely to occur under the structural condition of extremely high security threats.
In contrast to Desch’s thesis about low external/internal security threats and
mixed results in civil-military relations, I suggest that low security threat conditions in
both the international and domestic arenas engender the most desirable civil-military
relations. Under low threats, domestic audiences are less willing to accept an
increasingly authoritarian and coercive rule and are likely to stand firm against military
engagement in the political process.
50 Desch, 2003, p. 13.
51 Finer, 1962, p. 7.
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II. Security Threats and the Military’s Political Role: A Structural Theory
1. Security Threats and the Military
In this section, I develop a structural theory of civil-military relations that
comprises two-stage causal connection. In the first place, security threats are the primary
independent variable that influences major political actors’ positions in domestic politics.
And, in the next, the dynamic interactions among the major domestic actors—civilian
leadership, the military, and civil society—under certain security threats determine the
military’s relative influence in domestic politics.
In this dissertation, the primary independent variable—security threats—comes
either from the domestic or international arena, or both. Also, security threats can be
either high or low. The dependent variable—the military’s relative influence in domestic
politics—is treated as a continuum between the two extremes of military domination
(military coup and dictatorship) and officers’ total subordination to democratically
elected civilian leadership. Elaborating on Claude Welch and Arthur Smith’s
classification, I identify four types of civil-military interactions: (1) control, (2)
participation, (3) influence, and (4) subordination.52 Control refers to a situation in which
army officers stage a coup d’etat, overthrow civilian leadership, and establish military
dictatorship. On the contrary, subordination signifies a situation in which the armed
52 Welch and Smith categorize the military’s political participation into three types: control,
participation, and influence. See Welch and Smith, 1974, p. x. For another example of
categorization, see Richard H. Payne, “Military Intervention in the Politics of Developing
Systems: The African Case,” Ph. D. Dissertation (University of Georgia, 1970), pp. 34-36.
32
forces are a politically neutral institution and controlled by democratically elected
civilian leadership. Participation and influence are located in between.
Table 1-2: Summary of Causal Connections
Security Military Organization Military’s 
Threats Civilian Leadership Political Influence
Civil Society
(Independent) (Intervening) (Dependent)
I suggest that high security threats either in the domestic or international arena
generate a structural condition for the military to be politically influential, while low
security threats work against its political influence. As Finer suggested, “War conditions
are among the circumstances that may provide the military with opportunities for
intervention” and dominance of domestic politics.53 This is supposed to be true because
the military is first and foremost a security institution that exists primarily “to protect the
interests of one political group against the predations of others.”54 Therefore, mounting
security threats in a state should bring about the expansion of the military organization
and its domestic political role.
There are a number of reasons why high security threats in domestic or
international arena produce politically influential militaries. The first direct outcome of
severe security threats is the expansion of military organization. Previous institutionalist
theories simply assumed the presence of a military institution that has the organizational
53 Finer, 1962, p. 72.
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capacity to overwhelm the civilian political arena from the beginning. But the historical
experience suggests that not all developing countries that attained independence during
and after World War II possessed strong armed forces that could dominate society from
the beginning. Most of these countries, thereafter, witnessed the vast expansion of
military organization in the face of extreme security threat conditions and the experience
of war or a threat of war and domestic insurgency. Thus, the presence of predominant
military institutions in developing countries was not a given from the beginning but an
outcome that was shaped later by worsening security environments in the context of the
Cold War.
In addition to organizational expansion, high security threats—especially the
experience of interstate conflicts or domestic counterinsurgencies—sculpt army officers’
political beliefs and attitudes in certain ways. The experiences of war, for example,
create a strong belief within the army that it is the only institution that truly represents
and defends the interest of the people. Such a political belief is reinforced when civilians
fail to provide strong political leadership or undergo factional-partisan infighting. The
political voice of the top brass in the military is strongest in countries where the armed
forces are deeply engaged in the state-building process.
Second, high security threats give civilian leaders structural incentives and
opportunities to become more authoritarian and take coercive measures to rule society.
Deteriorating national security conditions will also serve as a threat to the regime security
of a civilian leadership. In such a challenging security condition, civilian leaders
54 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 4.
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recognize the armed forces as the most attractive strategic partner to secure both regime
security and state security. Civilian leaders find it easier to mobilize officers into politics
to expand their political power when the society faces severe threats either domestically
or internationally. At the same time, the military’s popularity among the general public
also rises when the state gets involved in internal or external conflicts. In sum, mounting
security challenges turn democratic civilian leadership into a more authoritarian one that
mobilizes the armed forces into politics.
Finally, high security threats work against civil society’s political role. One of the
most prominent outcomes of unfavorable security threats is the expansion and
strengthening of state apparatus that monopolizes the means of physical violence. Under
high security threats, the power balance between the state and civil society moves toward
the former, sacrificing the latter. Furthermore, the presence of a strong civil society
under an intimidating security situation may breed the military’s intervention in politics.
This is highly probable when a democratically elected civilian leadership becomes
increasingly authoritarian and rests on coercive means to deal with civil society. In this
situation, civil society groups are likely to adopt radical and physically violent means to
challenge the authoritarian state apparatus, resulting in socio-political crises. Such a
crisis situation provides the military with opportunities and justification to intervene in
domestic politics.
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Table 1-3: Security Threats and Major Domestic Actors




Low → Weak military presence in politics
Pressure against authoritarian rule
Influential civil society
By the same token, the decline of security threats provides structural
circumstances for states to reevaluate the military’s role in politics and security
policymaking. More specifically, a low level of external and internal security threats
creates few structural imperatives and incentives for military officers to intervene in
politics. In addition, civilian leaders’ attempt to mobilize the army into politics under
these circumstances is extremely difficult to justify and will generally face harsh
resistance from domestic audiences. At the same time, the power balance between the
state and society will turn in favor of the civil society arena under advantageous security
conditions. Furthermore, civil society groups’ pressure against authoritarian civilian
leadership becomes more and more influential. In sum, we can hypothesize that high
security threats in both domestic and international arenas cause the military to be a
politically influential organization, while low security threats make politicized army
officers less influential, leading to stronger civilian control of the military. Security
threats’ influence on three major domestic actors is summarized in Table 1-3.
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2. Domestic Political Dynamics and the Military
While the above statements illustrate a generalized pattern of the rise and fall of
the military’s relative influence in domestic politics, it does not explain or predict specific
manifestations of its engagement in and withdrawal from politics.55 That is to say, these
structural conditions themselves cannot explain or predict a more specific type of military
involvement in politics via coup d’etat and military dictatorial rule (control) or the
ascension of politicized officers as junior partners in an authoritarian regime
(participation). Furthermore, the structural conditions do not explain or predict specific
modes of military disengagement from politics during democratization: stable
democratization and complete military withdrawal from politics (subordination) or
incomplete democratization with a strong military presence in politics (influence). For a
structural theory to have sufficient explanatory power, other intervening variables at the
domestic level need to be considered.
I argue, therefore, that a more detailed aspect of the military’s involvement in and
withdrawal from politics is determined by intervening variables at the domestic level
such as the military’s organizational cohesiveness, the strength of civilian leadership, and
the strength of civil society. Dynamic interactions among the major political actors shape
specific manifestations of the military’s political role. The first intervening variable is
the cohesiveness of the military organization through which structural influences are
modified. A cohesive military institution is conducive to stable civilian control and
55 As Kenneth Waltz pointed out, a structural theory does not predict specific behaviors of
individual actors (i.e., states), rather it merely shows what constraints and incentives the
international political and security structure gives to states as individual actors. Waltz pointed out
the need of a theory of foreign policy to explain specific state behaviors. Kenneth Waltz, Theory
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promotes military professionalism and institutional autonomy.56 Civilian leaders find it
easier to monitor and control the armed forces when it retains organizational unity with
an effective hierarchical command structure. On the contrary, a military organization that
lacks institutional unity and suffers from factional struggles among the top brass in the
military results in the loss of professionalism and officers’ political neutrality. Civilian
leaders find it hard to control army officers when the army leadership is engaged in
factional competition. In sum, I hypothesize that the presence of a cohesive military
organization results in stronger civilian control of the armed forces, while factionalized
army leadership works against civilian control and breeds politicized officers’
intervention in civilian political affairs.
The second intervening variable is the strength of civilian leadership. The pattern
of civilian leadership is the most crucial intervening variable that influences both the way
the military gets involved in and withdraws from politics. As suggested in the previous
section, the structural condition of high security threats brings about an organizational
expansion of the military institution. In addition, high threats render civilian leadership
increasingly authoritarian and mobilize army officers into politics. Once military officers
are invited into the political arena, however, it is the strength of civilian leadership that
determines the modes of the military’s engagement in politics. In other words, army
officers are likely to engage in a coup d’etat and establish military dictatorship when
civilian leadership loses its legitimacy or fails to maintain domestic political and security
of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 121-122; also see Desch, 1999, p.
11.
56 For example, see Zoltan Barany, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military: the East
European Experience,” Comparative Politics 30: 1 (1997).
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order. Given the presence of politically active military officers, the existence of crisis
situations or power-vacuum in the civilian political arena makes a military coup highly
probable. On the other hand, the politicized military officers will not attempt a coup but,
instead, follow civilian guidance when civilian leaders exert strong leadership that gains
support from civil society.
In addition, the strength of civilian leadership influences the military’s withdrawal
from politics. The process of military withdrawal during democratization will be highly
unstable and incomplete when newly elected civilian leaders suffer from weak and
divided leadership, fail to maintain political and security order, or lack support from civil
society. When civilian leadership is divided, weak, and deficient in legitimacy, military
officers are unwilling to withdraw from politics and instead try to exert significant
political influence even after they are formally disengaged from politics. On the other
hand, unified and strong civilian leadership that garners support from civil society
encourages the military’s complete disengagement from politics, resulting in more stable
and complete democratization and the military’s depoliticization.
The final intervening variable is the strength of civil society. Generally speaking,
a strong and vibrant civil society works against a military role in domestic politics.
Reality, however, is more complicated depending on the security threats and the strategy
that civil society groups adopt. Under high level of security threats, the existence of a
strong civil society itself may invite the armed forces into politics, especially when civil
society groups advocate a radical ideology or adopts a strategy of physical violence,
engendering socio-political chaos. On the other hand, low level of security threats with
strong civil society groups that are ideologically moderate and adopt nonviolent strategy
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work against the military’s domestic political engagement. The influence of dynamic
interactions among domestic political actors on civil-military relations is summarized in
Table 1-4. 
 
Table 1-4: Domestic Political Actors and the Military’s Political Influence
Strong civilian leadership Weak civilian leadership









As is presented in my theoretical construction, there are two-stage causal
connections. In the first stage, security threats determine the military’s relative influence
in domestic politics, as noted in Table 1-4. Civilian control is strongest and the military’s
political influence is weakest under the structural condition of low internal and external
threats (Q4). On the contrary, high internal and external threats bring about the worst
civilian control of the military (Q1). To a lesser extent, high level of security threats
either in the domestic or international arena also stimulate a stronger political influence
of the military (Q2 and Q3). These expected outcomes are exactly opposite to Michael
Desch’s logic, as is summarized in Table 1-5. 
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Table 1-5: Security Threats and the Military’s Political Influence
High External Threats Low External Threats








While security threats in the domestic and international arenas determine the
military’s relative influence in domestic politics, the dynamic interactions among major
domestic actors—civilian leadership, the military, and civil society—are responsible for
more detailed and nuanced manifestations of the military’s domestic political role, as
noted in Table 1-6. A combination of strong civilian leadership (backed by strong civil
society) and unified military organization leads to firm civilian control of the military.
On the contrary, an amalgamation of weak civilian leadership and factionalized army
breeds coup d’etat and military domination of politics. In the conditions of weak civilian
leadership and divided military organization, civilian control of the military is rather
unstable and weak even though there is a low probability of a military coup when
security threats are low.





Military Unity Civil Society Expected
Outcomes
Strong United Weak ParticipationHigh
Weak Divided Weak Control
Strong United Strong SubordinationLow
Weak Divided Weak Influence
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4. Summary of Hypotheses
In this section, I provide a summary of major hypotheses derived from my
theoretical arguments suggested above. These hypotheses are tested in each of the
following empirical chapters.
Hypothesis I: High external and internal threats cause the military to be influential
in domestic politics, while low security threats produce politically weak armed forces.
Hypothesis II: The military becomes politically influential when it loses its
organizational unity and suffers from factional struggles, while a cohesive military
institution leads to stable civilian control.
Hypothesis III: Army officers are likely to stage a coup d’etat and establish
military dictatorship when civilian leadership loses its legitimacy or fails to provide
domestic political and security order.
Hypothesis III-1: The top brass in the army is discouraged to wage a coup and
placed under civilian guidance when civilian leaders exert strong leadership that is
supported by civil society.
Hypothesis III-2: The process of military disengagement from politics is highly
unstable and incomplete when civilian leaders suffer from weak and divided leadership,
fail to maintain security and political order, or lack support from civil society.
Hypothesis III-3: United and strong civilian leadership that is supported by civil
society makes the military more completely disengage from politics, resulting in more
stable and complete democratization and consolidation.
Hypothesis IV: The presence of strong and vibrant civil society weakens the
military’s domestic political influence.
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Hypothesis IV-1: The military is highly likely to intervene in politics when civil
society exacerbates domestic political disorder by advocating a radical ideology or
adopting a strategy of physical violence.
Hypothesis IV-2: The armed forces are discouraged from engaging in politics
when civil society is strong and adopts a nonviolent and moderate ideology.
III. Research Design
In this section, I present a research design, including the selection of cases,
definition and measurement of major variables, and data sources and methods.
1. Cases
To test the hypotheses generated from my theoretical arguments, I conduct a
comparative analysis of civil-military relations in four Asian countries. Two cases come
from East Asia (South Korea and Taiwan) and two cases from Southeast Asia (the
Philippines and Indonesia). The four cases selected in this research are adequate for the
purpose of this dissertation. They present sufficient degrees of similarities and
differences in terms of the independent, intervening, and dependent variables.
First, the four cases demonstrate divergent manifestations of security threats
throughout history. South Korea and Taiwan, for example, had to deal with mounting
security threats both domestically and internationally from the beginning of the state-
building process in the 1940s up until the mid-1980s. The Republic of Korea (or South
Korea) fought three years of the Korean War (1950-1953) and ensuing threats from
communist North Korea throughout the Cold War decades. Likewise, the Republic of
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China on Taiwan (or Taiwan) had been under severe threats from the Communist forces
on mainland China and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Since the mid-1985 up
until the late-1990s, however, security threats surrounding the two countries became
lower.
Table 1-7: Security Threats in History
High External Threats Low External Threats













On the other hand, the other two cases demonstrate differences in terms of
security threats throughout history. The Philippines, for example, benefited from low
security threats during the state-building process (1940s-1960s) with strong security
commitments from the United States. From the late 1960s, however, the Philippines had
to fight domestic insurgency groups such as the Maoist New People’s Army (NPA) and
the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Finally, Indonesia was under
severe domestic security threats from the beginning of the Republic (1940s) up until the
recent years. While security threats came from both domestic and international arenas in
the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the threats were mainly domestic in nature in the
other two cases.
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Second, all the cases display different political dynamics among major domestic
political actors. In terms of the strength of civilian leadership, all four countries were
under strong civilian leadership (either democratic or authoritarian) in the beginning
(1940s-1950s). But South Korea and Indonesia witnessed civilian leadership failure in
the 1960s, while the other two cases retained strong civilian leadership during the same
period. In addition, South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed strong civilian leadership during
the democratization period (1980s-1990s), while the other two suffered from civilian
leadership crisis.
The four cases also exhibit different patterns in terms of cohesiveness of the
military organization. Taiwan, for example, successfully retained its armed forces as a
professionalized and unified organization throughout its history. The Philippines is a
case in which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) maintained its organizational
unity until the 1970s, but suffered from factional struggles during the 1980s and the
1990s. In Indonesia, a difficult task was to create a unified army organization with an
effective and hierarchical command structure. Finally, the South Korean army failed to
build a professionalized and unified institution up until the 1980s. Since then, however,
it has developed the most professionalized and unified organization among the four cases.
The final domestic actor is civil society. Civil society’s role was insignificant in
the early years of state-building. The weakness of civil society groups is related to low
levels of economic development and immature middle-class citizenry. Another reason
for weak civil society is the presence of intimidating security threats and the expansion of
the state-apparatus that dominated the civil society arena. Since the 1980s, however, civil
society groups became influential in South Korea and Taiwan. During the period, newly
45
elected civilian leaders strengthened their political position by garnering supports from
bourgeoning civil society groups. On the contrary, civilian leaders in the Philippines and
Indonesia during the democratization period failed to gain support from civil society
groups. In sum, the domestic political dynamics throughout history are summarized in
Table 1-8.
Table 1-8: Domestic Political Dynamics in History
Strong Civilian Leadership Weak Civilian Leadership













Finally, the four cases demonstrate similarities and differences in terms of the
dependent variable, the military’s domestic political influence. Even though all the
countries had experienced the army officers’ deep engagement in domestic political
process, specific aspects of the engagement were different. The Korean and Indonesian
armed forces staged coups d’etat, deposed civilian leadership, and established military
dictatorships in the 1960s (control). During the same period, however, armed forces in
the Philippines and Taiwan did not attempt to oust civilian leadership but rather were
placed under civilian guidance (participation). In addition, the four countries showed
different forms of military disengagement from politics. South Korea and Taiwan
enjoyed a complete military withdrawal from politics during their democratization years
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(subordination), while the armies in the Philippines and Indonesia still exerted strong
political clout during and after democratization (influence).
While the four cases demonstrate sufficient degrees of similarities and differences
in all major variables, the four countries have gone through the rise and fall of the
military’s domestic political influence in roughly the same time period, thereby making it
easier to control for other contextual influences.
2. Measurement of Variables
1) Dependent Variable: Military’s Domestic Political Influence
The dependent variable is the military’s relative influence in domestic politics. In
this dissertation, I treat the dependent variable as a continuum between two extremes:
from the military’s political domination to its total subordination to civilian leadership.
More specifically, the dependent variable covers a wide range: from military coup and
dictatorship, to a less significant but still important institutional role under the civilian
guidance, to an indirect but significant influence with a veto power in important political
decisions, to a total subordination to democratic civilian leadership. As presented in the
previous section, I classify the military’s political influence into four categories: control,
participation, influence, and subordination.
Table 1-9: Measuring the Dependent Variable
Military Domination Civilian Domination
Control Participation Influence Subordination
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In measuring the armed forces’ domestic political influence, I rely on two major
dimensions of the military’s political role: “scope” and “jurisdiction.”57 Here, scope
refers to the extent to which army officers get involved in domestic politics, that is,
whether the range of their participation in civilian political affairs is widening or
narrowing. At the same time, the dimension of jurisdiction should be considered. The
jurisdiction refers to the military’s power to make certain political decisions. The
military’s political influence is prevalent when its political presence is widespread and
when it possesses broad decision-making authority in civilian political affairs. On the
contrary, the military’s political influence is considered to be narrowing and
inconsequential when its influence is limited within its own institutional matters, i.e.,
protecting the country from outside threats.
More specifically, I examine multiple indicators to measure the military’s
political role, such as (1) the number of active or retired military officers in key
governmental positions including both executive and legislative branches, (2) civilian
leaders’ decision-making authority in important government policies including foreign
and security affairs, (3) the military’s compliance with civilian leaders’ decision on key
security policies and military deployment, and (4) the armed forces’ self-definition of
primary missions, whether externally or internally oriented. Civilian control of the
military involves not only an objective control mechanism by the executive leadership
but also supervision and scrutiny by the legislative body. Therefore, the role of the
57 Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the
Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 32.
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legislative body in important security and military-related policymaking is also an
important indicator of democratic control of the military.58
2) Independent Variable: Security Threats
The primary independent variable in this dissertation is security threats. Security
threats can be either external or internal in origin, either high or low in severity. The
term “threat,” however, is highly elusive and difficult to measure, since it consists not
only of a tangible threatening actor (both state and non-state actors in both domestic and
international arenas), but also of civilian leaders’ or high-ranking military officers’
perception of it. Therefore, the presence of security threats can be a perception created or
manipulated by civilian leaders or the top brass in the military.
To measure security threats, therefore, I examine individual historical records of
international war, small-scale conflict behaviors, and domestic insurgencies and guerrilla
warfare. Furthermore, I examine more specific historical contexts and the qualitative
severity of security threat environments each state was faced with. In investigating the
historical contexts of each state, I also consider key political actors’—both civilian
leaders and the top brass in the army—perception of a threat. More emphasis, however,
will be placed on the factual information about the existence of threats in both domestic
and international arenas. Furthermore, the degree of security threats is dichotomized as
high and low.
58 Andrew Cottey, et al. points out that one of the significant aspects of democratic control of the
military includes “the development of effective systems for parliamentary oversight of civil-
military relations and defense policy.” In Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony
Forester, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military
Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 29: 1 (2002).
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3) Intervening Variable I: Strength of Civilian Leadership
In this study, civilian leadership is portrayed as either strong or weak; either
cohesive or divisive. The strength of civilian leadership can be measured by observing
various indicators such as party systems, party policy or ideological disposition, the
distribution of power among major political actors, the level of legitimacy of civilian
leaders, and the civilian leaders’ capability to overcome domestic resistance. But the
most important factor that determines the strength of civilian leadership is the civilian
leaders’ record of maintaining social, political, and security order, achieving good
economic performance records, and obtaining support from major political actors
including the military, civilian elite circle, and the general public.
Following Huntington and Weiner,59 I assume that multiparty systems in
developing countries tend to create weaker and more divided leadership than two (or one)
party systems. In addition, I take into account each party’s policy position and
ideological orientation. If there is a general consensus on major political issues among
political parties, the state may be considered as having strong leadership even with a
multiparty system. Conversely, if political parties demonstrate drastically different
political positions or if they have a wide spectrum of ideological disposition, the state has
weak and divided leadership even though it may have a two-party system.
Related to the number of political parties and their political-ideological
dispositions is the issue of the distribution of power among major political parties or
political elites. I consider a state to have strong civilian leadership when the distribution
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of political power is skewed toward the ruling party or to one or a small number of
political elites. On the other hand, if political power is equally distributed among several
parties or multiple political elites, the state is assumed to have weak and divided civilian
leadership. Finally, the strength of civilian leadership is also measured by assessing
civilian leaders’ legitimacy, and their capacity to overcome domestic resistance such as
challenges from opposition parties and mass demonstrations.
4) Intervening Variable II: Military’s Organizational Unity
The second intervening variable is the cohesiveness of military organization. A
cohesive army institution is conducive to a professionalized and politically neutral
military, while a military organization with factional struggles is detrimental to military
professionalism and officers’ political neutrality. In this dissertation, I measure the
military’s organizational unity by looking at two major indicators. First, I investigate
whether the armed forces of each country experienced factional struggles throughout
history. More specifically, I look at whether there exist competing groups of officers
with similar backgrounds such as hometown, military education, and economic class.
Also, I survey whether these social groupings have influence in promotion systems in the
army hierarchy. Second, I examine whether there is an effective and hierarchical
command structure in the military organization. A military organization is cohesive
when there is a well-established command structure, while it suffers from organizational
disunity when army officers do not follow the hierarchical command.
59 Huntington, 1968; Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, “The Impact of Parties on
Political Development,” in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner eds., Political Parties and
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5) Intervening Variable III: Strength of Civil Society
In spite of its significance, the role of civil society has been overlooked in major
literature of civil-military relations, especially its role in the military’s political
disengagement during democratization. Here, the concept of civil society is used in a
broad manner. Following Linz and Stepan, I define civil society as an “arena of the
polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous
from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations, and advance their
interests.”60 Civil society groups maintain autonomy from the state’s influence and
effectively articulate their members’ interests. Therefore, civilian groups organized and
supported by civilian political leaders or the military are not considered as civil society.
While admitting that there are numerous civil society groups that represent
diverse interests and voices in the societal arena, I count civil society as a unitary actor
that supports or opposes decisions inside political institutions. This assumption is
relevant especially when there is a prevailing political issue in society, such as the
opposition to military dictatorship and support for pro-democracy movements. The role
of civil society is important especially during the period of democratic regime transition
and democratic consolidation.
In examining the strength of civil society, I use various factual and proxy
indicators for measurement. First of all, I count the number and size of voluntary societal
organizations and, at the same time, how influential and effective these organizations are
Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
60 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996), p. 7; also see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the
Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 3.
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in pushing the military and government to change policies in accordance with their policy
preferences. I also track the records of how many civil society leaders later enter into
major political positions in government. In addition, the level of economic development
(measured by GDP per capita) can be another proxy indicator of the strength of civil
society.
In addition to the strength and effectiveness of civil society, the strategies civil
society actors employ to push government are also important for shaping civil-military
relations. When civil society actors rest on radical and violent practices, the existence of
strong and vibrant civil society itself can contribute to inviting the military into politics.
On the contrary, when civil society adopts nonviolent and moderate strategies, the
military is less likely to intervene in politics. Therefore, I examine how societal groups
decide on to voice their interests and policy preferences, either through violent and
radical measures or nonviolent and moderate strategies.
3. Data and Methods
Because my dissertation compares four Asian countries in a relatively long
historical time frame (about six decades), some level of generalization is required. I rely
mainly on library research, rather than conduct personal interviews due to the number of
cases and language barriers. Instead of focusing on searching for new information about
the relevant cases, I rely on already existing major findings and documentations, and sort
out factors that shaped the military’s domestic political influence across the four cases.
The main objective of my study lies not only in providing broad contextual
knowledge about the four countries, but also constructing a rigorous theory of civil-
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military relations and testing the theory against the cases. Therefore, most of the
information and data come from books, journal articles, periodicals, and government and
military documents. Where available, I also look into several periodicals and journal
articles that are published in Asian countries in their own languages.
In conducting systematic comparisons among the four cases, I use the method of
structured-focused analysis. Structured-focused analysis enables me to sort out, from
numerous causal variables, key factors that have major influence on the dependent
variable. In addition, structured-focused analysis enables me to apply same set of
research questions, variables, and measurements to the four cases under study. This
method allows me to conduct a rigorous empirical test of my theory.61
4. Four Stages of Civil-Military Interactions
To conduct my empirical research, I divide all the cases into four historical stages
based upon the military’s domestic political role: (1) security threats, state-building, and
the ascent of the military as a politically influential organization (1940s-1960s); (2) army
officers’ involvement in politics (1960s-1980s); (3) their withdrawal from politics during
democratization (1980s-1990s); and (4) the armed forces’ domestic political role in the
post-democratization period (1990s-present).
61 For the discussion of the usefulness of the structured-focused analysis, see Timothy J.
McKeown, “Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative Worldview,” in Henry Brady and
David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).
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1) The First Stage: State-Building, Security Threats, and the Military
In the first historical stage, I focus on the routes in which the armed forces turned
into politically influential actors during the state-building process in the 1940s-1950s.
The Indonesian Army (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) was formed in
the midst of waging guerrilla warfare against the Dutch forces. When the Republic
gained formal independence in 1949, it began as a parliamentary democracy, and the
ABRI formally withdrew from politics and was put under the guidance of civilian
leadership. The fragile parliamentary democracy, however, collapsed when the nascent
republic faced mounting internal security threats throughout the 1950s. In 1957,
President Sukarno abolished the flagging parliamentary democracy and declared “Guided
Democracy” and martial law. Guided Democracy concentrated political power in
Sukarno’s hands. The increasingly authoritarian Sukarno regime mobilized ABRI
officers to assume broad political, administrative, and economic missions.
South Korea, meanwhile, was liberated from Japan in 1945 and became an
independent state in 1948 after three years of American military occupation. In the
beginning, the Korean army was small in size and politically neutral. But the Korean
War (1950-1953) and subsequent military confrontation with North Korea quickly
transformed the Korean army into a dominant organization with more than 700,000
soldiers consuming over 50 percent of total governmental expenditures. In addition army
officers became politicized as democratically-elected President Rhee Syngman co-opted
the armed forces to adopt authoritarian measures and suppressed political opposition
movements during the 1950s.
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Similarly, the Philippines had one of the smallest and least politicized armies in
Asia when the country attained formal independence from the United States in 1946.
Increasing domestic insecurity from the late-1960s, however, brought about the
organizational expansion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
dissipation of democracy. President Marcos mobilized AFP officers to strengthen his
power and extend his presidential term beyond the constitutional limit in the midst of
rising Communist New People’s Army (NPA) and Muslim Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) insurgencies during the 1970s.
Finally, the Taiwanese military actively engaged in domestic political and
administrative affairs after the Kuomintang (KMT) government lost its battle with the
Communist forces on mainland China and moved to the Formosa Island in 1949. From
the beginning in Taiwan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT party relied on
the armed forces to maintain external and internal security through martial law. In sum,
each of the four countries was confronted with either external or internal security
challenges during the state-building period (1940s-1950s), which brought about the
creation of authoritarian state apparatus and increasing participation in politics by the
armed forces.
2) The Second Stage: Modes of the Military’s Political Involvement
In the second chronological stage, I compare different paths of political
engagement by the politicized officers, whether through coups and military dictatorships
(control) or the military’s political involvement as a junior partner under civilian
authoritarian control (participation). In South Korea, highly politicized army officers
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under the Rhee presidency in the 1950s staged a military coup d’etat in 1961 and
established dictatorial rule. In a similar context, the Indonesian army became highly
politicized in the 1950s, when President Sukarno declared martial law and brought ABRI
officers into politics. In 1965, General Suharto dethroned Sukarno with a military coup
and created a military dictatorship in Indonesia.
In contrast to the cases of South Korea and Indonesia, where army officers
directly controlled political power, the Philippine and Taiwanese armed forces did not
attempt to overthrow the civilian leadership during the same period. In Taiwan, army
officers were kept under civilian leadership even though they were highly politicized as
Chiang Kai-shek brought them into domestic political, administrative, and economic
affairs. Similarly, AFP officers became deeply engaged in domestic political affairs
when President Marcos declared martial law in 1971 and positioned the officers in key
political positions. In sum, there was military’s direct control of political power in South
Korea and Indonesia, while the Taiwanese and the Philippine armed forces carried out
their political participation under civilian guidance throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
3) The Third Stage: Military Withdrawal and Democratization
In the third historical stage of the military’s political role, I examine the dynamics
of military withdrawal from politics during democratization that occurred in a similar
time-frame (1980s) except for Indonesia (late 1990s). In this historical stage of military
withdrawal, I address different modes of the military’s withdrawal from politics during
democratic regime transition. Democratization in South Korea was set in motion in the
mid-1980s when opposition political leaders and civil society groups pushed the military
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dictator Chun Doo-whan for extensive political reforms. Since then, the democratization
process in South Korea has been stable and far-reaching, and politicized officers
withdrew from politics and were placed under democratically elected civilian leadership
without major resistance. Likewise, democratization in Taiwan during the 1980s and
1990s was accomplished without any backfires from the army leadership. Even with
significant differences in the regime transition between the two states, South Korea and
Taiwan share similarity in terms of the armed forces’ attitudes during their withdrawal
from politics.62
On the other hand, democratization in the Philippines and Indonesia was highly
unstable and the military’s withdrawal from politics was far from complete. In the
Philippines, democratically elected President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) suffered from
leadership crises when segments in the AFP staged at least twelve coup attempts during
her presidential term. In Indonesia, the ABRI, which had formally withdrawn from
politics after Suharto stepped down in 1998, regained its political influence after a couple
of years of democratic trial in the late-1990s and early-2000s. Even though the
Philippines and Indonesia did not fall into military dictatorship, the democratization
process was tarnished by army officers’ recapturing of political influence.
62 One of the major differences between the two cases is that democratization in Taiwan was
initiated and fostered by the political elites, while the process in South Korea was initiated and
forwarded by opposition leaders and civil society groups represented by college students and
labor unions. Democratization in Taiwan was done from above; in South Korea, from below.
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4) The Fourth Stage: Military’s Political Role after Democratization
In the final historical stage of civil-military relations, I explore the armed forces’
political role under the democratically elected civilian leadership. More specifically, I
examine how security threats surrounding each of the four countries affect the military’s
domestic political influence. In this section, I also examine how interactions among
civilian leadership, civil society groups, and the top brass in the military determine the
military’s political role in the post-democratization era. I conclude my empirical study
with some prospects for civil-military relations in the four countries in the near future.
Conclusions
In this chapter, I develop a structural theory of civil-military relations that
identifies security threats as the primary independent variable, three major domestic
actors—civilian leadership, the military, and civil society—as the intervening variables,
and the military’s domestic political role as the dependent variable. In the second half the
chapter, I provide a research design for the empirical test of my theory. The four
empirical cases and their division into four historical stages provide sufficient variations
for the empirical testing.
Some of the limitations of this research should be mentioned. First, since I
construct a structural theory of civil-military relations, micro-level explanations are
largely sacrificed. That is to say, this dissertation does not provide close examination of
key political actors’ preferences and their individual decision-making process. This is
inevitable since this study’s primary purpose is to identify causal factors at the structural
level. In addition, this dissertation does not deliberate my theory’s applicability to other
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cases in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, and Africa. Nevertheless, cross-
regional comparison is possible after a rigorous empirical test is made using the four
Asian cases. Finally, the empirical study of my dissertation relies mostly on secondary
sources and, as such, does not aim to furnish new data.
With these limitations in mind, I conduct the empirical tests of my theory and
hypotheses in the following four chapters.
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Chapter 2. Security Threats, State-Building, and the Military’s
Domestic Political Role
Introduction
In my structural theory of civil-military relations, I suggested that external and
internal security threats affect the military’s relative influence vis-à-vis other sectors in
the domestic political arena. Security threats influence both the army and civilian
leadership. Specifically, the presence of high security threats brings about the expansion
of the military organization to the detriment of other domestic sectors, as a large portion
of domestic resources are shifted to the armed forces. At the same time, high security
threats result in the centralization of political power within one or a small number of
political leaders, usually the head of the executive branch. Unfavorable security threats
of a state provide civilian leaders with structural opportunities and incentives to become
more authoritarian and take coercive measures to rule society. Civilian leaders find it
easier to justify mobilizing the top brass in the military into the political arena to expand
their political power when society faces severe security threats either domestically or
internationally.
This chapter explores the effect of high security threats on the expansion of the
military organization and its political role in the four countries under study—South
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Each of the four states underwent a state-
building process right after World War II and, in this process, faced mounting security
threats with the onset of worldwide Cold War confrontations in the 1940s and 1950s. But
the origin and nature of the security threats were different from country to country. South
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Korea and Taiwan, for example, suffered from severe security threats both domestically
and internationally. Indonesia had difficulty establishing a sovereign statehood due to
socio-political cleavages along religious, ethnic, and geographic constellations. Finally,
the Philippines benefited from favorable security conditions from the time of
independence up until the late 1960s when Maoist communist insurgencies and Muslim
separatist movements posed threats to the state. In sum, South Korea and Taiwan had
high security threats both domestically and internationally, while Indonesia and the
Philippines confronted domestic security challenges.
This chapter is composed of four sections. The first section examines the security
threats and the rise of the Korean army as a politically powerful institution in South
Korea from the late 1940s to the late 1950s. The second section explores the role of the
Taiwanese military during the civil war on the mainland and after the retreat to Formosa
Island in 1949. Section three examines changes in the political role of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), from a politically neutral institution to a highly politicized body
under the Marcos presidency during the 1960s and 1970s. Section four explores the
Indonesian army’s political role in the 1940s and early 1960s. In the conclusion, I
summarize and compare major findings.
I. South Korea
With the end of World War II in 1945, the Korean peninsula was liberated from
35 years of Japanese colonial rule. The peninsula, however, soon became a focal point in
the worldwide military and ideological confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The two superpowers divided the Korean peninsula for temporary military
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occupation along the 38th parallel, since neither wanted it to come under the other’s
influence.63 The allegedly temporary occupation by the two superpowers, however,
resulted in the establishment of two permanent sovereign states in Korea. On August 15,
1948, after general elections for the National Assembly,64 the Republic of Korea (ROK,
South Korea here) was established in the southern part, while the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea here) was declared on September 9, 1948.65 In
South Korea, the National Assembly elected the first president, Rhee Syngman, who was
one of the prominent leaders of the independence movements during the Japanese
colonial rule. President Rhee represented the conservative elements in the society and
was the United States’ favorite due to his staunch anti-communism.
The defense force of South Korea was created under the American occupation
period (1945-1948). During this time, the first military training school was established to
teach English language and basic military skills and help facilitate the operations of the
United States military government in Korea. This Military English Language Institute
was replaced in 1946 by the South Korean National Defense Officers Training Academy,
which, in turn, was reorganized into the Korean Military Academy in 1948.66 In the
63 On September 12, 1945, the United States built the Army Military Government in the southern
part of the peninsula and ruled the territory until the South Korean government was established.
64 The National Assembly elections were held on May 10, 1948. The first National Assembly
wrote the first written Korean Constitution.
65 For detailed information about the formation of the two Koreas, see Sungchul Yang, The
North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Boulder: Westview Press,
1994).
66 For the detailed description of establishment and development of the Korean defense forces
between 1945-1948, see John P. Lovell, “The Military and Politics in Postwar Korea,” in Edward
Reynolds Wright, ed., Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1975), pp. 153-199; Sejin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
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process of establishing the South Korean armed forces, the United States had a great
impact on the country’s military organization, training, and its overall political
orientation. The Korean army was small—around 50,000 men—in August 1948.
Military officers were not involved in politics but remained politically neutral.67 Soon,
however, the Korean army witnessed an unprecedented expansion through the end of the
Korean War in 1953.
From the beginning of the state-building period, South Korea faced severe
security threats, both internally and externally. Soon after the South Korean government
was established, North Korean guerrilla forces began to infiltrate into South Korean
territory, organizing and supporting pro-Communist guerrillas and violent uprisings by
impoverished citizenry in major cities and peasants in the rural area.68 In October 1948,
for instance, a South Korean Constabulary regiment, indoctrinated by communist
ideology, revolted against the government and occupied the cities of Yosu and Sunchon,
located in the south-western part of the Korean peninsula. Although the Korean army put
down the insurrection, hundreds of guerrilla forces escaped into the mountains to
continue waging guerrilla warfare. In November of the same year, another revolt by a
constabulary force took place in Taegu city, the south-eastern part of Korea. Here, too,
the insurrections by the Korean Constabulary forces were quickly suppressed by the
67 The Constitution prohibited active military personnel from assuming the prime minister or
minister positions in the government.
68 Even before the inauguration of the First Republic in South Korea in August, 1948, pro-
communist guerrilla forces were organized in South Korea. One of the most significant incidents
was Cheju uprising, in which communist guerrillas swept police stations and government
buildings. The South Korean constabulary forces put down the rebels. By the end of the
incident, about 60,000 people, or one-fifth of the total population in Cheju Island, were killed.
Oh, 1999, pp. 34-36.; John Merrill, “The Cheju-do Rebellion,” Journal of Korean Studies (1980).
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military units, but the incident revealed that guerrilla forces from North Korea were
already infiltrating into South Korean territory before the Korean War broke out in 1950.
Immediately after these domestic insurrections, the National Assembly hurriedly
introduced the National Security Law on December 1, 1948, and passed the law two
months later. Article 1 of the law stated that the law warrants “the national security and
interests” from the “enemy” of the state.69 The enemy was defined in Article 5 as “any
association, groups or organizations” that plotted against the state. The law was at first
applied against the South Korean Labor Party and other pro-Communist groups. Later,
however, the law was used by Rhee Syngman to suppress any political activities against
his rule, including opposition political leaders, religious organizations, labor unions,
student movements, and newspapers. In sum, from the beginning of the Republic of
Korea, a series of domestic rebellions provided President Rhee with structural
opportunities and incentives to become increasingly authoritarian and take coercive
measures to cope with those security challenges.
In addition to increasing domestic guerrilla insurgencies, two international events
in East Asia further exacerbated security environments in the nascent Republic. First,
Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang government lost the civil war with the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Victorious Mao Tse-tung and
the CCP proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. The Rhee
government felt a great threat from the rising Communists on the mainland. Second, the
United States National Security Council made a decision to withdraw U.S. troops from
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South Korea in April 1948. By June 1949, the United States pulled out its armed forces
almost completely from South Korea, except for the Provisional Military Advisory Group
to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) with around 500 personnel.70 The withdrawal of the
American military forces, coupled with Chinese communization, served to deteriorate
South Korea’s security environment significantly.
It was the Korean War, however, that brought tremendous changes to the
organization of the armed forces and its domestic political role. As early as 1949, both
Koreas were launching attacks and counterattacks along the 38th parallel. With the
approval from Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung and with all the American forces already
withdrawn from the South,71 North Korean forces embarked on a massive attack upon
South Korea on June 25, 1950. Even though the Korean army already numbered slightly
over 100,000 at war’s outbreak, they were so unprepared to fight that North Korean
forces occupied Seoul, the capital city, within just three days.72
The Korean War lasted for three years and ended with no winning side but rather
an agreement on an armistice. Korean society made tremendous sacrifices during the
three years of war. The total number of deaths during the war added up to three million,
69 Secretariat, House of Representatives, Republic of Korea, The National Security Law
(December 1, 1948); also see Won-sun Pak, Kukka Poanbop Yongu (The Study of the National
Security Law), Vol. 2 (Seoul: Yoksa Bipyongsa, 1992), pp. 15-16.
70 The United Nations Document, A/936, Add. I, Vol. II, Annexes, p. 36.
71 Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s January 1950 speech signified the United States’ defensive
perimeter in Asia as a containment policy. South Korea and Taiwan were excluded in this
containment line, which gave Joseph Stalin a signal that the Korean peninsula was not
strategically important for the United States. Acheson’s defensive perimeter led Stalin to give
permission to the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung to liberate South Korea. Dean Acheson,
Speech on the Far East (January 12, 1950).
72 When the Korean War began, Korean military forces numbered slightly over 100,000 but most
of them were poorly trained and equipped.
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equal to 10 percent of the total population of the two Koreas.73 The war formally ended
with the armistice agreement between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the
Communists on July 27, 1953. Although the armistice agreement did bring a precarious
peace to the peninsula, it also aggravated the military and ideological confrontation
between the two Koreas.
The Korean War made a major impact on the military organization and political
settings in South Korea. First of all, it caused a massive expansion of the military
organization.
Table 2-1: Expansion of Military Forces in South Korea, 1947 – 195474
Year 1947 1948 1949 1950 1953 1954
Number of
Military Forces
12.0 50.0 64.0 113.0 650.0 620.0
a) Numbers in thousands.
b) Police forces not included.
As Table 2-1 shows, during the time of state-building in 1948, the South Korean defense
forces numbered around 50,000 men. Even at the beginning of the war, this number
amounted to a little over 100,000 of poorly-equipped and trained forces.75 The war,
73 Specifically, almost three hundred thousands of military forces were killed in the war (South
Korean forces: 227,000; armed forces under the command of the United Nations: 58,000). The
North Korean side suffered loss of 500,000 military forces (North Korean forces: 300,000;
People’s Liberation Army: 200,000). For more detailed information, see Kenneth G. Clare, et al.,
Area Handbook for the Republic of Korea (Washington DC: GPO, 1969), pp. 300-301.
74 Hochul Sohn, “Hanguk Jeonjaeng-gua Ideology Ji-hyung (The Korean War and the
Ideological Terrain),” Hanguk-gua Gukje-Jeong-chi (Korea and International Politics) 6: 2
(1990), p. 22; Myunglim Park, “Hanguk-eui Gukga-Hyungsung, 1945-1948 (State-building in
Korea),” Korean Political Science Review 29: 1 (1995), p. 220.
75 Even though South Korea had 100,000 military personnel, only about 65,000 men were
equipped with guns, but without any tanks and planes. In contrast, North Korean armed forces
67
however, drove the country toward total mobilization of domestic resources for the
military buildup. At the end of the conflict, South Korea came to have almost 700,000 of
heavily-armed forces. The Korean army became the best-organized state institution,
consuming almost one-half of total governmental expenditures as Table 2-2 indicates.
The war fostered the preoccupation of military officers and the general public
with a strong conservative and anti-communist ideology. These ideological settings
allowed the military’s coup d’etat in 1961, as the country was suffering from political and
social turmoil right after President Rhee was forced to resign.
Table 2-2: Composition of Government Expenditure (%)76



































During the massive military build-up process, the United States became the most
crucial supporter and builder of the South Korean army. Before the outbreak of the
numbered 150,000 trained by Soviet military advisors and equipped with about 240 Soviet-made
tanks, more than 200 planes, and other heavy equipment from the Soviet Union. See, Robert T.
Oliver, Why War Came in Korea (New York: Fordham University Press, 1950), pp. 1-22.;
Young-Ho Lee, “The Politics of Democratic Experiment: 1948-1974,” in Edward R. Wright ed.,
Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), pp. 19-21.
76 The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1962, pp. 24-5; Yong-Pyo Hong, State
Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South
Korea, 1953-60 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 110.
68
Korean War, the Korean peninsula had little strategic interest for America in East Asia.77
The war, however, pushed the United States to consider the peninsula vital for the
American security strategy. Right after the armistice agreement on October 1, 1953,
South Korea and the United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in Washington D.C.
From then on, the United States became the country’s major patron. American military
assistance to South Korean amounted to nearly $6 billion from 1950 to 1979, which was
equivalent to almost 80 percent of Korean defense spending and 10 percent of the Gross
National Product (GNP) in South Korea in the given period.78
In addition to the organizational expansion of the armed forces, three years of war
left President Rhee Syngman an almost omnipotent figure in Korean politics. During the
war, Rhee strengthened his political position and centralized political power; in all these
efforts, the military was used by the president for his political purposes.
In centralizing political power, the Rhee regime actively exploited the communist
threat from North Korea and anti-communist ideology during and after the war, satisfying
two political purposes. First, internationally, his staunch anti-communist position helped
obtain continuous American military and economic support. The United States needed a
prominent political leader who had the experience of fighting for independence from
Japanese colonial rule and therefore had a high regard among the general public. At the
same time, the leader was supposed to have a strong anticommunist ideology. President
Rhee satisfied all these qualifications. Therefore, President Rhee gained continuous
support from the United States even when he became an authoritarian leader in South
77 See, U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin (January 23, 1950), p. 115.
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Korea. Second, domestically, the threat perception and antagonism against communist
North Korea served as the unifying force of the general public and the military, and
became a justification for the centralization of political power in his hands. In other
words, the continuous threat from the North created the so-called ‘rally effect’ among the
general public, who showed little antipathy to the increasingly authoritarian regime.
The first stage in the process of strengthening Rhee’s power came during the 1952
presidential election, when the regime attempted to revise the Constitution to make the
president elected through popular referendum, not by the National Assembly vote. Rhee
tried to revise the Constitution for popular election because he did not have a broad
support base within the National Assembly and within his own political party. Having a
hostile relationship with the Assembly, he was certain to fail in the presidential election.79
When the bill for constitutional amendment was proposed, it was overwhelmingly
rejected in the National Assembly.80 Afterwards, President Rhee mobilized the general
public for anti-National Assembly demonstrations and adopted other various tactics to
intimidate the opposition Assemblymen.
After his failure to amend the constitution to create a popular presidential
election, Rhee turned to more heavy-handed tactics against the opposition Assemblymen.
On May 15, 1952, he declared martial law in the Busan area, the temporary capital during
78 Sung-joo Han, “South Korea and the United States: The Alliance Survives,” Asian Survey 20:
11 (November, 1980), p. 1076.
79 President Rhee had hostile relationship with National Assembly from the beginning of the
First Republic in 1948 due to the differences in the formation of government. A dominant
number of Assembly men favored a cabinet political system, while Rhee pursued a strong
presidential power.
80 143 of the votes were against the constitutional amendment, while only 19 voted in favor of
the amendment.
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the war, claiming that communist guerrillas penetrated the area. He used the military
police to arrest 50 assemblymen for allegedly receiving political bribes from the
communist groups. With the military and the police encircling the Assembly building,
President Rhee successfully forced the National Assembly to pass the constitutional
amendment. With a new constitution, Rhee was elected as president for the second time
in the August 1952 presidential election, winning about five million votes (74% of total
votes). He kept hold of his presidency by using the military to suppress opposition
political leaders, going so far as to move two army divisions to the Busan area even in a
time of war. Worse yet, the constitutional amendment set a precedent for succeeding
political leaders to revise the constitution based on political expediency.
The forced constitutional amendment in 1952 created tensions between President
Rhee and the top brass in the military, as a number of high-ranking officers opposed
mobilizing the army for his political ambitions. The military leadership was divided over
the issue of the army’s political role. One group of officers, led by General Lee Jong-
chan, wanted the armed forces to maintain political neutrality. They opposed the
politicization of the officer corps and Rhee’s use of the military. Another group of
officers, including Park Jung-hee, yearned for a deeper political involvement to
overthrow corrupt civilian political leadership and establish military-led government.
One thing in common of the two groups, however, was that they came to express their
own political attitudes. The growing political activism among younger officers was
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eventually manifested as a coup d’etat in 1961 when the civilian leadership lost political
control.81
In the face of more politically active military officers, President Rhee felt he
needed to build a mechanism to control the military leadership. In doing this, he relied
on his personal charisma and political skill of manipulating factions within the military.
Rhee spent 30 years in exile in the United States during Japanese rule and became the
first president of the Korean Provisional Government in exile.82 He was respected both
by the general public and by many military officers for his leadership for the
independence movement. Rhee was the only strong man in civilian political leadership
and had charisma enough to control high-ranking officers.
In addition, Rhee strengthened his authority over the military by circulating key
positions within the army to secure his personal control. He removed uncooperative
officers such as General Lee Jong-chan and General Choi Kyong-rok from the army
leadership and instead placed personally loyal officers in key military positions.
Moreover, he created a new military police unit within the Department of Defense in
81 Even before the May 1961 coup d’etat, a group of young military officers led by Park Jung-
hee committed failed coup attempts. The first coup attempt took place on November 20, 1959,
but failed as Park’s position was moved to commander of the logistics base. Another coup was
planned in 1960, but was postponed as president Rhee was dethroned as a result of student
revolution in April, 1960. See, Yong-won Han, “Gunbuui Jedojok Sungjanggua Jeongchijuk
HaengdongJuui (The rise of the military institution and its political activism),” in Bae-ho Han,
ed., Hanguk Hyondae Jungchi Ron I (Modern Korean Politics I) (Seoul: Orum, 2000), p. 289-
292.
82 In addition, he had highly-regarded educational background, with Masters Degree at Harvard
and Doctoral degree in International Law at Princeton University.
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order to oversee not only the entire armed forces but also civilian politicians.83 All the
key positions within the military were determined by Rhee’s political considerations.
Most importantly, Rhee astutely exploited the factional struggles within the armed
forces. From the beginning of the Republic, there were several distinctive groups within
the military: (1) Chinese-origin officers who fought the Japanese army on mainland
China and Manchuria, either as part of the Chinese Nationalist army or as independent
guerrilla forces; (2) Japanese-origin officers who joined the Japanese Imperial Army
during World War II; (3) Manchurian-origin officers from the Manchurian Defense Force
under Japanese influence; and (4) North Korean-origin officers who escaped from North
Korea before and during the Korean War.84
In the beginning of the Republic, Rhee depended mainly on Chinese-origin
officers until they were overwhelmed by the Japanese- and Manchuria-origin soldiers.
The Chinese faction had strong political ties with Kim Koo, a prominent political leader
who had trained the Chinese-origin military officers during the independence war against
Japan.85 The faction of Chinese-origin officers, however, lost its power-base when Kim
was assassinated. The next faction that Rhee chose was the officers with a Japanese
background. There were two reasons that Rhee relied on the Japanese faction: first, to
have a better image of a well-trained and equipped Korean Army; second, to balance the
83South Korea, History of the Department of National Defense (Seoul: Sungkwang-sa, 1956), p.
373.
84 Se-Jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina, 1971), pp. 40-63.
85 Kim Koo was one of the most prominent political leaders for the anti-Japanese rule in Korea.
He organized and trained Korean soldiers in mainland China to fight the Japanese forces. Kim,
however, was assassinated during the early years of the state-building period in South Korea.
With Kim’s death, the officers of the Chinese origin also lost their political influence.
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once-dominant Chinese faction.86 The experiences of the 1952 political crisis in the
constitutional amendment process and martial law led Rhee to select the third military
faction, the officers with Manchurian background. Along with the Japanese-origin
officers, the Manchurian-origin officers brought to Korean politics values quite contrary
to democracy. These officers with Japanese and Manchurian background brought into
Korean politics the military’s political activism that had been cultivated in the Japanese
army during the two world wars.
Rhee’s control and mobilization of the military officers for his personal purposes
had been so successful that he never lost his personal control over the military leadership
until the last moment of his presidency. With his increasingly authoritarian and coercive
political tactics, however, he isolated himself from the general public and many military
officers. In addition to the constitutional amendment in 1952 for popular presidential
election, Rhee proposed another amendment bill to the National Assembly on September
6, 1954, which aimed to abolish the two-term restriction on presidential tenure for the
first president of South Korea. This amendment would, in effect, enable a president to
hold office for life. This bill was passed in the National Assembly on November 29,
1954. Such undemocratic practices by the Rhee government, however, eventually eroded
his political legitimacy.
In addition to the Rhee regime’s undemocratic practices and the use of military
officers for his personal purposes, the economic situation had a negative impact on his
86 The Japanese-origin faction within the Korean Army had tremendous impact on Korean
politics mainly due to the fact that the office group brought to Korea the Japanese Army’s
political orientation during World War II. The 1961 coup d’etat was carried out by young
military officers who had the Japanese military background.
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political position. Following the end of the war, the South Korean economy showed no
indication of significant improvement. After 1953, North Korea boasted an incredible
record of economic recovery. By 1960, national income in North Korea reached 680
percent of the 1946 level, while gross industrial output increased 2,100 percent for the
same period.87 Even though it is difficult to accept North Korean economic indicators at
face value, it was undeniable that North Korea surpassed South Korea in terms of
economic performance and military buildup.
Table 2-3: Average Growth Rate in Two Koreas, 1953-6088







In contrast to North Korea, South Korea showed few signs of economic recovery.
Even with a large amount of economic assistance from the United States throughout the
1950s, the South lagged far behind mainly due to the lack of viable economic plans and
rampant political corruption. The GNP growth rate in South Korea was 5.2 percent in
1954; 4.0 percent in 1955; and 0.3 percent in 1956, while the inflation rate was 26.4,
51.0, and 42.9 percent for the same years. Rhee’s failure to implement a sound economic
recovery plan significantly weakened his legitimacy among the general public.
87 Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea carried out two economic plans to be
accomplished by 1960. In the first plan period (the Three Year Plan, 1954-56), North Korea had
a 220 percent increase in national income and 280 percent increase in gross industrial product.
During the second plan period (the Five Year Plan, 1956-60), national income increased 210
percent and gross industrial product by 340 percent. See, Joseph S. Chung, “North Korea’s
Seven Year Plan (1961-1970): Economic Performance and Reforms,” Asian Survey 12: 6 (1972).
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To make matters worse, Rhee’s main political base, the Liberal Party (LP), split
between hardliners and softliners during the late 1950s. The softliners tried to recover
western-style democracy and pursued more moderate measures for the political
opposition, while the hardliners wanted to use more heavy-handed approaches to
suppress the politically active general public, especially student demonstrations against
the Rhee regime. But the decisive factor that ousted Rhee was the military’s decision not
to follow Rhee regime’s order to put down student demonstrations. By this time, the
military as an institution had already risen as a veto power against the civilian leadership.
In Chapter Three, I discuss the process of President Rhee’s ouster, subsequent political
turmoil in the Second Republic, and the military coup d’etat in 1961.
II. Taiwan
The Republic of China was established with the overthrow of the Manchu
Dynasty in 1911. Afterwards, the first Chinese republic with modern statehood had to
deal with severe internal and external security threats until it retreated to Formosa Island
in 1949. Internally, the central government did not gain control over its territory, as
influential warlords ruled most of the provinces of mainland China. According to one
estimate, there existed more than 1,300 warlords and 140 regional military uprisings
during the early decades of the republic.89 In addition, the nationalist Kuomintang
(KMT) government had to fight a Communist revolt throughout the 1930s and the 1940s.
88 Pong Lee, “An Estimate of North Korea’s National Income,” Asian Survey 12: 6 (June 1972),
pp. 518-526.; The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (Seoul: The Bank of Korea,
1962), p. 12.
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To make matters worse, the Japanese invasion of mainland China in 1937 in effect placed
the country under total anarchy. While facing these extreme internal and external threats,
the army of the Republic of China played a decisive role in the political and nation-
building processes, not only on the mainland but also after the retreat to Formosa Island.
Senior officers in the army became increasingly influential actors in domestic politics as
the country struggled with mounting external and internal security threats.
Since the inception of the republic, the KMT government had to wage multi-front
warfare. In addition to fighting burgeoning provincial warlords in the 1920s and the
Japanese military in the 1930s and 1940s, the KMT government also had to wage a long
battle with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on
the mainland until its retreat to Taiwan in 1949.90 When the KMT withdrew to Taiwan,
nearly 600,000 soldiers and 600,000 civilian refugees also moved to the island.
The end of civil war between the KMT and the CCP in 1949 did not resolve the
internal battles between the two Chinese governments, but became even more intense
after two sovereign states were established in Taipei and Peking. The KMT government
had to be concerned about constant internal and external threats and also its regime
survival. Internally, it had to deal with the pressure from native Taiwanese who were not
cooperative but preferred independence rather than incorporation into a nationalist China.
The native Taiwanese perceived the arrival of the Kuomintang government and its rule as
another form of colonialism by another external authority, as Japan had done for
89 Hung-mao Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China: 1927-1937 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 9.
90 The Chinese Communist Party was formally established in 1921 and, later, the Party set up its
own army, the Red Army, in 1927.
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decades.91 The mainland Chinese, an ethnic minority, monopolized key positions in
political, economic, and military arenas. Externally, the KMT had to cope with the
increasing threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the PLA as the latter
pledged to liberate the island and truly end the civil war.
When Japan was defeated in the Pacific War in 1945, Formosa Island came under
Chinese rule.92 During September and October of 1945, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched the
KMT officials and the armed forces to the island to replace the Japanese occupation
forces and establish the Chinese governmental authority. The KMT government
appointed General Chen Yi as the chief administrator of the Taiwan Provincial Executive
Office and, at the same time, he became Taiwan Garrison Commander.93 General Chen
was entrusted with extensive powers over the areas of civil administration, judicial
authority, and military command. The Chen administration showed little respect for the
native Taiwanese or their living conditions that had seriously deteriorated during the
Japanese occupation. Even though provincial and local elections were held in 1946, the
ethnic Taiwanese did not have any decision-making power over important political
issues, and virtually all the important posts were monopolized by the mainland Chinese.
91 Taiwan had three major subethnic groups: (1) about 166,000 aborigines (non-Chinese); (2)
Taiwanese Chinese who migrated during the Ming Dynasty in the 17th century; and (3) mainland
Chinese who arrived to the island around 1949 along with the KMT government. As of the
1940s, mainland Chinese consisted of about 12-15 percent of total population in Taiwan. For
Taiwan’s ethnic distribution, see, John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990).
92 In 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek issued a joint declaration that Taiwan and
its surrounding islands were to be placed under China. Later, this declaration was confirmed in
1945 at Potsdam. The KMT forces captured the island in October 1945.
93 Monte R. Bullard, The Soldiers and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan’s
Development (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 76.
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The corrupt and incompetent Chen administration adopted heavy-handed
approaches to governing the island, which provoked demonstrations for self-government
by the Taiwanese natives. On February 28, 1947, they revolted against Chen’s rule. A
series of violent conflicts between ethnic Taiwanese and the KMT authority began when
General Chen Yi decided to nationalize businesses on the island. The uprising escalated
into even more violent riots against the KMT armed forces. In response, Chen Yi
declared martial law and brutally put down the revolt. It is estimated that more than
60,000 people participated and, according to an official figure, more than 6,000 were
killed in the uprising.94
Chiang Kai-shek initially defended General Chen Yi and charged that the Chinese
Communist Party and the Taiwanese natives trained by the Japanese army were behind
the riots. Shortly after the February 28th Uprising, General Chen stepped down as chief
administrator, and civilian administrators were sent to placate the enraged Taiwanese.
However, the incident left a deep schism between the native Taiwanese and the mainland
Chinese for decades. This ethnic tension continued to become a major source of
domestic instability as most of the key positions in the party, government, and the
military continued to be monopolized by the mainlanders. Of 10 KMT Central Standing
Committee members, for example, there was no member of Taiwanese origin throughout
the 1950s and 1960s. There were only two Taiwanese out of 21 in CSC membership in
94 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston: Riverside Press, 1965); Peter R. Moody,
Political Change on Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability (New York: Praeger, 1992).
Some records indicate that more than 10,000 Taiwanese were killed in the February 28th Uprising.
See Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (New York: M. E.
Sharpe, 1994).
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1970 as summarily noted in Table 2-4.95 The situation in the legislative bodies was
similar to the executive branch. Both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan,
which had been originally elected in 1947 on the mainland, were dominated by the
mainlanders.96 After 1949, elections for both bodies were temporarily brought to a halt
since they were assumed to represent not only Taiwan but also the entire territory of the
mainland. The KMT government never imagined that it would stay in Taiwan forever
but anticipated retaking the mainland territory by force in the near future.
Table 2-4: Taiwanese in the KMT Central Standing Committee, 1952-197097









The monopoly of key positions by ethnic Chinese was also conspicuous in the
KMT military institution. As Table 2-5 points out, ethnic Taiwanese constituted a
majority at the private soldier level. But the higher-ranking positions were dominated by
the Chinese mainlanders. Mainlanders monopolized all the leadership positions in the
95 Hung-mao Tien, “The Transformation of an Authoritarian Party-State: Taiwan’s
Developmental Experiences,” Issues and Studies 25: 7 (July 1989), p. 116.
96 In addition to the National Assembly that has constitutional authority to elect the president, the
Taiwanese political system consists of five governmental branches (Yuan): (1) Legislative Yuan
that passes laws (The membership of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were
frozen until the KMT government retake the mainland China and hold new elections in all the
provinces of China); (2) Executive Yuan that, headed by the President, holds the power to
execute laws; (3) Judicial Yuan that is the highest court; and (5) Control Yuan that is responsible
for evaluating the public officials; and (5) Examination Yuan that administers the recruitment and
selection of civil servants. Gary M. Davidson, A Short History of Taiwan: The Case for
Independence (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp. 83-85.
97 Hung-mao Tien, “Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan,” in Harvey Feldman,
Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., Taiwan in a Time of Transition (New York:
Paragon House, 1988), pp. 12-14.
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army until the 1970s when Chiang Ching-kuo assumed political leadership and embarked
on slow but steady Taiwanization in civilian politics and in the military leadership.
Table 2-5: Ethnic Composition of the Military, 1950-198798





































Some Taiwanese activists who opposed KMT rule went abroad to form
organizations for Taiwan’s independence. While such groups were established in Japan
and the United States from the 1940s until 1980s, their influence on the Taiwanese
people was minimal due to the Chiang regime’s harsh punishment on any discussion over
the issue of Taiwan independence.99 The February 28 Uprising and the ensuing ethnic
tensions between ethnic Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders became major sources of
internal instability and threats for the legitimacy of the KMT rule throughout the 1950s.
An even more serious security challenge for the KMT government, however, was
external, that is, the Mao’s Chinese Communist Party and its People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). On October 1, 1949, the CCP proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
98 Tien, 1988, p. 14.
99 One example of punishments by the KMT was that of professor Peng Ming-min, a well-known
political science professor at the National Taiwan University, who advocated the Taiwanese
independence. Peng was sentenced 8 years in prison, but later was released due to international
pressure. He moved to the United States to continue Taiwan’s independence movement. In
1993, he returned to Taiwan to become a candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
for the 1996 presidential election. See, Ming-min Peng, A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a
Formosan Independence Leader (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1972).
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on the mainland, with Peking as its capital. The KMT government not only lost the
mainland territory, but also faced the imminent attack by PLA forces without any
external support. Right after the KMT retreated to Taiwan, Chinese communists wanted
to finish the civil war and prepared to “liberate” the island. The Third Field Army of the
PLA planned for an amphibious attack. PLA forces preparing for the invasion were
reported to have numbered more than 300,000. U.S. intelligence estimated that the PLA
had organized enough troops and vessels to launch an invasion across the Taiwan Straits.
The KMT government estimated the total number of PLA troops to be 585,000.100 The
CCP expected Taiwan to be liberated by 1950.
In such a difficult situation, the United States tried to distance itself from Chiang
Kai-shek and the KMT government. From a strategic point of view, Washington was not
concerned with whether Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Tse-tung would rule China; the U.S.
simply wanted a strong and stable government that could check Japanese military
expansionism in East Asia. When Chiang Kai-shek lost China, the Truman
administration modified its previous China policy by terminating its security commitment
to the Nationalist Chiang government and accepting the new political reality on the
mainland. In August 1949, the United States was ready to develop a cooperative
relationship with the CCP if the Communists terminated their relationship with the Soviet
Union.101 In reality, the Truman administration thought Mao Tse-tung “might well turn
100 Jon W. Huebner, “The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 110 (1987), p.
272.
101 Chiao C. Hsieh, Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations of the
Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949-1979 (London: The Sherwood Press, 1985), p. 81.
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out to be the ‘Asian Tito’.”102 So, the powerful pro-KMT China Lobby in the U.S.
Congress did not improve security conditions for Taiwan. As a result, without support
from the United States, the KMT government fully expected that PLA forces would
attack in the Spring of 1950.
It was the Korean War, however, that changed U.S. security policy toward
Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy for mainland China. The outbreak of war in June
1950 dramatically changed the American perception of Chinese Communists and their
political aims.103 In addition, the war significantly changed the United States’ strategic
interest in Taiwan and in the overall security of East Asia and the Pacific regions. The
U.S. Joint Chief of Staff recommended resuming military assistance to the KMT
government, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet was dispatched to the Taiwan Strait. The U.S.
Congress also authorized the setting up of a U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory
Group for the KMT government. In 1954, the United States and Taiwan signed the
Mutual Defense Treaty, and Washington poured massive military and economic aid into
the country. Under the Defense Treaty, the U.S. assisted the KMT government to
modernize its weapons, equipment, and training. Likewise, the Korean War changed the
American perception on Mao’s communist forces and the strategic interest of Taiwan.
102 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), p.
37.
103 The People’s Liberation Army was engaged in the Korean War in October 1950 under the
slogan of “Resist America and aid Korea.” In addition to the Korean War, the Sino (PRC)-Soviet
Pact, signed in February 1950, also influenced the U.S. perception on the Communist China.
With the signing of the Pact, the Soviet Union returned Soviet-held properties in Manchuria and
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Table 2-6: U. S. Economic and Military Assistance, 1949 – 1962 (in U.S. $ million)104
1949-1952 1953-1956 1957-1960
Economic Aid 467.8 431.6 421.0
Military Aid 48.0 1007.3 713.1
Total 515.8 1438.9 1134.1
a) Numbers include Grants and Loans
The Korean War had the effect of diverting the Chinese Communists’ attention
away from Formosa Island for some time. Meanwhile, the war provided Chiang’s KMT
government with a window of opportunity to retake the mainland. Therefore, with the
outbreak of the Korean War and with help from the United States, Chiang Kai-shek
developed a strategy of counter-attack against the Communist China to recover the
mainland, the essential foreign policy goal of the KMT government throughout the Cold
War years. Chiang Kai-shek always believed that the retreat to Taiwan was not
permanent but a temporary stay. The KMT government deployed its forces closer to the
south-eastern part of PRC. Military bases with about 100,000 troops were installed on
the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, the off-shore islands of the mainland. Furthermore,
the KMT launched commando raids and reconnaissance flights over the mainland
Chinese territory. They carried out bombing campaigns on south of the Changjiang
(Yangtze River), including Shanghai, the most populated city in the south-eastern part of
the mainland. Throughout January and February of 1950, the KMT forces dropped some
promised a $300 million loan to CCP. See, Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs
(London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 43-64.
104 David W. Chang, “U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan,” Asian Survey 5: 3 (1965),
pp. 152-160.
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40,000 pounds of bombshells on Shanghai, killing about 1,400 people and causing heavy
property damage.105
The KMT government also employed guerrilla warfare tactics in the mainland
during the Korean War. Chiang Kai-shek’s government estimated that as of June 1950,
there were about 400,000 anti-communist forces fighting on the mainland. In August of
the same year, the number increased up to 1,600,000, of which over 55 percent were
under the KMT command.106 It was estimated that there were 1,800 battles on the
mainland, resulting in 300,000 CCP/PLA casualties.107 Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy of
guerrilla warfare to retake the mainland, however, was not successful because the United
States did not want the two Chinese forces to enter into another full-blown war and
because the guerrilla warfare faded away with the violent crises in Quemoy.
After the end of the Korean War, Communist China redirected its military forces
and adopted more aggressive policies toward the KMT on Taiwan. Between 1954 and
1958, the PLA bombed the islands of Quemoy and Matsu where the KMT military bases
had been built. During the first Quemoy crisis in 1954, the PLA fired 17,243 rounds of
shells on the islands as a form of military demonstration against the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the KMT and the United States.108 In the second Quemoy crisis that
broke on August 23, 1958, PLA forces launched an even heavier attack. Under such an
extreme security crisis situation, the KMT government stepped up its military build-up
105 Huebner, 1987, p. 261.
106 Hollington K. Tong, Chiang Kai-shek (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1953), p. 522.
107 Hsieh, 1985, pp. 91-92.
108 The China Yearbook (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1979), p. 88.
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from 500,000 men to 1,000,000 by 1958.109 For both the KMT on Taiwan and CCP on
the mainland, the 1950s was a decade of the most severe security threat environments,
with both entities on the verge of entering into full-scale warfare.
In such a daunting security situation, virtually all the political powers were
concentrated in Chiang Kai-shek’s hands and the military was mobilized by Chiang for
his political purposes. His political authority had already been built up before the
Nationalist forces moved to Taiwan. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of
China and the founder of the KMT, died in 1925, and Chiang Kai-shek was elected to the
presidency three years later. In 1938, he became the Director-General of the KMT.
During the intervening decade, Chiang’s political power within the party was firmly
established through his control of the Whampoa Military Academy. Sun Yat-sen sent
Chiang to Russia to study the organization of the Soviet Army and the Bolshevik party
organization. Under the guidance of the Soviet military advisors, the Whampoa Military
Academy was established in Canton and Chiang Kai-shek was appointed as the first
superintendent of the Academy. Chiang’s connection with the Military Academy was
crucial for him to have firm control over the KMT government, when political fights
within the party took place right after Sun Yat-sen’s death.110
Chiang Kai-shek consolidated his political leadership within the KMT by
manipulating cliques within the party, the military and the business sector. There were
109 For more detailed records on the Quemoy and Matsu crises, see, Tsou Tang, The
Embroilment over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles (Salt Lake: University of Utah Press,
1959).
110 After Sun Yat-sen died the KMT party split along with three powerful figures, Chiang Kai-
shek, Hu Han-min and Wang Ching Wei. Chiang was the most influential figure because he had
control over the party army. Hu died in 1936, Wang in 1944. See, Hsieh, 1985, p. 17.
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four major cliques in the party: the C.C. Clique, the Whampoa Clique, the Blueshirts, and
the Political Study Clique that had dominated the KMT party politics from the 1920s.
Among them, the Whampoa Clique served as Chiang’s military power base, as it was
made up of the graduates of the military academy that Chiang was instrumental in
founding. Chiang’s influence further increased as members of the Whampoa Clique
moved up the ladders of the military and party hierarchies.111
As Chiang consolidated his leadership within the KMT during the 1920s and
1930s, the military became his most important political asset, since it had become more
and more important in the governmental policy-making process. Senior army officers’
influence within the KMT government had grown in the course of fighting against the
warlords,112 the Communists, and later the Japanese Army. Already in 1929, the military
presence within the KMT was overwhelming as they held 280,000 memberships, while
civilian membership totaled only 266,000.113 The army’s influence in the KMT party
also rose as Mao’s communist forces embarked on armed struggles with the KMT and as
Japanese forces invaded the mainland.
The Army’s political and social role further increased after the retreat to Taiwan.
With the presence of serious internal and external security threats, the KMT government
put key constitutional elements on hold with the declaration of martial law on May 20,
1949, which gave the military the right to intervene in the social and political arenas.
111 Keith Maguire, The Rise of Modern Taiwan (Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 19-21.
112 When the Nationalist Army was anchored in the province of Guangdong, they had to face
three major warlord groups: the Zhil faction, the Fengtien forces, and the Gouminjun. Even
though the KMT forces defeated the warlords, the KMT’s control was still limited to the
country’s south and south-eastern parts.
87
Furthermore, through the emergency legislation in 1950, the KMT government created
the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) within the Ministry of National Defense to
implement all aspects of martial law and maintain domestic security order.
Under martial law, political activists critical of the KMT regime and Chiang Kai-
shek were tried and sentenced by military tribunals, along with those who committed
criminal offenses. Between 1950 and 1986, about 10,000 criminal cases involving
civilians were tried in Taiwanese military courts.114 In addition, Military Training
Offices were established in schools at all levels, including universities, to carry out
military education and political studies to build support for the KMT rule. Furthermore,
the army built its own network of newspapers, television and radio studios, as well as
publishing company.115 Since its retreat to Formosa Island, the KMT government
mobilized virtually all its people and available domestic resources for the military
buildup. As a result, Taiwanese army became the most influential and best organized
institution in the country. In addition, the coercive state apparatus was extensively
engaged in the governing process during the early years of the state-building in Taiwan.
In conclusion, the KMT government was under severe internal and external
security threats from the beginning of the Chinese Republic in the mainland. From the
1920s until its withdrawal to Taiwan, it had to fight provincial warlords who controlled
most of the territory, the Chinese Communist insurgents, and Japanese troops that
invaded mainland China. The security threats were even more intimidating after the
113 Patrick Cavendish, “The ‘New China’ of the Kuomintang,” in Jack Gray, ed., Modern
China’s Search for a Political Form (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 175.
114 Maguire, 1998, p. 34.
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KMT’s retreat to the Formosa Island. And, in this situation, one of the most significant
consequences was the expansion of the military institution. In addition, continuing
security threats resulted in the concentration of all political powers onto one political
leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who brought the top brass in the military into
civilian political affairs.
III. The Philippines
After centuries of colonial rule by Spain and later by the United States, the
Philippine Commonwealth was established on November 1935. When World War II
ended, the United States transferred sovereignty to the Philippine people so that the
country started as an independent republic on July 4, 1946. The armed forces of
independent Philippines were organized with heavy U.S. influence. The Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) was originally created in 1935 under the guidance of General
Douglas MacArthur and, therefore, owed significantly to the U.S. army’s organization,
ideology, and political orientation.116 From its establishment in the 1940s up to the point
of President Ferdinand Marcos’ declaration of martial law in 1972, the Philippines had
been one of the most democratic countries in Asia.117 In addition, the AFP was the least
115 M. Taylor Fravel, “Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan’s
Democratization,” Armed Forces and Society 29: 1 (2002), p. 62.
116 In 1935, the National Defense Act was passed and an American Military Mission led by
General MacArthur created the program for establishing the Philippine Armed Forces. In 1941,
the AFP was incorporated into the United States Armed Forces to fight Japanese invasion.
Viberto Selochan, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines and Political Instability,” in Viberto
Selochan, ed., The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), p. 85.
117 For the United States’ role in the establishment of democracy in the Philippines, see Jose
Veloso Abueva, “Filipino Democracy and the American Legacy,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 428 (1976), pp. 114-133.
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politically oriented army in the region and was placed under the control of the
democratically elected civilian leaders.118
It was President Marcos who made AFP officers politically active and influential
when he co-opted them into the domestic political arena throughout the 1970s. Under the
martial law regime, Marcos became an authoritarian ruler and used increasingly
oppressive measures against opposition politicians and the general public. In this
process, the military had been the most crucial actor supporting Marcos’s regime until he
was forcefully stepped down in 1986. High levels of domestic security threat
environments made possible the increasingly authoritarian Marcos and the politically
influential military during the 1960s and 1970s. In this section I explain how the security
threat environments as a structural cause gave rise to the centralization of political power
in Marcos’ hands and the expansion of the military and its domestic political role.
Mainly due to their geographic isolation from the Asian continent by seas, the
Philippines faced few serious external security threats for decades after independence.
Moreover, the United States became the guarantor of the Philippine security from any
external aggression. The Philippines has been one of the major allies of the United States
in East Asia from the beginning, cemented by two sets of military agreements, the
Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951.
Through the MBA, the American air and naval bases were stationed in the Philippines
from 1947 until the early 1990s. In addition, the Philippines received various types of
118 The 1935 Constitution prohibited the active military personnel from being engaged in
partisan political activity.
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military assistance from the United States through the defense treaty. Throughout the
Cold War, the U.S. assumed the responsibility for Philippine security.
The major source of security threats came from the domestic arena from the
beginning of its Republic. The first domestic threat that resulted in the AFP’s role
expansion was the Hukbalahap (or Huk) rebellion in the 1940s and 1950s. The Huks
originally emerged as People’s Anti-Japanese Army to wage guerrilla warfare against the
Japanese aggression during World War II. After the war ended, however, the Huks were
not recognized as a legitimate political organization, but instead were deprived of several
congressional seats that had been gained by the Hukbalahap leaders at the 1946 elections.
The Huks thereafter resumed their armed resistance against the Philippine government.
The Huk rebellion, however, was not a serious threat to President Ramon
Magsaysay, elected to the presidency in 1953. Magsaysay’s strategy of combining a
military counterinsurgency program with positive economic inducements to the
insurgents significantly reduced the influence of the Huks during the 1950s.119 The
experience of the Hukbalahap rebellion in the 1950s, however, resulted in the expansion
of the military organization and its role. The original size of the AFP increased from
37,000 soldiers with a $70.8 million military budget in 1948 to 59,000 men with $572
million budget in 1970.120 In addition, the AFP assumed responsibilities beyond the
national security including officers’ participation in local governments and economic
development programs.
119 Carl H. Lande, “The Political Crisis,” in John Bresnan ed., Crisis in the Philippines: The
Marcos Era and Beyond (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 130.
120 Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburg Press, 1995), p. 88.
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The Philippines’ internal security significantly deteriorated during the 1960s and
1970s. The most serious threats came from the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) which was formed in December 1968 and its New People’s Army (NPA)
organized in 1969. The CPP was qualitatively different from the previous communist
party in that it adopted the strategy of Maoist guerrilla warfare in rural areas and pledged
to wage armed struggle to overthrow the central government. Even though the CPP
originated in the Hukbalahap movement, it was organized and led by highly educated
elites and was able to build a nation-wide organization.121 In addition, the CPP gained
popularity among the general public by advocating various socio-economic reform
programs, including land reform. Within five years of its establishment, the CPP opened
20 guerrilla war fronts in seven provinces outside Manila, including northern, central, and
southern Luzon, Mindanao, and the eastern and western Visayas.122 The number of
clashes between the AFP and the NPA guerrillas gradually increased until martial law
was declared in 1972.
Table 2-7 shows how fast the CPP and NPA increased their strength and became
widespread throughout the archipelago especially after Marcos declared martial law in
1972. The CPP/NPA became most influential during the mid-1980s as it posed a serious
security threat to the Marcos regime and to the newly democratically elected Corazon
Aquino government during the late 1980s (see Chapter Four).
121 Jose Maria Sison, professor of the University of the Philippines, organized the Labor Party in
1962 and the Nationalist Youth in 1964. After losing his position at the University, Sison became
the leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
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Table 2-7: CPP/NPA and MNLF Strengths, 1968-1986123
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In the meantime, Muslim separatist movements in Mindanao, the southern
provinces of the Philippines, were also increasing in size and the scope of their operations
(see Table 2-7). They had centuries-old historical legacies, but the direct cause of their
reappearance was rooted in the 1960s. At this time, the increasing influx of Christian
Filipinos into traditional Muslim territories raised religious, cultural, and economic
confrontations between the two religious groups. Violent clashes between the two began
to occur: the Corregidor incident in 1968, Cotabato in 1970 over the issue of land
ownership, and violence during the 1971 election campaign.124 Both Christian and
Muslim politicians mobilized their private armed bands to win elections. Grievances
among the Muslim population increased as the central government sided with the
Christian immigrants supporting their political and economic rights.
122 Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1989), p. 54.
123 Larry A. Niksch, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines (Washington DC:
Library of Congress, July 1, 1985), p. 36; Office of the Minister of National Defense, Philippines,
OSND Statistical Data (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 1987); for MNLF
Strength, see Office of the Minister of National Defense, Philippines, 1987, p. 4.
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In 1968, the same year the CPP was formed, Udtog Matalam, a prominent Muslim
leader in the southern part of the archipelago, announced the formation of the Muslim
Independence Movement (MIM) and called for the establishment of a Muslim
independent state covering the provinces of Sulu, Palawan, and Mindanao.125 While the
NPA increased its size and influence throughout the islands, the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) became a more serious security threat to the central
government in the southern provinces during the mid-1970s. By 1972-1973, the MNLF
emerged as a well-organized political and military organization and, with the declaration
of martial law, engaged in full-blown armed struggle with the AFP. As noted in Table 2-
7, the Moro insurgency movements posed a serious security threat to the Marcos regime
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The MNLF gained economic and diplomatic support
from Muslim nations such as Malaysia, Libya, and other countries from the Islamic
Conference. Violent conflict spread throughout the southern part of the Philippines and
resulted in the deaths of thousands of Filipinos and over 500,000 refugees.126 Even
though the influence of the MNLF was significantly reduced after the mid-1980s, the
organization was a serious threat to both the national and regime security.
The deteriorating domestic security threat environments provided President
Marcos with justifications for the extension of his presidential tenure beyond the
constitutional limitation and the further centralization of political authority in his hands.
124 Lela G. Noble, “Muslim Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of a
Stalemate,” Asian Survey 21: 11 (November, 1981), p. 1098.
125 Lela G. Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines,” Pacific Affairs 49: 3
(Autumn, 1976), p. 408.
126 Ivan Molloy, “Revolution in the Philippines: The Question of an Alliance Between Islam and
Communism,” Asian Survey 25: 8 (1985), p.825.
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From the beginning of his presidency in 1965, he conducted a series of reforms in the
AFP structure to strengthen his personal control over the military. During the first
thirteen months of his presidency, for example, the President concurrently served as
Secretary of Defense. In addition, he conducted the largest-scale military reform since
the formation of the AFP and gave priority in promotions to officers from his hometown,
Ilocos. The “Ilocanization” of the officer corps was especially prominent in crucial
positions such as the Presidential Guard Battalion (PGB), the National Intelligence and
Security Authority (NISA), the Metropolitan Command of the Philippine Constabulary
(METROCOM), and the Manila Unit of the Integrated National Police (MUINP).
Officers from Ilocos received commandership positions in those units that were
concentrated around metropolitan Manila to maintain the Marcos regime security.
Marcos also mobilized the AFP officers during the 1969 presidential elections, using
them to mobilize and coerce voters. In this process, military officers began to actively
participate in domestic political processes even before martial law was declared in
1972.127
Marcos actively manipulated the threat perception among the general public to
justify his increasingly authoritarian rule and his presidential term beyond the
constitutional limit. As early as February 1970, he mentioned the possibility of declaring
martial law several times until he actually did in 1972. The early months of 1970
witnessed violent student demonstrations, targeting both Marcos and the facilities of the
American government. Anti-Marcos and anti-American demonstrations created a sense
127 For detailed explanation about the AFP’s non-military roles during Marcos administration,
see Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of
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of pervasive political crisis. Furthermore, the 1971 election was tainted by numerous
incidents of physical violence in which 223 people were killed and 250 wounded.128 In
addition to the political turbulence, natural disasters—such as volcanic eruptions,
earthquakes, severe droughts, and typhoons—further deteriorated the socio-economic
conditions of the country. Kidnappings, robberies, and murders became rampant
throughout the country.
Added to these crises, there were two incidents of physical violence that gave
Marcos the final push to declare martial law. The first occasion was a bomb explosion
during a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda at the heart of Manila in August 1971, in
which nine were killed and 90 injured, including eight senatorial candidates.129 Initially,
NPA guerrilla forces were reported to be responsible for the incident which provided
President Marcos with the excuse to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. It was, however,
speculated later that the government itself, along with the military, was responsible for
the bombing. The final catalyst was the attack on the car of Defense Secretary Juan
Ponce Enrile in September 1972.130
The day after the bombing, Marcos declared martial law—two years before his
second, and constitutionally final, presidential term would end. Marcos justified the
declaration of martial law by citing the 1935 Constitution which stated that presidents can
declare martial law “. . . in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof.” The existence of domestic violence and terrorism seemed to justify his
Authoritarianism (Westport: Praeger, 1997), pp. 77-82.
128 Mark R. Thomson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition
in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 42.
129 Lela G. Noble, “Politics in the Marcos Era,” in Bresnan ed., 1986, p. 82.
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statement. Marcos declared: “We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our
Republic. But at the same time we must now reform the social, economic, and political
institutions in our country . . .”131 The first and foremost rationale of martial law was to
secure the Republic from internal security threats. In addition, Marcos proposed to build
a “New Society” that included removing “the inequities of that society, the cleanup of
government of its corrupt and sterile elements, the liquidation of the criminal syndicates,
and the systematic development of our economy.”
With the declaration of martial law, Marcos significantly increased his
presidential power. Although it did not mean the installation of a military dictatorial rule,
the presence and influence of army officers in domestic political process had expanded
enormously. At the same time, Marcos weakened his political competitors’ political
bases by abolishing Congress and imprisoning key political opponents, including Senator
Benigno Aquino, the most likely successor to the presidency. He also closed several pro-
opposition newspapers, radio and television stations. In addition, he prohibited any type
of street demonstration and political opposition. By 1977, about 70,000 people had been
imprisoned by the military tribunals.
The declaration of martial law was possible due to the military’s support. Marcos
himself revealed in 1974 that he closely consulted with 12 high-ranking officers five days
130 Enrile later admitted that the incident had been crafted. See, Noble, 1986, p. 84.
131 The Office of the President of the Philippines, September 22, 1972.
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before declaring martial law.132 The first notable outcome of the declaration of martial
law was the expansion of the number of military personnel and the size of the budget.
As Table 2-8 indicates, the Philippines had relatively few armed forces until the
late 1960s due to the lack of significant external threats and the security guarantee from
the United States. After the declaration of martial law in 1972, however, the number of
military personnel greatly increased throughout the 1970s. The AFP had slightly over
50,000 personnel at the time of Marcos’ presidential inauguration. During the Marcos
Presidency, however, the size of the AFP expanded three-fold. In addition, defense
expenditures also greatly increased. Defense spending increased by almost ten fold in the
four years after the declaration of martial law, comprising more than 30 percent of total
governmental spending. The defense budget consistently increased throughout the
martial law regime, culminating with 45.7 percent of governmental spending in 1986.133
After declaring martial law, Marcos also extended other benefits to the AFP. Already in
1972, he promoted all officers one grade, raised the officers’ salaries by 150 percent, and
increased other benefits. The so-called “twelve disciples” who supported Marcos’
decision in 1972 were promoted to the highest positions of authority and responsibility in
the military establishment.134
132 William E. Berry, Jr., “The Changing Role of the Philippine Military during Martial Law and
the Implications for the Future,” in Edward Olson and Stephen Jurika, Jr., eds., The Armed
Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 230.
133 Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines:
Military Perceptions in a time of Continuing Crisis,” in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun
Cheong, eds., Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1988), p. 172.
134 Some of the noteworthy officers are: Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile; AFP Chief of
Staff General Romeo C. Espino; PC Chief General Fidel V. Ramos; Presidential Security
Command Chief General Fabian Ver. With other disciples, these generals were influential
political actors not only during the martial law regime but also the overthrow of Marcos and
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Table 2-8: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1965-1986135













































a) Total includes Army, Navy, Air, Constabulary (PC), Local Home Defense Forces (LHD),
Marines, and Coast Guard.
The AFP also performed the role of business management in state corporations,
many of which had been confiscated from opposition elites. The military took control of
the steel and sugar industries and all major utility companies. To reward key military
officers, Marcos built two defense-related businesses: the Philippine Expeditionary
Forces to Korea-Investment and Development Corporation, a military investment
company, and the Philippine Veterans Investment Development Company for retired
officers.136 In addition, numerous senior officers were allowed to stay in office beyond
the compulsory retirement period of 30 years in service. Furthermore, many of the
retired officers were appointed in key positions in the central and local governments such
democratization process in the mid-1980s. See, Carolina Galicia-Hernandez, The Extent of
Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines: 1946-1976 (State University of New York at
Buffalo, Ph. D. Dissertation, 1979), p. 217.
135 International Institute Security Studies, The Military Balance (London: IISS, multiple years).
136 Kessler, 1989, p. 126.
99
as ambassadors, Presidential Regional Officers for Development (PRODs), governors,
and loan collectors for land banks.137
In return, the AFP became the guarantor of Marcos’ authoritarian regime until
1986, when a group of officers turned against him and sided with the pro-democracy
civilian elites. From the declaration of martial law in 1972 until 1977, the military
arrested most of political dissidents, and military tribunals replaced civilian courts until
1978. Most of these arrested were communists and their supporters, but also included
opposition politicians, journalists, and college students. The martial law regime further
militarized the Philippine society by organizing the Civilian Home Defense Force
(CHDF) to train 36,000 people annually. The AFP also integrated police forces into its
command structure. Juan Ponce Enrile, the secretary of national defense, was
concurrently chairman of the National Police Commission. The integration of the police
into the AFP enabled the Marcos regime to mobilize them into local politics and elections
in provincial cities and municipalities.
The politicization of the military officers, however, inevitably decreased
professionalism within the AFP. During the martial law regime, a small number of
military officers who graduated from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) formed a
secret organization within the military, the Reform the AFP Movement (RAM). The
RAM aimed to restore professionalism and public respect for the armed forces. The
RAM members played a decisive role in the downfall of Marcos’ regime in 1986.
Furthermore, politicized military officers posed a serious stumbling block to the
137 Casper, 1995, p. 95.
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democratization process under the Aquino presidency in the late 1980s, in which AFP
officers made more than seven major coup attempts.
IV. Indonesia
With the end of World War II, Indonesia proclaimed independence from Japanese
and Dutch colonial rule, but had to fight a five-year ‘revolutionary’ war with Dutch
forces until it gained formal independence in 1949. The experience of war and
subsequent security challenges heavily influenced the military organization and its
political orientation up until 1998 when President Haji Mohammad Suharto was ousted
from his presidency.
In this section, I examine the relationship between Indonesia’s experiences of
internal and external conflicts and security threats during the state-building process on the
one hand, and the organization and political orientation of the ABRI (Angkatan
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces) on the other. From
the time of independence in 1949 to 1968, Indonesia experienced three phases of political
development: parliamentary democracy in 1949-1956, increasingly authoritarian Guided
Democracy in 1957-1965, and the power transition from President Achmad Sukarno’s
fall to the installation of the military dictatorial rule under the leadership of General
Suharto in 1965-68. This section focuses on the first two periods; the third period will be
discussed in the next chapter.
The Indonesian army was founded during the Japanese occupation in the early
1940s. In 1943, the Japanese armed forces created two military organizations to mobilize
the Islanders to support Japanese forces waging warfare in Southeast Asia. First, Heiho
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was based on indigenous Indonesians in April 1943 and, by the end of the War in 1945,
about 40,000 of them received military training in military transportation, road building,
and defense duties. Second, the Japanese established Peta (Pasukan Sukarela Tentara
Pembela Tanash Air, the Army of Defense of the Fatherland) in late 1943 as territorial
defense forces. By the time the war ended, about 38,000 Peta soldiers and 1,600 Peta
officers were being trained by the Japanese Army.138 These groups actively cooperated
with the Japanese in the hope that Japan would support Indonesia’s independence. Heiho
and Peta, with several other paramilitary organizations, became the foundation of the
ABRI.139
After World War II, these organizations were integrated as the Indonesian armed
forces (ABRI) during the struggle against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949.140 The ABRI
were formally established in October 1945. Most of its officers, including General
Sudirman, the commander-in-chief of the army, and General Suharto, came from the
Peta. The revolutionary war began after the Japanese withdrew from the Indonesian
islands but the Dutch colonial authorities did not recognize the Indonesian declaration of
independence. After negotiations with the Indonesian revolutionary forces failed, the
Dutch army attacked. The Dutch, with 150,000 soldiers, were stronger in major cities but
138 Harold W. Maynard, “The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces,” in Olson and Jurika, Jr.,
eds., 1986, p. 188.
139 Some of the other prominent paramilitary groups were the Barisan Pelopor (Vanguard
Corps), Hizbullah (Army of Allah), and the Seinendan (Youth Corps). Clifford Geertz, “The
Integrative Revolution,” in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: the Quest for
Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 108.
140 The Dutch ruled the Islands of Indonesia by establishing the Dutch East Indies Company in
the 1600s, but later ruled directly until the Japanese forces entered into the territory.
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had little influence in rural areas.141 Their attempts to maintain control over Indonesia
brought about violent uprisings in many parts of the archipelago.
During the revolutionary war, the ABRI was inevitably involved with the
domestic political processes since the civilian government was not well organized and the
ABRI was the only organization that could perform administrative functions.
Throughout five years of the revolutionary war, the ABRI developed into a strong and
well-organized force. Not surprisingly, throughout the war, the ABRI acquired a strong
belief that it was the only institution that truly represented and defended the interest of
the people. When the Dutch forces attacked Jogjakarta, the capital city, and captured
Sukarno and other civilian leaders in December 1948, the ABRI under General
Sudirman’s leadership refused to surrender and waged guerrilla warfare until Indonesia
gained independence from the Dutch. The five year-long war of independence set the
basic organizational structure and political orientation of the Indonesian Army. The
ABRI was not originally organized by civilian politicians, but spontaneously sprang from
the masses during the war. Because of this, officers in the ABRI did not consider
themselves as instruments of the civilian leadership for whom enforcing their political
will proved to be difficult from the beginning of the Republic.142
After winning independence in December 1949, Indonesia started as a
parliamentary democracy with multiple parties competing for seats in the parliament. By
the time President Sukarno declared “Guided Democracy” in 1957, three major parties
dominated domestic politics: Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, the Indonesian Nationalist
141 Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.
45.
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Party), supported by secular nationalists; Masjumi, backed by modernist Muslims from
outside Java; and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), representing traditionalist Muslims based in
Java.143 Indonesian politics in the early 1950s was quite democratic; elections were
relatively free and fair, the courts were independent from other governmental branches,
civil society was thriving, and freedom of the press was guaranteed.144 During the period
of the parliamentary democracy, the military formally drew back to the barracks and
disengaged from the domestic political process.
The parliamentary democracy with multiple parties based on ethnic and religious
cleavages, however, turned out to be too weak to deal with problems springing up
throughout the archipelago during the 1950s. Given the diversity in culture, religion,
ideology, and ethnicity, the parliamentary system was unable to form a stable and
workable long-term coalition government. Before long, the political consensus of the
early period of the Republic began to fall apart, as political parties became ideologically
and ethnically polarized. In seven years of the parliamentary system, seven coalition
cabinets took turns to run the country.
The first major challenge to the civilian leadership occurred in October 1952. A
group of military officers in Jakarta incited the general public to demonstrate in front of
the Presidential Palace, when a delegation of senior officers was meeting with President
142 Maynard, 1986, p. 188.
143 David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz, Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader (New York:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 4.
144 For the detailed description of the political circumstances during the parliamentary
democracy period in Indonesia, see Herbert Feith, “Constitutional Democracy: How Well Did It
Function?” in David Bourchier and John Legge, eds., Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s
(Clayton: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Monash Papers on Southeast
Asia No. 31, 1994).
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Sukarno to call for dissolving the ill-functioning parliament.145 This protest was a
demonstration against the parliament’s attempt to interfere with the ABRI’s
reorganization and demobilization plans. Some of the most politically active officers
demanded a more influential role in governmental decision-making. They argued that
they had the right to participate in determining the political fate of the Republic, since
independence and state-building had been achieved largely by the ABRI’s own efforts.146
Some observers speculated that General Abdul Haris Nasution and several radical
officers planned for a military coup to abolish the weak parliamentary system and create
a more powerful presidential system.147 Even though this “October Affair” did not
develop into a significant political crisis, the incident shows that from the beginning of
the Republic the army was ready to get involved in politics.
A more serious source of friction that threatened to worsen domestic security
conditions resided within the military itself. The ABRI was composed of personnel from
numerous provinces with diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. Even though
orthodox Muslims were dominant in numbers at the lower positions within the army,
Javanese officers were overrepresented, especially at the higher ranks. Army officers
perceived the fundamentalist Muslims within the military as a serious threat to the
security of the state. As early as 1945, the first Constitution spelled out Pancasila (or
Five Principles) as the official national identity, not Islam. Pancasila was first devised
145 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988), p. 30.
146 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 70.
147 For example, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 262.
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by Sukarno in the 1945 Constitution, which contained five principles: belief in God,
humanitarianism, the unity of Indonesia, democracy, and social justice.148 Within the
army, fundamental Muslims who refused to accept Pancasila principle launched the
Dural Islam rebellion on West Java and some parts of Central Java. They were strongly
committed to creating an Islamic republic in Indonesia. The Dural Islam uprising began
in 1948 when S. M. Kartosuwirjo, the commander of the Hizbullah forces, declared the
“Islamic State of Indonesia.”149 The rebellious movements later spread over to Aceh and
South Sulawesi in the 1950s when the parliamentary system suffered from weak
leadership.
Related to the problem of fundamentalist Muslims, the army also had to deal with
intra-military fragmentation as regional commanders turned against the central command
and joined local rebellions. From the revolutionary war period in the 1940s until the mid-
1950s, local rebellions supported by regional military officers seriously challenged the
authority of the government. These local uprisings were focused on the islands of
Sumatra, East Java, and Sulawesi. The rebels in many cases were allied with local
Islamic leaders to make Islam as the basic principle of the state. In addition, there were
continuing tensions between the officers who were trained by the Dutch and those trained
by the Japanese. While the former were better educated and more professionally trained,
the latter were more patriotic with experiences of independence guerrilla warfare. Also,
the Japanese-trained officers were usually well connected with local political elites and
business interests. In this situation, establishing an effective and hierarchical command
148 Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization”: The Indonesian Pro-
Democracy Movement in a Changing World (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997), pp. 54-55.
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structure by the central government turned out to be a difficult task.150 In sum, Indonesia
faced multiple sources of domestic security threats throughout the archipelago in the
1950s. The most serious security threats during the early 1950s were religious conflicts,
while the late 1950s were overshadowed by ethnic and regional conflicts, both within and
outside the ABRI.
Growing domestic conflicts, coupled with the ill-functioning parliamentary
democracy, forced President Sukarno to declare “Guided Democracy” in 1957.151 With
the declaration of Guided Democracy, Sukarno abolished the parliamentary system and
returned to a presidential one under the 1945 Constitution. At the same time, he declared
martial law, bringing military officers into politics who took broad political, economic,
and administrative functions under the Sukarno Presidency. Guided Democracy was
originally intended to overcome national disunity and internal conflicts, but it resulted in
the concentration of political power in the hands of Sukarno and army officers. Under
Guided Democracy, democratic ideas with institutionalized opposition were blamed for
aggravating social unrests and disunity. Western-style democratic ideas were replaced by
“deliberation” to reach political consensus and, if no consensus was made, Sukarno
himself, being the elderly political leader, made the final decision.152
149 Steven Drakeley, The History of Indonesia (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 88-94.
150 Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Haris Nasution attempted to establish a system of officer
rotation and strong central command authority. This attempt was faced by resistance from local
commanders, resulting in losing Nasution’s leadership position in the ABRI. See Drakeley, 2005,
pp. 97-98.
151 For more detailed analysis of the origins and developments of Guided Democracy in the
1950s, see Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-1959: The Emergence of Guided
Democracy (New Delhi: K P Bagchi & Company, 1982).
152 Feith, 1962, p. 515.
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Under Guided Democracy, Sukarno and the ABRI were effective in restoring
domestic political and security order momentarily in the late 1950s. Regional rebellious
activities were put down and political opposition activities were strictly restrained.
Elections were canceled and the main opponents of Sukarno’s leadership—PNI and PSI
(Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party)—were banned in 1960.153 Half of
the seats in the new parliament were distributed to so-called “functional groups” that
represented various occupational interests including the military.154 With Guided
Democracy, Sukarno became a stronger and increasingly authoritarian leader.
In addition to the expansion of presidential power, the immediate impact of the
declaration of Guided Democracy and martial law in 1957 was the further political role of
ABRI officers. The 1956 aborted coup attempt by deputy chief of staff, Colonel Zulkifli
Lubis, nevertheless, set in motion a series of regional and local military commanders
taking control of local governments and mobilizing popular support in Sumatra and
Sulawesi. This highlighted the already existing ruptures in the army and ABRI officers’
dissatisfaction with the flagging parliamentary democracy.155 In response, Sukarno
declared martial law, and all rebellious activities by local militaries were put down.
However, a series of domestic unrests had the effect of expanding the army’s role not
only in politics, but also in administrative and economic affairs.
153 The PNI led the first cabinet (1953-1955). In the 1955 elections, the PNI won the largest
portion of the popular votes (22.3%). See Herbert Feith, “Constitutional Democracy: How Well
Did It Function?” in David Bourchier and John Legge, eds., Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and
1990s (Monash University, Australia: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 31, 1994), p. 18.
154 Uhlin, 1997, p. 39.
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The expansion of ABRI’s political and administrative role was justified by the
concept of the “Middle Way” deliberated by the army chief of staff, Major General
Abdul Haris Nasution.156 According to the “Middle Way” principle, the ABRI would
neither pursue taking over the government nor remain politically inactive. Instead, the
ABRI would have the right to voice its views in the government, legislature, and the state
administration. General Nasution maintained that the infusion of governmental bodies
with the military officers who were trained with managerial and technical skills would
improve the administration of the country.157 The principle of the Middle Way points to
the fact that the civilian leaders and military officers could have equal rights and
authority to take part in the governing process.
General Nasution’s Middle Way doctrine provided a rational justification for
ABRI’s participation in politics under Guided Democracy. The Middle Way doctrine
had moderate and limited political goals when it was first declared. This principle was,
however, developed into the idea of dwifungsi (dual function) in the 1960s under the
Suharto leadership. According to the dwifungsi doctrine, “The participation of ABRI in
the political process may be seen from two angles, namely in its position as a defense and
security force . . . , while as a social force it has rights and obligations as any other
ordinary citizen . . . in taking part in the legislative bodies, occupying certain offices in
155 According to Ghoshal’s analysis, the aborted coup came from the historic rivalry between
KNIL to which General Nasution belonged and the PETA of which Colonel Lubis was a member.
See Ghoshal, 1982, pp. 64-65.
156 Damien Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (New York: Routledge,
2003), pp. 51-54.
157 Sundhaussen, 1982, p. 127.
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the executive and judicial branches . . .”158 In September 1982, the doctrine of dwifungsi
was made into law by President Suharto.
With Guided Democracy, martial law, and the doctrine of the Middle Way, ABRI
officers began to expand their presence in the government in the late 1950s. Under the
provisions of the state of siege, local military commanders came to have almost
unrestrained powers to maintain security and order. Furthermore, the military’s political
presence was more prominent in the organs of central government. Among the cabinet
members appointed in July 1959, over 30 percent of the ministers came from the ABRI,
while there had been no military presence at the minister level before 1958.159 The ABRI
continued to implement emergency powers under martial law until 1963, when a
modified form of martial law was reintroduced in 1964.
In addition to its increasingly influential presence in government, the ABRI also
became involved in economic affairs. When Dutch companies in Indonesia were
nationalized by the Sukarno government in the midst of violent uprisings by nationalist
demonstrators in 1957, several military officers were dispatched to manage them. Army
officers continued to take part in the management of the new state-owned business
enterprises such as plantations, mining, banking, and trade. ABRI officers’ economic
role was further expanded in the 1960s when British and American companies were put
under military supervision. Furthermore, the state-owned oil corporation, founded in
1957, was directly administered by the army leadership. Less significantly, local military
158 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, “The Military and National Development in Indonesia,” in
Djiwandono and Cheong, eds., 1988, p. 77.
159 Crouch, 1988, p. 47.
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units built up their own business industries, mostly in connection with ethnic Chinese.160
ABRI officers’ engagement in local economic affairs produced a corrupt officer corps
that the central government found difficult to control.
Due to the military officers’ economic activities in several lucrative industries, it
is almost impossible to estimate the military defense spending exactly as a percentage of
the national budget. Numerically, the defense spending decreased for years, from 27
percent in the late 1960s, to about 6 percent in the 1970s up until the late 1990s.161 The
bigger portion of the military budget, however, came from industries that ABRI officers
controlled. Officers’ engagement in economic affairs further spread out under Suharto’s
New Order regime in the late 1960s.
Guided Democracy during the late 1950s seemed to maintain political stability
and internal security order for a moment. But subsequent political and security crises in
the early-to-mid 1960s forced military officers to assume more politically influential
positions in the Sukarno government. The early 1960s witnessed increasing threats
against both the state and Sukarno regime. Sukarno’s endeavor to balance the three
politically influential groups—the ABRI, the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Communist
Party of Indonesia), and Muslims—could not last long, as antagonism between ABRI
officers and the PKI intensified.
On September 30, 1965, a group of young officers launched a coup and
kidnapped and killed the six highest-ranking officers. Under the leadership of General
160 Crouch, 1988, p. 39.
161 For more detailed description of the defense spending in Indonesia, see, J. Kristiadi, “The
Armed Forces,” in Richard W. Baker, M. Hadi Soesastro, J. Kristiadi, and Douglas E. Ramage,
eds., Indonesia: The Challenge of Change (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 101.
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Suharto, the coup attempt was put down several days later. The PKI (Partai Kommunis
Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party) was blamed for the coup attempt, and the army
killed over a half million people suspected of communists and ethnic Chinese.162 In this
political turmoil, President Sukarno had no choice but to transfer all political power to
General Suharto. The next chapter will explain in detail the process of Sukarno’s step
down and the installment of the military-dominant Suharto regime in the 1960s.
Conclusions
This chapter has examined the rise of the armed forces’ domestic political
influence during the state-building process in four countries—South Korea, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Indonesia. Each country had the task of building a sovereign statehood
after World War II. The Republic of Korea was proclaimed after 35 years of Japanese
colonial rule and additional three years of American military occupation. The Republic
of China on Taiwan lost the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland
and established its government on Formosa Island in 1949. The Philippines attained
independence from American colonial rule in 1935 and achieved sovereign statehood in
1946 after Japanese forces withdrew from the archipelago. Finally, Indonesia attained
sovereignty in 1949 after fighting a revolutionary war against the Dutch colonial power.
In the state-building process, all four countries had to deal with extreme external
and/or internal security threats. The Korean peninsula was divided into two hostile
162 For more detailed analysis of the massacre, see Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A
Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1971); Robert Cribb ed., The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali
(Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No.
21)).
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camps between the South and the North in 1948. Ideological and military hostilities burst
into the full-blown Korean War from 1950 to 1953. In Taiwan, the KMT government
had to cope with imminent threats from the Chinese Communist Party and its Army.
Internally, the KMT regime had to deal with violent uprisings by native Taiwanese. The
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had to fight various domestic uprisings from the
1950s until the late-1980s, such as the Hukbalahap rebellion in the 1950s, the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People’s Army (NPA) from the late-1960s,
and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) during the 1970s. Indonesia fought for
five years against the Dutch and, after independence, the country faced religious, ethnic,
and regional conflicts and rebellions by regional army commanders allied with Islamic
groups. In South Korea and Taiwan, security threats came from both international and
domestic arenas, while the main source of security threats in the Philippines and
Indonesia resided within the domestic arena.
The first outcome of extreme internal/external security threats was the expansion
of military organizations. Within five years after the opening of the Republic, the South
Korean army witnessed a vast expansion of the number of military personnel (see Table
2-1). In addition, three years of war transformed the Korean army into the most cohesive
and best trained organization in the country. Similarly, the AFP underwent a major
expansion while fighting various rebellious forces. Armed forces in South Korea and the
Philippines were originally small in size, but later underwent massive increases in
personnel, training, and equipment. In contrast, the Taiwanese and Indonesian militaries
were already large at the time of independence. These cases demonstrate that, unlike
what the institutionalist theories of civil-military relations assume, not all the military
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organizations enjoyed dominant roles society from the beginning. Rather, the armed
forces expanded its size and strength under certain structural conditions, i. e., security
threats. Thus, it is worth examining the processes in which the military as an institution
increases its organizational strength under certain threats, rather than treating the
presence of a strong military in a society as a given.
Another important outcome of the presence of extremely high security threats was
the centralization of political powers within one or a small number of political leaders,
usually the head of the executive branch. In this process, the military was frequently
mobilized by civilian leaders into the domestic political arena for political purposes,
creating highly politicized military officers. In all four cases, the presence of high
security threats brought about more powerful and more authoritarian civilian leadership.
Three years of the Korean War concentrated all the political powers within President
Rhee Syngman’s hands. Even after the war, Rhee actively exploited the North Korean
threat and anti-communist ideology to expand his power and extend his presidential term.
Rhee’s increasingly authoritarian and oppressive rule was possible due to the military
officers’ involvement in domestic political processes.
Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek could monopolize power within the KMT government
under extreme security threat environments on both mainland China and Taiwan. In this
process, the military, especially the Whampoa Military Academy and its graduates, was
vital to Chiang’s rule. In the Philippines, violent domestic turmoil in the late 1960s and
early 1970s enabled President Marcos to declare martial law and extend his presidential
term beyond the constitutional limitation. His increasingly authoritarian and oppressive
rule was backed by the AFP. Under Marcos, the AFP organization and its political role
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significantly increased. Finally, extreme internal threats in the 1950s forced President
Sukarno to abolish the parliamentary system and declare “Guided Democracy.” With the
declaration of martial law in 1957, the already influential officers expanded their
political, judicial, administrative, and economic roles.
In each of the four cases examined in this chapter, the presence of high security
threats resulted in the expansion of the armed forces, more authoritarian civilian
leadership, and civilian leaders’ co-optation of the military officers into politics to secure
their political position. In all four cases, martial law was declared in the midst of
domestic turmoil and the military assumed political roles in administrative, legislative,
and judicial branches under the martial law regime.
Once invited into the domestic political arena, however, the military’s political
role was different from case to case. In South Korea and Indonesia, army officers
abolished the civilian leadership and dominated the political arena via coup d’etat, while
army officers in Taiwan and the Philippines were kept under civilian control even though
they were politically influential. The next chapter details the dynamics of domestic
political processes that made the difference between coup d’etat and the retention of
political power by civilian leaders.
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Chapter 3. The Dynamics of Military Intervention
Introduction
In Chapter Two, I explained the rising political role of the armed forces in the
four countries during the state-building period. I explored how growing security
challenges to the states contributed to the installation of civilian authoritarian regimes and
army officers’ participation in governing process. All four countries began with
democratic political systems, including popular elections and political oppositions.
Before long, however, mounting security threats brought about a concentration of
political powers within one or a small number of political leaders and the expansion of
military organization. Furthermore, increasingly authoritarian leaders mobilized the top
brass in the military into politics to achieve the state and regime security.
Once brought into the domestic political arena, however, the way the armed
forces engaged in politics was different from case to case. Army officers in South Korea
and Indonesia toppled civilian leadership and established military-dominant dictatorial
rule, while military leadership in Taiwan and the Philippines were kept under the
supervision of civilian leadership. If we follow my classification that was elaborated in
Chapter One, military’s role in politics in South Korea and Taiwan was one of control,
while the other two cases were one of participation.
In this chapter, I attempt to reveal structural factors that made differences in the
modes of military engagement in domestic politics, whether through coup d’etat and the
installment of military dictatorship (control) or the military’s involvement in politics
under the supervision of civilian leadership (participation). My structural theory
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suggests that in order to explain different modes of military intervention in politics, one
needs to look at the dynamics of the interactions among major political actors at the
domestic level—the military, civilian leadership, and civil society—in a given security
condition. More specifically, I argue that army officers are likely to topple civilian
leadership and install a military-led dictatorship (1) when the armed forces suffer from
internal factional struggles, (2) when civilian leadership loses its legitimacy or fail to
maintain security and political order, or (3) when civil society groups endorse a radial
ideology or a strategy of physical violence. On the contrary, soldiers are likely to come
under civilian guidance (1) when the military institution secures its organizational unity
and effective command structure, (2) when civilian leaders are able to sustain their
political leadership and manage security order; or (3) when civil society groups do not
provoke domestic disorder.
This chapter is composed of four sections. The first two sections deal with the
cases of military coup and the installment of military regimes in South Korea and
Indonesia. Section One focuses on South Korea from the late 1950s to early 1970s in
which civilian leadership lost control, the 1961 military coup under the Park Jung-hee’s
leadership, and the consolidation of military dictatorial rule with the declaration of
Yushin in 1972. Section Two examines the political history of Indonesia from the late
1950s to late 1960s, in which Sukarno’s Guided Democracy failed to provide domestic
order, ensuing crisis including an aborted coup occurred, and General Suharto took
control of the country via coup d’etat. Section Three and Four analyze the Taiwanese
and Philippine cases, where civilian leadership invented control mechanisms over
117
politicized army officers during the 1960s and 1970s. The final section is a conclusion in
which major findings are summarized and some theoretical implications are discussed.
Coup D’etat and Military-Dominant Regime: Military’s Political Control in South
Korea and Indonesia
I. South Korea
President Rhee Syngman successfully mobilized power throughout the 1950s, and
the Korean army was instrumental in this process. Army officers were used whenever
Rhee tried to increase his power and extend his presidential tenure beyond the
constitutional limit. Increasingly authoritarian rule and performance failures by President
Rhee, however, eroded his legitimacy and isolated him from the general public and, in
the end, from the armed forces. Officers of the Korean army played a decisive role in the
process of Rhee’s ouster in the midst of the April Student Revolution in 1960.
Furthermore, a segment of the Korean army intervened in politics via coup d’etat and
dominated political society in Korea by establishing military dictatorial rule in 1961. In
this section, I explore the historical routes from the demise of the Rhee regime in April
1960, to the political turmoil under the short-lived parliamentary democracy by Prime
Minister Chang Myon (1960-1961), to the military coup d’etat under the Park Jung-hee
leadership in 1961, and to the consolidation of military dictatorship with the declaration
of Yushin (revitalizing reform) constitution in 1972.
By the late 1950s, President Rhee and his ruling Liberal Party (LP) faced
escalating resistance from both opposition political elites including the opposition
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Democratic Party (DP) and the general public, especially radicalized college students.
Support for the Rhee regime quickly evaporated for several reasons: deteriorating
economic conditions since the end of the Korean War, the extension of his presidential
tenure beyond the constitutional limitation,163 ever more heavy-handed repression against
opposition political elites,164 and most critically, serious election fraud in the 1960
presidential election. Faced with growing opposition from domestic audiences, President
Rhee and hard-liners in the ruling LP adopted more authoritarian tactics to continue the
regime survival.
President Rhee at the age of 85 was running in the 1960 presidential election for
his fourth term. By this time, however, his regime was certain to lose the election
because it had already lost support from the general public and, at the same time, the
opposition DP was gaining political strength. The DP nominated Cho Byong-ok as its
presidential candidate and Chang Myon as vice-presidential candidate. Both candidates
163 Rhee Syngman amended the constitution twice, in 1952 and 1954. The 1952 constitutional
amendment changed the presidential election method from the National Assembly vote to the
popular referendum. The 1954 constitutional amendment included, among other things,
abolishing the two-term restriction on presidential tenure for the first president of the Republic of
Korea. The bill for the second amendment was passed in November 1954. In the two
constitutional amendments, Rhee used the Korean army to intimidate the opposition elites.
Jungwon Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1976); Baeho Han, Hanguk-eui Jeongchigwajunggwa Byonhoa: Gwonuijueui
Saengsung Gua Jeongae (Changes in Korean Political Process: Establishment and Development
of the Authoritarian Regime) (Seoul: Bupmoon-sa, 1993).
164 There was a series of incidents in which the Rhee regime used heavy-handed tactics against
the opposition. In September 1956, Chang Myon, Vice President and the DP leader, was shot in
the hand during the DP convention. The policed arrested the gunmen, who confessed that he was
hired by the National Police Chief. In 1958, Cho Bong-am, the Progressive Party leader, was
arrested and charged with espionage and subversion. Cho was sentenced to death and hanged. In
1959, the Kyungsang Shinmun (daily newspaper) was charged with the violation of the National
Security Law, two reporters were arrested, and the publishing license was canceled. For the
detailed description of Rhee’s authoritarian rule in the 1950s, see Sungju Han, The Failure of
Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Yong-pyo Hong,
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were prominent political figures who had gained widespread support from the general
public. In this situation, the hard-liners in the ruling LP engaged in systemic election
fraud, including the invalidation of opposition ballots, group voting, ballot stuffing,
intimidation and physical terror of the opposition election campaigns.165 Even before the
election concluded, the DP candidates proclaimed that it was fraudulent and therefore not
valid. The election resulted in Rhee’s victory by substantial margins, in which the ruling
LP candidate Rhee Syngman won 89 percent and vice-presidential candidate Yi Ki-pung
won 79 percent of the vote.166
Irregularities in the presidential election prompted violent public demonstrations,
especially among high school and university students. The anti-Rhee demonstrations
started in southeastern cities but rapidly spread to Seoul and other major cities. Violent
clashes between the demonstrators and the police resulted in the deaths of more than 100
demonstrators and more than 1,000 serious injuries.167 The student demonstrations in
Seoul were joined by middle class people and more than 300 university professors.
The Rhee regime declared martial law and brought heavily armed military forces
to the capital, claiming that “devilish hands of communists” had infiltrated and instigated
State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in
South Korea, 1953-1960 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
165 For the detailed discussion about the irregularities in 1960 presidential election, see Byong-
cho Suh, Jukwonja ui chung on: Hanguk daeui chongchi’isa (A Testimony by a Sovereign: A
History of a Representative Government) (Seoul: Moumsa, 1964), pp. 297-344; David W.
Reeves, The Republic of Korea (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 49.
166 For the 1960 presidential election results, see Daehanmin-guk Son-gosa (History of Elections
in Korea) (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1964), pp. 481-483.
167 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1968), p. 175.
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commotion throughout the South Korean territory.168 By this time, however, the coercive
apparatus of Rhee’s government was no longer working, as the police and the armed
forces were hesitant to follow orders of the martial law commander, General Song Yo-
chan.169 Outnumbered and disheartened, many of the policemen abandoned their duties,
while the dispatched military forces disregarded the martial law commander’s order and
tried to maintain neutrality between the Rhee regime and the demonstrators.
Furthermore, several high-ranking officers, including General Song Yo-chan and Defense
Minister Kim Jung-youn, personally met the President and insisted on his resign.170
President Rhee stepped down on April 26, 1960, concluding 12 years of authoritarian
rule. Rhee left Seoul and lived in Hawaii until his death.
With Rhee’s departure, democracy was restored with the inauguration of the
Second Republic by Chang Myon. The Second Republic adopted the parliamentary
system by amending the 1948 constitution on June 15, 1960. On July 29 of the same
year, a national election was held to elect a new National Assembly which would, in turn,
elect a president. In the election, the Democratic Party, now the ruling party, gained 175
seats out of 233 in the House of Representatives, as well as 31 out of 58 seats in the
House of Councilors.171 In August 1960, after five months of an interim government led
168 John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Development
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 41.
169 During the April Student Revolution, President Rhee appointed the Army Chief of Staff
General Song Yo-chan to the commander of martial law. Byong-yong Ryu, ed., Hanguk Hyondae
Jeongchi Sa (History of Korean Politics) (Seoul: Jipmoondang, 1997), p. 107.
170 Kyung-cho Chung, New Korea: New Land of the Morning Calm (New York: McMillan,
1962), p. 71.
171 The Second Republic had a bicameral legislature, composed of the House of Councilors and
the House of Representatives. For the 1960 election results, see Oh, 1999, p. 44.
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by Heo Jung, the Second Republic was established with Chang Myon as prime minister
and Yun Po-sun as president with ritual powers. In the 1960 constitution, the prime
minister served as chief of executive and headed the State Affairs Council (the cabinet).
The 1960 constitution drastically increased the democratic components of Korean politics
by weakening presidential powers and decentralizing the powers into the executive and
the legislative branches.
Even though democratic in nature, the Chang Myon government could not
overcome serious challenges from both within and outside the government. The Chang
regime was too weak and incompetent to deal with social and political problems that was
deepened under the Rhee government, such as a deteriorating economy, factional
struggles within the ruling Democratic Party, and empowered but impatient and radical
student protesters. Weak political institutions combined with growing demands of wider
political participation significantly exacerbated the security conditions in both domestic
and international arenas, as North Korea expanded its influence in South Korea during
the domestic turmoil.
The economy showed no sign of improvement but was further impaired by
continuing social and political disorder and rampant corruption of the civilian
government. Inflation skyrocketed, and industrial production continued to decline.172
The Chang government’s first priority was to solve its economic difficulties. As a means
of improving economic conditions, Prime Minister Chang tried to reduce armed forces
personnel, which numbered over 600,000 and consumed about 50 percent of
172 Under the Chang regime, the price of rice went up 60 percent, oil 23 percent. The industrial
production dropped more than 12 percent. See Bank of Korea, Monthly Report (March 1961).
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governmental expenditures. During the 1960 election campaign, one of Chang’s pledges
was to cut 200,000 military personnel, and up to 100,000 in his first year alone.173
Chang’s plan to reduce the military, however, encountered strong opposition not only
from the top brass in the army but also from the Kennedy administration, which was
concerned about communist expansionism in Asia. As a result, the plan to downsize the
Korean army was quickly revoked, nevertheless, the incident created deep distrust among
high-ranking officers against the Chang regime.174
A more serious and immediate challenge to Chang Myon came from politically-
empowered college students. The April Student Revolution was originally against
President Rhee and his Liberal Party and their undemocratic policies. Six months after
Rhee’s ouster, however, the students were still instrumental in deciding the direction of
Korean politics. They demanded drastic and wide-ranging political reforms, including
punishment of the LP members who manipulated the 1960 presidential election. When
the newly elected government failed to respond to their demands, the students went to the
streets to demonstrate. In one event on October 11, 1960, for example, student
demonstrators occupied the parliamentary building and urged thorough punishment for
173 Dae-kyu Lee, Kyu-hui Hwang, and In-hyuk Kim, eds., Bikyo Goonbu Jeongchi Gaeip Ron
(Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention in Politics) (Busan: Dong-A University Press,
2001), p. 357.
174 Some explains the 1961 military coup in South Korea as a result of the military’s effort to
secure its corporate interest. For example, see Jinsok Jun, “South Korea: Consolidating
Democratic Civilian Control,” in Muthiah Alagappa ed., Coercion and Governance: The
Declining Political Role of The Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp.
122-125; Yong-won Han, “5.16 coup d’etat eui balsaeng-kwa jeonkae kwajeong (The Genesis
and Evolution of the 5. 16 Coup d’etat),” in Bae-ho Han ed., Hankuk Hyondae Jeongchi Ron II:
Je 3 Kongwhagukeui Hyongseong, Jeongchi Kwajeong, Jeongchaek (Contemporary Korean
Politics II: The Genesis, Political Process, and Policies of the Third Republic) (Seoul: Orum,
1996), pp. 46-54.
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the election frauds.175 In less than a year of the Second Republic, there were more than
2,000 demonstrations with about one million participants.176 The student demonstrations
were more widespread and frequent under the Chang regime than the previous
government. In this situation, a more challenging task for the Second Republic was not
about guaranteeing political freedom and participation but rather about what Huntington
called “the creation of a legitimate public order.”177
The ruling DP also suffered from factional struggles from the beginning of the
Second Republic. The DP was formed as a loose coalition of diverse social forces,
including intellectuals, student organizations, and anti-Rhee opposition leaders who
represented both liberal and conservative elements of society. Therefore, the party did
not possess clear ideological or political ideals, not to mention party discipline or
integrity. The only raison d’etre for the party was the overthrow of the old regime. In
Gregory Henderson’s words, it was “a marriage of convenience between two interest
groups, not of belief and loyalty.”178 Eventually, the ruling DP broke into two factions.
Members of the new faction, representing the spirit of the April Student Revolution,
challenged the older and conservative leadership and urged more extensive political
reforms. The old faction, the less influential components of the ruling circle, formed the
New Democratic Party (NDP), a new opposition party.
175 For detailed description of the college students’ political role during the 1960s, see William
A. Douglas, “Korean Students and Politics,” Asian Survey 3: 12 (December, 1963); Byung-hun
Oh, “Students and Politics,” in Edward R. Wright, ed., Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1975), pp. 107-152.
176 Stephen Bradner, “Korea: Experiment and Instability,” Japan Quarterly 8: 4 (1961), p. 414.
177 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968), p. 7.
178 Henderson, 1968, p. 304.
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In this situation, the Chang regime’s task was twofold. The first task was to
create a new concrete political organization that could consolidate the ruling class,
especially the DP. The next step was to find a balancing point between two extremes of
political groups: left-leaning college students and intellectuals who pushed for far-
reaching reforms and punishment for the old crooks under the Rhee regime, and
conservative elites and army officers who were concerned more about political stability.
Chang Myon, however, was successful in none of these tasks. Weak and divided, the
nascent democratic regime was further damaged by political and economic turmoil. The
crime rate doubled since President Rhee had resigned, and corrupt police did not obey
civilian leadership. In this situation, the general public became deeply disillusioned with
crumbling democracy and rampant social disorder.
A sense of national crisis was heightened further as pro-communist groups
proliferated rapidly under the Chang government. The Socialist Party was formed, and a
left-wing newspaper, Minjok Ilbo (People’s Daily), began publishing in February 1961.
The newspaper was reported to receive financial support from an unknown communist
organization based in Japan.179 Another source of security challenge came from the
college students’ idealistic proposal for national reunification. They maintained that
South Korea should pursue a foreign policy of nonalignment between the two
superpowers by distancing from the United States and cultivating a closer relationship
with the Soviets. Furthermore, they urged an immediate dialogue with North Korea for
179 Se-jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 30; Hanguk Ilbo (August 13 and 29, 1961).
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peaceful reunification.180 North Korean authorities immediately welcomed the students’
proposal, demanding free election throughout the Korean peninsula and reducing both
sides’ military forces to 100,000. Even though Chang Myon instantly rejected the
proposals, the left-leaning political groups instigated reactions from the conservative anti-
communist groups, which charged the Chang leadership for its inconsistency and pro-
communist policies. In effect, North Korea’s political propaganda and spy infiltrations
substantially increased during the Second Republic, expanding its influence in Korean
society
Radical college students and growing socialist political groups offended the
general public and high-ranking military officers’ staunch anti-communist sentiment
stemming from the Korean War. The Korean army especially perceived the burgeoning
leftist groups in society as a grave security challenge to the state. Intensifying anti-
communist ideology and Chang Myon’s loss of regime legitimacy brought about crises in
both national security and regime security, which provided a justification for the May
1961 coup d’etat. The first and foremost pledge by the military junta was that “Positive,
uncompromising opposition to communism is the basis of our policy.”181 Furthermore,
the coup forces justified their takeover of power by charging that the civilian leadership
was incapable of carrying out economic development and maintaining political order.182
When a group of army officers staged a coup on May 16, 1961, there was little resistance
180 Dong-A Ilbo (November 2, 1960).
181 Secretariat, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, Military Revolution in Korea
(1961), p. 11.
182 Jung-hee Park, Uri Minjokeui Nagal Gil (Future of Our Nation) (Seoul: Koryo Inc., 1965),
pp. 174-175.
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from the general public; instead, people seemed to accept the coup as an inevitable
remedy for the country’s political, economic, and security predicaments.
As early as 1952, when President Rhee became an authoritarian ruler and
dependent upon army officers to maintain his dictatorial regime, General Park Jung-hee
had conceived of a military coup d’etat. After President Rhee’s election fraud in 1960,
General Park and a small number of young turks in the army planned a coup on May 8,
but the plan was brought to a halt due to the outbreak of the April Student Revolution.
Two days later, eight officers were arrested, charged with “plotting to overthrow the
government,” but all of them were released a few days later.183 General Park and his
followers continued attracting supporters within the army by leading a “purification
campaign” in the military. During the campaign, Park Jung-hee demanded that Army
Chief of Staff Song Yo-chan resign to take responsibility of the military’s engagement in
the 1960 election fraud. Even though Park’s coup attempt did not materialize this time,
young army officers’ support for Park rapidly increased during the Second Republic.
In the early hours of May 16, 1961, a group of about 250 army officers, supported
by about 5,000 soldiers, undertook a speedy and bloodless coup d’etat. With the coup,
the nine-month-old parliamentary democracy was overthrown. Park Jung-hee justified
the coup by criticizing the Chang regime’s pervasive corruption, its inability to defend
the country from communist threats, and the absence of a viable plan for social and
economic development. Park arrested several old politicians, college student activists,
opposition politicians suspected of endorsing pro-communist ideology, and a number of
corrupt businessmen. A Revolutionary Court and Prosecution was set up on July 12 to
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try 697 civilians for their pro-communist activities and political and economic
corruption.184 Less than two months after the coup, Park founded the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) to support the military’s dictatorial rule, with Kim Jong-pil,
his brother-in-law, as the head. The KCIA possessed virtually omnipotent power,
carrying out surveillance not only over army officers but also over civilian politicians,
college students, intellectuals, and the press.
The Military Revolutionary Committee proposed six pledges to the people,
including anti-communism as the prime national policy objective, industrial revolution,
closer military alignment with the United States, fulfillment of all international
agreements, and “a spiritual regeneration of the people.”185 Promises also included the
transfer of the government to civilians and the coup officers’ return to their original
duties right after completing their revolutionary missions.
Even though the coup faced no organized resistance, the junta could not
accomplish complete control over the military or win support from the general public.
One of the important characteristics of the 1961 coup was that it was not staged by the
military as an institution, but by a small number of young officers with similar regional,
educational, and career backgrounds.186 UN Commander-in-Chief General Carter
Magruder declared that “all military personnel in his command [must] support the duly
183 Kim, 1961, p. 78.
184 The Revolutionary Court sentenced 15 civilians to death, 16 to life imprisonment, and 276 to
prison for years. See Robert Scalapino, “Which Route for Korea?” Asian Survey 2: 7 (1962), p. 3.
185 Republic of Korea, Military Revolutionary Committee, A Statement by the Military
Revolutionary Committee (May 16, 1961).
186 The army officers who participated in the 1961 coup d’etat were alumni of the 8th graduates
in the Korean Military Academy. Also they had the similar hometown background of Kyungnam
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recognized Government of the Republic of Korea headed by Prime Minister Chang
Myon,” and asked President Yun Po-sun to mobilize 40,000 soldiers to suppress the coup
plotters.187 President Yun, however, did not respond to General Magruder’s request and
opposed carrying on a counter-coup, arguing that it could lead to civil war. In addition to
the lack of recognition, the junta suffered from factional struggles within the coup
leadership.188
Due to lack of support from within and outside the military, the junta promised to
go back to the barracks as early as possible. In reality, however, Park Jung-hee planned
to consolidate his dictatorial rule through what S. E. Finer termed “quasi-
civilianization.”189 The junta called for presidential elections on October 15, 1963. Right
before the election, General Park retired from the active military duty and ran for the
presidential election as a “civilian” candidate. He organized the Democratic Republican
Party (DRP) and filled the DRP with retired army officers. He won the 1963 presidential
election by a close margin, garnering 42.6 percent of total votes while his competitor,
Yun Po-sun, gained 41.2 percent. Park won again, four years later, in the 1967
presidential election.
province. Yong-won Han, Hangukeui Gunbu Jeongchi (Military Politics in Korea) (Seoul:
Daewangsa, 1993), pp. 210-211.
187 Walter Briggs, “The Military Revolution in Korea: On Its Leader and Achievements,
Koreana Quarterly 5 (1963), p. 30. At the time of the 1961 coup, Prime Minister Chang Myon,
the chief executive, went into hiding in a Catholic church in Seoul.
188 Factional struggles within the Korean military institution had existed from the time of the
state-building period in the late 1940s. But the factional confrontations became ever more severe
under the Rhee regime, as Rhee Syngman exploited the factional struggles to secure his control
over the military institution. For detailed analysis of military factions in the Korean Army, see
Kim, 1971, pp. 36-76.
189 According to Finer, the transition from direct military rule to “quasi-civilianization” is a
recurring phenomenon. See, S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp.
176-190.
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In spite of this quasi-civilianization, army officers became deeply involved in
every aspect of political and economic processes under the Park presidency. As Table 3-
1 shows, a number of retired generals became Congressmen throughout the Park regime.
The presence of the retired officers was even more conspicuous in the executive branch.
Between 1964 and 1979, the Park government’s 314 ministers featured 118 with an
active military background. Park Jung-hee successfully consolidated his grip on the
military by appointing senior army officers in key governmental positions or sending
them to foreign countries as ambassadors.190 Korean society in general was also
militarized further during the Park years. In addition to having more than 600,000
regular military personnel, Park organized all adult male civilians into militia forces and
trained them for domestic defense.
Table 3-1: Military Elite in the National Assembly, 1963-1979191





















190 Se-jung Kim, “Gunbu Gwonuijui Saengseonggwa Jeongae: Je 3.4-Gonghwagookeui
Jeongchigwajeonge Daehan GwonryokJeongchijeok Jeopgeun (Creation and development of
military authoritarianism: an approach to power politics to the 3rd and 4th republic,” in Hung-soo
Han, ed., Hanguk Jeongchi Dongtae Ron (Political Behavior in Korea) (Seoul: Orum, 1996), pp.
271-273.
191 Kwang-oong Kim, “Hanguk Mingun Gwanryo Elite ui Ideology wa Jungchi (The Korean
Politics and the Ideology of the Civilian and Military Elites),” Kyegan Kyunghyang (Spring,
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Military dictatorial rule was firmly consolidated with the declaration of the Yushin
(revitalization) constitution in October 1972, which substantially strengthened
presidential power. On October 17, 1972, Park Jung-hee declared martial law, abolished
the National Assembly, and outlawed any type of political activity. The Yushin
constitution enabled the president to be elected not by the popular vote but by a small
number of congregation selected by Park Jung-hee himself.
Several factors enabled Park Jung-hee to declare Yushin. First of all, the military
regime was exceptionally successful in its major policies. Even though democratic
values were sacrificed with the military dictatorship, South Korea restored high levels of
social and political order and stability. Furthermore, the Park administration was
extremely successful in economic development. Park Jung-hee’s victory in three
consecutive presidential elections (1963, 1967, and 1971) was possible due to remarkable
economic success and social stability.
Table 3-2: Economic Growth under Park Jung-hee, 1961-1979192
































Another, and probably more significant, factor that motivated Park to declare the
1972 Yushin was the degenerating security environments around the Korean peninsula in
the late 1960s. The Vietnam War and the United States’ “abandonment” of Vietnam
caused the Park government to rethink the credibility of the United States’ security
commitment to South Korea. To make matters worse, the Nixon administration
announced a rapprochement policy toward communist China, at the same time revealing
the news that one third of the American troops stationed in Korea would be withdrawn by
1971. In this situation, North Korea drastically increased its armed infiltration into South
Korea.193 During the late 1960s, therefore, Korean society was burdened by a sense of
insecurity.
Table 3-3: North Korea’s Armed Infiltration into South Korea, 1965-1971194

















192 Bank of Korea, Kyongje Tonggye Nyonbo (Annual Economic Statistics) (various volumes);
Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics of Korean Economy (various volumes).
193 On January 31, 1968, for example, a North Korean commando unit infiltrated near to the
Blue House, the presidential mansion, in Seoul to assassinate Park Jung-hee. In the next day, the
U.S. Pueblo and its crew members were captured by the North Korean military. In November the
same year, around 120 North Korean guerrilla forces infiltrated into the north-eastern part of
South Korea, which took almost two months for the Korean army to put down the guerrilla
forces. In April, 1969, a U.S. reconnaissance plane (EC-121) was shot down by North Korea.
For the inter-Korean relationship, the 1960s was the most perilous moment since the end of the
Korean War. See Chang-heon Oh, Yushin Chejewa Hankuk Jeongchi (Yushin and Korean
Politics) (Seoul: Orum, 2001), p. 79.
194 Chang-hon Oh, Yushin Cheje-wa Hyundae Hangukjeongchi (Yushin and Contemporary
Korean Politics) (Seoul: Orum, 2001), p. 78.
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Added to these outside threats, anti-Park demonstrations also heightened domestic
instability to both the state and the regime in the early 1970s. Among the demonstrators,
college students posed the greatest threat to the Park regime. Their demonstrations were
rooted in resistance against the lengthening of compulsory military education in
universities.195 But they also demanded the immediate termination of military
dictatorship and restoration of democracy. Between March and November of 1971, about
300 demonstrations occurred. The Park government declared the Garrison Decree over
Seoul and temporarily closed all of the city’s universities.
With the Yushin constitution, Park Jung-hee consolidated the military-dominant
regime in South Korea until 1979, when he was assassinated by one of his closest
confidants.196 As noted, the failure of civilian leadership—by both Rhee Syngman and
Chang Myon—provided the military with an opportunity for the 1961 military coup and
the installation of a military dictatorship. The extension and consolidation of the
military’s dictatorial rule was possible in the presence of growing security threats both
domestically and internationally. In the aftermath of Park’s death, there occurred another
coup d’etat and military dictatorship led by Chun Doo-whan, which lasted until 1987.197
195 All college students were responsible to take 711 hours of military education, which amounts
to 17 percent of total education curriculum.
196 Park Jung-hee was assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, Head of the Korean Central Intelligence
Agency (KCIA) on October 26, 1979. For detailed description of the 10. 26 assassination, see
Chang-hun Oh, “Yushin Cheje Jedohwaeui Silpae Gwanhan Yeongu (Study of the Failure in the
Institutionalization of Yushin: Political and Institutional Variables),” Korean Political Science
Review 28: 2 (1994).
197 I do not detail the 1980 coup by Chun Doo-whan in this dissertation. For the 1980 coup, see
Chong-sik Lee, “South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of a New Authoritarian Order,” Asian
Survey 21: 1 (January 1980), pp. 125-143; Po-sik Choi, “Je-o Gonghwaguk Jeonya: 12.12 Pyon
(The Eve of the Fifth Republic: The 12. 12 Period),” Wolgan Choson (May 1996), pp. 497-631;
Kyungkyo Seo, Military Involvement in Politics and the Prospects for Democracy: Thailand, the
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II. Indonesia
In Chapter Two, I detailed how domestic security threats during Indonesia’s state-
building process led to the failure of parliamentary democracy and the installation of an
authoritarian regime with Guided Democracy in 1957 and how the ABRI (Angkatan
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) became deeply involved in domestic politics. The
installation of Guided Democracy was an attempt to overcome an ill-functioning
parliamentary system and secure the territorial integrity of the state. With the declaration
of martial law, the central military command of the ABRI was entrusted with extensive
powers to suppress regional rebellions against the central government. In this context,
the army became deeply engaged in civilian administration and the management of key
economic sectors. As a result, Guided Democracy and martial law resulted in the army
officers’ deeper penetration into domestic politics and the growth of the ABRI’s
corporate economic interests.
Guided Democracy with strong presidential power provided the state with some
level of political stability for a short time in the late 1950s. During this period, President
Sukarno secured his political leadership by maintaining a delicate power balance between
the two most influential and competing political actors—the PKI (Partai Kommunis
Indonesia, the Indonesian Communist Party) and the ABRI. The Communist Party
emerged as an influential political group in Indonesia in the 1950s by supporting liberal
democracy and political freedom as a strategy to broaden its support base among the
Indonesian people. Political freedom and free elections in the parliamentary democracy
enabled the PKI to emerge as one of the most influential political groups from the
Philippines, and South Korea in Comparative Perspective, Ph. D Dissertation (University of
134
elections, winning 17 percent of the vote in 1955 and 27.4 percent in the 1957 provincial
elections in Java.198 When Guided Democracy was proclaimed, however, the PKI turned
its attitudes from supporting liberal democracy to endorsing the PNI (Partai Nasional
Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party) and Sukarno’s authoritarian leadership.
While President Sukarno strengthened his political ties with the PKI, he also
developed a cooperative relationship with the ABRI as a way of counterbalancing the
PKI. Originally, Guided Democracy was effective due to the army officers’ active
support. Guided Democracy and martial law strengthened the ABRI’s political influence
in central and provincial administrations by launching a territorial command structure
that stretched from the central military headquarters in Jakarta down to the local levels.199
As a result, army officers in provinces exercised executive authority equal to that of
civilian administrators.
President Sukarno and central army leadership formed a strategic partnership to
put down regional insurrections and strengthen the president’s power by putting an end to
the parliamentary democracy. In return, the ABRI extended its influence into political
and economic arenas, which were legitimatized by General Nasution’s “middle way”
Southern Illinois at Carbondale, 1993).
198 In the 1955 elections, four parties won almost equal numbers of vote. Two of these were
Islamist parties (Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama), the other two parties were nationalist parties
(PNI and PKI). For 1957 provincial election results, see Ulf Sundhaussen, “Indonesia: Past and
Present Encounters with Democracy,” in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin
Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume Three: Asia (London: Adamantine
Press Limited, 1989), p. 434.
199 For more detailed analysis of the ABRI’s territorial command structure, see, Damien
Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp.
67-139; Thomas E. Sidwell, The Indonesian Military: Dwi Fungsi and Territorial Operations
(Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995).
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doctrine.200 The middle way doctrine declared that the ABRI would not limit its mission
within its function of national defense. Rather, army officers would assume a more
active role in all levels of government to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state.201
For army officers, close relationship with Sukarno provided a justification for their
engagement in domestic political, administrative, and economic affairs. For Sukarno’s
part, the ABRI was instrumental to preserving both state and regime security and to
balancing against the growing influence of the PKI.
Since all regional insurrections were effectively put down with martial law,
Sukarno and the ABRI marched together to recover West Irian which was still occupied
by the Dutch and therefore was a symbol of national humiliation for both political elites
and the general public. The recovery campaign could become a means to enhancing
support from domestic audiences. This campaign eventually resulted in strengthening the
ABRI’s political position as it escalated from diplomatic disputes to an armed battle. In
December 1961, Sukarno set up the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian
under his leadership, appointing General Nasution as his deputy and Major General
Suharto as commander of the military operation.202 The West Irian campaign, with
United States’ diplomatic support, succeeded in 1963.
As the ABRI gained more prestige in the Sukarno government after the West Irian
campaign, Sukarno felt threatened by the ABRI’s growing influence and from his own
200 William Liddle R., “Indonesia’s Democratic Past and Future,” Comparative Politics 24: 4
(1992), p. 446.
201 For more discussion about the middle way doctrine, see C. L. M. Penders and Ulf
Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography (St. Lucia: University of Queensland
Press, 1985).
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excessive dependence upon army officers. Thus, he began to strengthen his ties with
other political groups including the PKI, the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, Muslim Teachers’
Party, a conservative Sunni Islamic group), and the PNI to curb the increasingly
influential ABRI.203 Sukarno’s alliance with these political groups led him to declare the
doctrine of “Nasakom,” which included nationalism, regionalism, and communism as the
organizing principles of national unity. The Nasakom doctrine, the President believed,
would become a channel for national unity by incorporating diverse political and
religious forces into a cooperative relationship.
The unstable balance between the ABRI and the PKI until the early 1960s began
to destabilize the Sukarno regime as he adopted several policy initiatives that the PKI
endorsed. The PKI became more influential and challenged the ABRI’s prerogatives in
the government. The antagonism between the two groups further deepened with the issue
of the creation of an independent Malaysia. Malaysian state-building was seen by
President Sukarno and the PKI as a British project that attempted to establish a puppet
regime to perpetuate neocolonial rule in the neighbor territory. Sukarno and the PKI
initiated a “Crush Malaysia” campaign, called Konfrontasi, which escalated into a
military campaign in August 1964.204
While the PKI enthusiastically supported Sukarno’s Crush Malaysia campaign
from the beginning, the ABRI was in a position to follow it only hesitantly. Army
202 Rudolf O. G. Roeder, The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia (Jakarta:
Gunung Agung, 1969), p. 195.
203 Another influential political party, Muslim Masyumi (Majdjelis Sjuro, Muslim Indonesia),
was banned after the declaration of Guided Democracy.
204 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988), p. 57.
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officers, with a strong self-image as the only organization that truly represented national
interests, could not oppose the campaign openly since, like the West Irian campaign, it
was closely connected with the general public’s sense of national prestige. If the ABRI
had opposed the campaign, its image could have been severely damaged.
In the meantime, even though the Konfrontasi was not popular among the
moderate political groups in Indonesia, the PKI vehemently carried on a campaign to
shift the Indonesians’ hostility toward the PKI onto Britain and the United States.205 At
the same time, the communist forces attempted to garner support from the nationalist and
anti-colonialist segments in the country. The PKI charged that the federation of Malaysia
was nothing more than a “form of neocolonialism” and a British strategy to extend
influence in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).206 In January 1964,
members of the PKI occupied several British plantations in Indonesia and launched a
campaign against the United States supporting the independence of Malaysia. The anti-
Western demonstration reached its zenith when the U.S. military forces started massive
air raids on North Vietnam. The Konfrontasi ended after General Suharto controlled the
government with the 1965 coup d’etat. In 1966, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace
treaty.
The PKI’s influence in the Sukarno government extended further into other
domestic issues, including land reform and the reduction of the size of the ABRI and its
economic role. The PKI’s land reform campaign (aski sepihak, unilateral action) began
205 John O. Sutter, “Two Faces of Konfrontasi: “Crush Malaysia” and the Gestapu,” Asian
Survey 6: 10 (1966), p. 527.
206 Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1965), p. 273.
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in Central and East Java, but soon spread to other regions in West Java and Sumatra.
Major targets of the land reform campaign were not only regional landlords who had
close ties with the PNI and the NU, but also government-owned properties that were
managed by ABRI officers.207 The PKI’s unilateral action caused violent conflicts
between the PKI-led peasants and regional landlords who aligned with regional military
units during the early 1960s. The PKI’s land reform initiative, coupled with the Crush
Malaysia campaign, provoked the ABRI, as the former threatened the corporate interests
of the latter.
In the foreign policy area, the Sukarno regime, now under the heavy influence of
the PKI, isolated itself from major Western powers by withdrawing its membership from
the United Nations and moving closer to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of
China.208 In 1965, Sukarno announced his leadership role within the formation of an
international alliance for anti-imperialist and nonalignment movements, including
countries such as Indonesia, North Vietnam, Communist China, North Korea, and other
left-leaning countries. At the same time, the PKI built up close ties with, and gained
financial support from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Sukarno government’s
foreign policy during the early 1960s significantly damaged its relationship with the
United States and other Western countries.
The Sukarno government’s unfriendly relationship with the West and inconsistent
domestic economic policies caused the economic crisis of the 1960s. The withdrawal
207 Crouch, 1988, p. 64.
208 For Sukarno’s foreign policy toward the Communist states and the PKI’s influence in this
process, see Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-
1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974).
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from international organizations such as the United Nations and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) led to an economic crisis.209 In the aftermath of the campaign to
“Crush Malaysia,” the IMF put off financial credits from Indonesia. At the same time,
the United States canceled its plan to provide new economic aid to the country. By 1965,
inflation stood at 600 percent, the price of rice rose 900 percent, and poverty and hunger
were widespread.210 The budget deficit reached 300 percent of total governmental
revenues.
By the early 1960s, Sukarno’s design of political equilibrium between the PKI
and the ABRI was quickly breaking down, as the president moved closer to the PKI in
several political and policy issues. A series of events curtailed the ABRI’s influence in
the government. In June 1962, Sukarno announced extensive structural and personnel
changes in the ABRI hierarchy. With these changes, Sukarno became Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, exerting more influence in the ABRI. In the area of
personnel changes, Army Chief of Staff Abdul Haris Nassution was forced to hand over
his position to Major General Ahmad Yani. Moreover, army officers of the Yani faction
were promoted to commander positions in the ABRI hierarchy, which in turn was directly
controlled by Sukarno. This relegated General Nasution to a mere administrative head of
the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces staff, without actual power in the army.211
209 For the IMF’s and the U.S’ decision to withdraw economic support, see Jamie A. C. Mackie,
Konfrontasi: The Indonesian-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966 (London: Oxford University Press,
1974).
210 David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz, Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader (New York:
Routledge, 2003), p. 6.
211 On July 1, 1962, Nasution gave up his position, Assistant Body to the Supreme War
Authority, to Yani. In May 1964, Sukarno abolished the Committee for the Retooling of the State
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By getting rid of General Nasution, who had been an emblematic leader among army
officers since the inception of the Republic, Sukarno tried to restrain the ABRI’s
influence in politics.
Another critical event that enraged the ABRI was Sukarno’s lifting of martial law
in 1963. The installation of Guided Democracy and martial law in 1957 was quite
successful in suppressing various regional rebellious components, including the Darul
Islam in West Java, rebellions in Sulawesi, and the West Irian campaign. Since domestic
security threats had dwindled significantly by the early 1960s, President Sukarno lifted
martial law and cut defense spending by 47 percent in 1963.212 Military budget
reductions put ABRI commanders in a difficult position, since they had to downsize
military personnel. Army generals, however, were not willing to reduce the number of
their forces while facing growing communist threats domestically and internationally. By
this time, senior army officers were determined to fight back against the PKI-dominant
Sukarno regime. Rumors were spreading that a group of army generals who were
receiving support from the United States were plotting coup d’etat to topple Sukarno and
the PKI.
Before the coup was executed, however, a group of pro-PKI officers, led by
Lieutenant Colonel Untung and allied with two army battalions and the air force,
launched a preemptive coup during the night of September 30, 1965.213 The coup plotters
Apparatus which had been headed by Nasution. Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power:
Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 163-164.
212 Donald Hindley, “Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives,” Asian
Survey 4. (1964), p. 904.
213 For the Untung coup and the PKI’s role in the coup, see Daniel S. Lev, “Indonesia 1965: The
Year of the Coup,” Asian Survey 6: 2 (1966).
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kidnapped and killed six highest-ranking officers of the ABRI. They occupied part of
Jakarta and declared that they seized power to protect President Sukarno and prevent a
coup by army generals who were allegedly backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency.214 It took less than 24 hours, however, for Major General Suharto to put down
the Untung group and regain control over the ABRI. It was reported that the PKI was
behind the coup attempt and, during the six months following the aborted coup, more
than a half-million PKI members and communist sympathizers were killed by ABRI
forces.215 Army officers took a leading role in the massacre, but other civilian groups,
especially Muslim youth groups, also joined in crushing the PKI.
The aborted coup attempt marked a power transition from the Sukarno-PKI
coalition to a military-dominant authoritarian regime led by General Suharto, the highest-
ranking general among ABRI officers. The period from 1965 to 1967 was a critical
moment in Indonesian politics in which, under Suharto’s leadership, the military
established its political hegemony and redirected the country from the leftist orientation
toward one integrated with the global capitalist system, and closely tied to major Western
powers. In March 1966, President Sukarno forcefully stepped down, transferred power to
General Suharto, and was put under virtual house arrest. In June 1966, the National
Consultative Assembly (or Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly) endorsed
Suharto’s authority and, one year later, it elected Suharto as Acting President. In March
214 Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and “The Third Wave of Democratization”: The Indonesian Pro-
Democracy Movement in a Changing World (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997), p. 40.
215 During the 1960s, the PKI came to realize that there was no way but to take the total control
over the government to achieve its strategic goals. See, Sutter, 1966, p. 534.
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1968, Suharto became President, and was confirmed in his post by Indonesian voters in
the 1971 elections.
The elimination of Sukarno and the PKI left the ABRI as the dominant political
force in the post-coup period. The first thing that Suharto and the army leadership did
after gaining power was to ban the Communist Party and dismiss 14 ministers from the
government. In addition, Suharto reorganized the ABRI to strengthen his
commandership, purged officers with pro-communist ideology and pro-Sukarnoism, and
took away powers from the regional military commanders. Suharto secured his control
over the ABRI by getting rid of the Chief of Staff’s power to command troops and by
downsizing the elite troops. Furthermore, Suharto filled key positions in the army with
officers he personally trusted. There were two kinds of officers who rose to power under
Suharto’s rule: officers personally loyal to Suharto on the one hand, and politically
inconsequential officers on the other.216
With the installation of Suharto’s New Order, the ABRI became more deeply
engaged in domestic political, administrative, and economic affairs. Suharto dispatched
army officers throughout the archipelago to maintain internal security by repressing any
possibility of opposition to the central government. The ABRI played a vital role in
strengthening the central government’s control over local governments and military units.
President Suharto issued limited tours of duty for regional commanders and appointed
216 Among the Suharto loyalists were General Leonardus Benyamin Murdani, Admiral Sudomo,
and General Yoga Sugama. Politically influential officers included General Maraden Panggabean
and General Mohamad Jusuf. Suharto loyalists had had close ties with the President for a long
period of time; the officers of the second category came from regional military divisions outside
Java. See Salim Said, “Suharto’s Armed Forces: Building a Power Base in New Order Indonesia,
1966-1998,” Asian Survey 38: 6 (1998), pp. 536-538.
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officers from outside the region to the commandership positions.217 In addition, the
ABRI was automatically guaranteed 20 percent of seats in the legislative body at all
levels of government. In the domestic economic area, the military officers’ role further
expanded under the New Order regime. Suharto extended preferential treatment to the
military-owned businesses after monopolizing certain economic sectors.218 Some officers
were appointed as directors of public corporations (including the state-owned oil
companies), while others founded joint ventures with civilian businessmen,
predominantly of Chinese ethnicity. As a result, the ABRI’s political role further
increased throughout the years of the Suharto leadership from the late 1960s up until
1998 when he stepped down from his presidency.
In addition to safeguarding his political power by using the ABRI, President
Suharto also organized a political party, Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Group), to
have his own electoral organization. Unlike other political parties in a general sense, the
Golkar was a federation of various functional groups such as youth, farmers’, and
women’s organizations that were arranged by elites in Indonesian society. These loose
organizations had existed before Suharto rose to power, but he mobilized them into a
political-party type entity.219 Suharto managed tight control over the Golkar Party by
appointing party leaders from the top to the lower levels and exerting heavy influence
217 John M. Allison, “Indonesia: Year of the Pragmatists,” Asian Survey 9: 2 (1969), p. 132.
218 For the military’s economic role under the Suharto regime, see J. Kristiadi, “The Armed
Forces,” in Richard W. Baker, M. Hadi Soesastro, J. Kristiadi, and Douglas E. Ramage, eds.,
Indonesia: The Challenge of Change (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Robert Lowry,
Indonesian Defense Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces (Canberra: Strategic and Defence
Studies Center, Australian National University, 1993).
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over the decision-making process within the party. Army officers were instrumental in
building the Golkar. Even though active ABRI officers were not allowed to take
leadership roles in the party, an advisory council that was composed of retired generals
directed the Golkar Party from behind the scenes. For Suharto’s rule, the Golkar
functioned as the most instrumental element to control the bureaucracy, the military, and
civilian society in general, as all members of the bureaucracy and the army had to be
members of the Golkar.
With the installation of a military-dominant authoritarianism, Indonesia was able
to control various components of domestic instability. Major sources of domestic
security threats at the local levels were effectively suppressed with a more centralized
military commandership under Suharto. His seizure of power was welcomed by the non-
communist world countries.220 Suharto’s cooperative relationship with major Western
powers had the effect of stabilizing the domestic economy. As OPEC hiked up oil prices
in the 1970s, Indonesia’s economic prospects improved considerably, and its dependence
on foreign aid was reduced significantly. Suharto’s success in economic and security
areas enabled him to maintain his authoritarian rule until 1998.
219 The Golkar party was organized in 1964 by the Army officers to compete with the PKI. For
the formation and development of Golkar, see David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative
to the Party System (London: Oxford University Press, 1985).
220 It has been presumed that the United States and other major powers actively supported the
Indonesian Army’s seizure of power and suppression of the PKI. See Peter D. Scott, “The United
States and the Overthrow of Sukarno,” Pacific Affairs 58: 2 (1985), pp. 239-264; Geoffrey
Robinson, “Indonesia: On a New Course?” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance:
The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001),
p. 227.
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Military’s Participation in Politics: Civilian Control over the Politicized
Army in Taiwan and the Philippines
In the previous two sections, I examined the military coups in South Korea and
Indonesia. In these cases, the armed forces overthrew fragile civilian leadership and
established military dictatorships (South Korea, 1960s-1980s and Indonesia, 1960s-
1990s). The remaining two cases—the Philippines (1960s-1980s) and Taiwan (1950s-
1980s)—represent the military’s deep penetration in governing process under the
guidance of civilian authoritarian leadership. The question to be addressed in the
remaining two sections is, therefore, what factors contributed to preventing the military’s
domination.
III. The Philippines
From the inception of the Republic to the overthrow of Marcos in 1986, the
political roles of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) evolved in three distinct
stages. In the first juncture, the AFP was created as a politically neutral and professional
organization under American tutelage. In the next, President Marcos, with the
declaration of martial law, turned politically neutral officers in the AFP into politically
influential actors. In the third stage, a group of politically influential generals withdrew
support from their master and played a decisive role in Marcos’ downfall.
This section details the ways in which President Marcos managed his authority
over politicized army officers throughout his authoritarian rule, focusing on the factors
that thwarted military coup throughout the Marcos regime. This section explores how
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Marcos’ personalistic control over the AFP undermined army professionalism, promoted
factional struggles, and in the end led to the withdrawal of officers’ support for him.
Even though there was no coup during Marcos’ rule, his manipulation of army officers
made them even more politically active, which brought about a highly unstable
democratization during the late 1980s.
During the early years of martial law, Marcos and the AFP maintained a cordial
and cooperative relationship. The declaration of martial law was possible only through
the support of a dozen high-ranking officers, who were called the “twelve disciples.” The
twelve disciples included, among others, Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, Armed
Forces Chief of Staff Romeo C. Espino, Philippine Army commanding officer Fidel V.
Ramos, and Philippine Navy Commander Favian Ver.221 President Marcos consulted
with these officers concerning the declaration of martial law, and in turn, these officers
helped fortify Marcos’ authoritarian rule.
After all the politically influential actors—opposition parties, Congress, college
students, and labor unions—were eliminated from the political scene, the military became
a primary means for President Marcos to govern the country. For this reason, Marcos
provided army officers with various incentives, including promotions, higher pay and
military budgets, extension of tenures beyond term limits, and other economic incentives.
For the AFP’s part, Marcos was instrumental in guaranteeing its organizational interests
and justifying its participation in domestic political and economic affairs. Thus, during
221 Carolina G. Hernandez, The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines,
1946-1976, Ph. D. Dissertation (State University of New York at Buffalo, 1979), p. 217.
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the early years of martial law, Marcos and the top brass of the army managed an
accommodating relationship.
At the same time, however, Marcos was well aware of the danger of becoming too
dependent upon the armed forces to maintain his presidency. Since all opposition forces
were eliminated under martial law, the AFP became the only remaining politically
influential organization and, therefore, the greatest threat to his power.222 For this reason,
the first thing Marcos did after declaring martial law was to make army officers
dependent upon his authority to prevent them from developing into a politically
autonomous institution.
Throughout his presidential tenure, Marcos designed a delicate personalistic
control mechanism over the military organization. Although all AFP officers were
promoted by one grade immediately after martial law was declared, their subsequent
tenure was to be renewed once every six months, depending upon a review of their
allegiance to the president. President Marcos positioned the officer corps from his home
Ilocos region in the highest and most important posts of the AFP. The “Ilocanization” of
army officers had already begun in Marcos’ legal presidency, when he served
concurrently as Secretary of Defense for the first 13 months of his term, and stayed on
during the martial law period.223 Among officers from the Ilocos region, General Fidel
Ramos and Major General Fabian Ver were the most influential figures under Marcos’
222 Richard J. Kessler, “Development and the Military: Role of the Philippine Military in
Development,” in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Chong, eds., Soldiers and Stability in
Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), p. 222.
223 For detailed information about the Ilocanization of the Philippine Armed Forces, see Carl H.
Lande, “The Political Crisis,” in John Bresnan ed., Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and
Beyond (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 134-136; also see Chapter Two of this
dissertation.
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rule.224 Officers who either came from Ilocos or were personally connected with Marcos
or his wife were promoted to the highest positions in the military hierarchy.
The personalistic control over the AFP had a destructive impact on military
professionalism and increased factional struggles among army officers. While officers of
the Ilocos region received enormous benefits and monopolized key commandership
positions, other officers who were non-Ilocos or unclear in their loyalty to the president
were assigned to areas outside Metro Manila to conduct dangerous counter-insurgency
warfare with the New People’s Army (NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF).225 Officers outside Marcos’ inner circle became increasingly frustrated as they
found themselves fighting the proliferating insurgent forces without sufficient equipment
or training. Many junior officers became infuriated that Marcos was not seriously
concerned about state security, but instead only the security of his regime.
Marcos was able to control high-ranking army officers by instigating factional
competition based on education, region, and religious-linguistic identity. The top brass
was divided almost evenly between graduates of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
and four-year university graduates with ROTC commissions. The factional struggles
between these two groups were emblematized by two senior officers: (1) General Ver
who was a graduate of the University of the Philippines and was supported by the highly
politicized ROTC officers; and (2) General Fidel Ramos who, even though not a PMA
224 In the martial law regime, General Ramos was appointed as the new commanding general of
the Philippine Constabulary; Major General Ver became the Presidential Security Command.
David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988), p. 147.
225 Benjamin Muego, Spectator Society: The Philippine Under Martial Rule (Athens: Ohio
University Center for International Studies, 1988), p. 148.
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alumnus, graduated from West Point in the United States and gained great respect from
junior-level and more professionalized army officers. As time passed, the factional
struggles came to have clear-cut lines between the PMA and non-PMA officers.226
The power balance between the two factions, however, changed in favor of
General Ver’s side, while the Ramos faction became marginalized in the Marcos circle.
Marcos began to distance himself from senior officers such as Defense Minister Enrile,
AFP Chief of Staff Romeo Espino, and Philippine Constabulary Commander Ramos by
removing them from the chain of command in the AFP.227 On the other hand, Marcos
trusted General Ver and gave him more powers, positioning him to head the Presidential
Security Command (PSC) and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA).
In turn, General Ver tightened his control over the PSC by placing his three sons in key
positions.228 The PSC and the NICA functioned as Marcos’ secret police, responsible for
eliminating any anti-Marcos movements within both the armed forces and civil society.
The rift between Marcos and a group of junior officers loyal to General Ramos
became pronounced as the president faced multiple challenges in the late 1970s. Marcos
struggled with a deteriorating domestic economy, intensifying opposition from Catholic
Church leaders, growing domestic insurgency movements with the NPA and the MNLF
strengthening their sphere of influence, and emerging political opposition from civil
society groups. But the most serious blow to the legitimacy of the Marcos regime was
226 Eva-Lotta Hedman, “The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil,” in Alagappa, ed.,
2001, pp. 177-178.
227 In 1978, Marcos circulated Letter of Instructions No. 776, which excluded Enrile and Espino
from the assignment and promotion of the military personnel. Cecilio T. Arrilo, Breakaway
(Manila: Kyodo, 1986), p. 132.
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the assassination of Benigno Aquino, the former Senator and presidential competitor to
Marcos in the early 1970s.229
Marcos’ justification for the extension of his presidential tenure and martial law
relied significantly upon his economic performance during the first few years of his
presidency. In the 1970s, the Marcos government was successful in improving economic
conditions, with GNP growth over 6 percent per year, mainly due to sound economic
policies designed by technocrats.230
Table 3-4: Economic Conditions under the Marcos Presidency, 1975-1983231
1975-79 1981 1983
Real GNP growth 6.4 3.4 1.1
Foreign Debt (billion $US) 4.9 20.9 24.8
Trade deficit/GNP -4.9 -5.4 -8.1
Fiscal deficit/GNP -1.3 -4.0 -2.0
The rejuvenated economy in the early years of martial law gave rise to broad-
based support for Marcos’ rule. After 1979, however, the Philippine economy suffered
continuous decline. The second oil shock in 1979, the worldwide recession, and
domestic economic scandals were responsible for an economic decline by the early
1980s. The economic growth rate plunged drastically, while foreign debt and the
228 General Ver’s three sons in the PSC included Colonel Irwin Ver, Lieutenant Col. Rexor Ver,
and Major Wyrlo Ver.
229 Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of
Authoritarianism (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 24.
230 Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 205-207.
231 Stephan Haggard, “The Political Economy of the Philippine Debt Crisis,” in Joan M. Nelson,
Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 235; Mark R. Thomson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle:
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governmental budget deficit multiplied. Furthermore, the 1983 political crisis caused by
the assassination of former Senator Aquino resulted in a massive flight of foreign capital.
During the final two years of Marcos’ rule, GNP growth dropped by 5.3 percent, inflation
swelled by 50 percent, and the unemployment rate rose to 36 percent.232
The economic crisis of the early 1980s impaired Marcos’ political standing in
several ways. First of all, the continuous economic decline evaporated the support for the
Marcos regime from the business communities that previously had maintained a cordial
relationship with the president. Even before he became president, Marcos established a
patron-client relationship with wealthy business families. These business groups
received enormous benefits from Marcos’ favoritism during the martial law years. In
turn, these business elites provided important financial support to the Marcos regime.233
The Makati-based and Filipino-Chinese were hit especially hard by the economic
crisis. Marcos’ relationship with the business elites of Chinese ethnicity worsened as his
government tried to track their currency transactions for governmental revenues. These
Manila-based economic elites did not oppose Marcos’ authoritarian rule as long as the
president did not intervene in their economic interests. But the economic crisis of the
1980s forced Marcos to interfere in the conglomerates’ corruption and tax evasion. In
response, the business elite resisted Marcos’ policy by organizing street demonstrations,
in which more than 100,000 workers marched in the streets on September 14, 1983.
Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1995), p. 120.
232 Bernardo Villegas, “The Economic Crisis,” in Bresnan ed., 1986, p. 145.
233 For more information on the patron-client relationship in the Marcos regime, see John F.
Doherty, Who Controls the Philippines Economy: Some Need Not Try as Hard as Others
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1982).
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Furthermore, Filipino-Chinese businesses began to secretly provide financial support to
opposition political groups.234
More damagingly, poor economic performance also had the effect of
strengthening the insurgency movements of the NPA and the MNLF. In the early years
of martial law, Marcos was effective in weakening these insurgency movements through
effective counter-insurgency operations in the Southern provinces. From the late 1970s,
however, the NPA and the MNLF were rejuvenated in several regions as economic
conditions worsened. Those insurgency groups expanded their influence as impoverished
farmers joined the rebel groups. The CPP and NPA significantly expanded their
membership and influence not only in provincial areas but also in the Metro Manila area,
while the Muslim MNLF became somewhat weaker due to the lack of foreign support
and a leadership crisis inside the organization (see Table 2-7 in Chapter Two for the
CPP/NPA and MNLF strengths during the Marcos era).
While the CPP/NPA and MNLF insurgencies posed a serious threat to national
security, the general public’s turn against the Marcos dictatorship posed grave security
crisis to the regime. The Catholic Church’s leadership exerted a tremendous influence
over public opinion, given that over 85 percent of the population was Catholic.235 In the
early years of Marcos’ rule, Church leaders were ambivalent about martial law and tried
to avoid political involvement. During this period, Church leaders formed a Church-
234 Lewis M. Simons, Worth Dying For (New York: William Morrow, 1987), pp. 55-56; Sandra
Burton, Impossible Dream: The Marcoses, the Aquinos, and the Unfinished Revolution (New
York: Warner Books, 1989), p. 277.
235 For information on state-church relationship under the Marcos rule, see Richard P. Hardy,
The Philippine Bishops Speak (1968-1983) (Quezon City: Maryknoll School of Theology, 1984);
Pasquale T. Giordano, Awakening to Mission: The Philippine Catholic Church 1965-1981
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Military Committee and focused on investigating mistreatment of political prisoners and
other human rights violations by armed forces personnel.236 The Church-Marcos
relationship deteriorated as the army arrested several Church leaders who joined or
secretly supported the NPA rebellion.237 The Catholic Church provided critical
leadership in the struggle that led to the fall of Marcos and the subsequent
democratization process in the Philippines.
By the early 1980s, the political, economic, and security environments all were
turning against Marcos and, in this situation, he became more dependent upon army
officers, especially General Ver and his followers. The greatest threat to his regime
arrived with the news that former Senator Benigno Aquino was returning to the
Philippines from a decade-long exile in the United States. On his return to the Manila
airport on August 21, 1983, however, he was assassinated by a gunman. It was suspected
that the first lady, Imelda Marcos, and General Ver were responsible for the
assassination. Aquino’s assassination caused massive anti-Marcos demonstrations in
which millions of Filipinos participated. The Catholic Church and Manila-based business
elites took leading roles in organizing the so-called “Parliament of the Streets.”238
Marcos’ personalistic rule over and factionalization of the AFP ultimately resulted
in the loss of control over certain segments of the army, especially with the deterioration
of political, economic, and security conditions. Deeply disappointed with corruption,
(Quezon City: New Day, 1988); Wilfredo Fabros, The Church and Its Social Involvement in the
Philippines 1930-1972 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988).
236 Task-Force Detainees, Philippine Human Rights Update (Manila, monthly issues for periods
covered); Kessler, 1989, p. 137.
237 Manila’s Jamime Cardinal Sin took a leading role in criticizing the Marcos’ dictatorial rule
and human rights violations.
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factional struggle, and the loss of professionalism in the AFP, a group of junior officers
headed by Colonel Gregorio Honasan created a secret fraternity, named Reform the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM).239 Most RAM members were PMA
graduates who had combat experience against Muslim and Communist insurgents
throughout the 1970s but were outside Marcos’ inner circle. These RAM officers were
furious about the promotion system in the AFP, as they were systematically excluded
from the higher ranks while Manila-based officers from the Ilocos region and responsible
for the security of Marcos monopolized most of the senior generalship. The RAM
officers demanded improved training, better equipment, a merit-based promotion system,
and military professionalism. They stressed that professionalization of the army was the
only way to restore its ability to succeed in defeating the insurgencies.240
After Aquino’s assassination, the RAM went further to demand that Marcos step
down from his presidency. At this time, RAM members devised a plan to overthrow the
Marcos government and, if necessary, assassinate him and establish a military junta with
a target date of mid-1987. The coup plan, however, was called off after Marcos
unexpectedly announced a presidential election to be held in early 1986. In February
1986, General Ramos and General Enrile hastened the revolt plan, leading to the
disintegration of army officers’ rally for Marcos.241 When the 1986 presidential election
result was inconclusive with both Marcos and his competitor Corazon Aquino declaring
238 Thomson, 1995, p. 8.
239 As early as 1978, a group of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates formed a
clandestine fraternity. In January 1980, a group of about 200 soldiers were arrested in charge of a
coup attempt. Kessler, 1989, p. 128.
240 Rodney Tasker, “The Hidden Hand,” Far Eastern Economic Review (August 1, 1985), pp.
10-11.
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victory, the RAM under the leadership of Ramos and Enrile played a decisive role in the
ouster of Marcos and establishment of a new democratic government led by Corzaon
Aquino, the widow of former Senator Aquino.
Unlike the cases of South Korea and Indonesia, the AFP did not execute a coup
and establish military dictatorship during Marcos’ rule. The absence of a coup during
this period was largely due to Marcos’ ability control the political power of high-ranking
officers. But his personalistic control over the AFP damaged professionalism and
organizational unity while inflating factional struggles. Therefore, even though there was
no coup, the AFP was further politicized during Marcos years, which became a stumbling
block for the democratization process in the late 1980s, as RAM officers staged seven
major coup attempts within the first four years of the Aquino presidency as will be
explained in Chapter Four.
IV. Taiwan
Of the four cases under study, Taiwan demonstrates the most stable civil-military
relations; the Taiwanese army was under strong civilian leadership from the 1950s until
recent years. In this respect, the Taiwanese case from the 1960s to the 1980s provides a
different path of historical development than the Philippine case in which politicized AFP
officers turned against their civilian master and overthrew him. This section explores the
factors that promoted a strong civilian guidance over the Taiwanese military even when
the officers had a strong influence in domestic politics. I suggest that a confluence of
several factors—changes in security environments, the strength of civilian leadership, and
241 Kessler, 1989, p. 130.
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professionalized control of the armed forces—produced strong civilian control over the
military.
After losing mainland China and retreating to Formosa Island in 1949, the
Kuomintang (KMT) government’s immediate task was to build a strong military capable
of coping with severe domestic and international threats and, in the long run, of retaking
the mainland territory. To undertake the task of building a strong state, Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek’s first mission was to reform the KMT party with ideological
indoctrination and strong leadership. The Chiang government established a single-party
authoritarian state, and the military became the party’s army that was directly subordinate
to the KMT party. The party organization, in turn, was highly centralized and placed
under the direct control of Chiang Kai-shek (1927-1975) and later his son Chiang Ching-
kuo (1975-1988).242
It was Chiang’s strong conviction that the defeat in the civil war with the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) was due to rampant corruption, lack of discipline, and factional
struggles within the KMT party and the army. Therefore, Chiang’s first priority after
retreating to Taiwan was a thorough organizational restructuring of the party and the
government. The factional struggle within the party had been a constant problem since
Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925. The most influential factions in the party included the C.C.
Clique, Whampoa Military Clique, Western Hills Group, Political Study Group, and local
242 Monte R. Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan’s
Development (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 3.
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military leaders.243 The center of the party lost control over its local branches, and party
elites’ corruption became an easy pathway for Communist infiltration into the KMT party
organization. Chiang Kai-shek strongly believed that the Nationalists’ defeat on the
mainland was not due to the military weaknesses but due to the Communists’
organizational strength and ideological indoctrination.
As a consequence, Chiang’s party reorganization plan focused on removing
factions and establishing a highly centralized and ideologically-indoctrinated party.244 In
August 1950, Chiang created a Central Reorganization Commission (CRC) that consisted
of 16 members who were hand-picked by Chiang himself and would supervise the
direction of the KMT party reform. The first reform move was to purge the Chen
brothers, who were the leaders of the C.C. Clique and responsible for endemic corruption
in the party. The reform drive also removed many of Chiang’s long-time political allies,
such as T.V. Soong and H. H. Kung, from party leadership.245
The party reorganization followed six principles: the Party (1) was to be a
revolutionary democratic party; (2) should spread out into various social groups such as
farmers, workers, youth groups, and intellectuals; (3) was to be democratic centralist; (4)
was to adopt the Leninist party’s organizational structure; (5) would provide political
leadership in all areas of governmental policies; and (6) should pledge allegiance to Sun
243 For more detailed information and analysis about the KMT Party reorganization in 1950-
1952, see Bruce J. Dickson, “The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on
Taiwan 1950-1952,” The China Quarterly 133 (1993), pp. 56-84.
244 Chiang Kai-shek retired from the presidency when his troops lost the mainland in 1949, but
still retained his leadership in the party behind the scene. In 1950, Chiang regained his
presidency when the Legislative Yuan asked him to carry on his presidency.
245 Keith Maguire, The Rise of Modern Taiwan (Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), p. 32.
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Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People.246 Both Chiang Kai-shek and his son Ching
Kuo had been trained in Soviet military academies and had learned the ideological and
organizational advantages of a Leninist party. Chiang thus reorganized the party into one
based on the principles of “democratic centralism” meaning that all the important powers
were concentrated in the hands of the party chairman, Chiang himself, and the Central
Standing Committee.247
As a crucial component of the party reorganization drive, Chiang Kai-shek also
restructured party-army relations by introducing a “political commissar system,” or a so-
called “political warfare system,” to the army. To build a political commissar system,
Chiang created the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) and appointed his son
Chiang Ching-kuo as the GWPD’s first director. The primary function of the GWPD was
to check and reinforce the political reliability of military officers, youth (high school and
university students), and the general public. One of Chiang’s main concerns was to
prevent pro-communist infiltration into the armed forces. During the early 1950s, it was
reported that several high-ranking generals were found to be agents of the CCP.248 Thus,
Chiang Ching-kuo, the GWPD head, built the party cells in the military hierarchy to
indoctrinate army officers with anti-communist and anti-separatist ideologies.
246 Simon Long, Taiwan: China’s Last Frontier (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1991); also see
Magure, 1998, pp. 32-33.
247 For the Kuomintang Party structure, see Ching-cheng Lo, “Taiwan: The Remaining
Challenges,” in Alagappa, ed., 2001, pp. 145-146; Hsiao-shih Cheng, Party-Military Relations in
the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Hsiao-shih Cheng, “The
Polity and the Military: A Framework for Analyzing Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan,” Journal
of Social Sciences and Philosophy 5: 1 (1990).
248 The high-ranking officers who were charged with the CCP spy included the Chief of Military
Conscription, the vice-minister of National Defense, and the Chief of Army Supply Services.
See, George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston: The Riverside Press Cambridge, 1965), p. 395.
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In addition to the KMT party’s penetration into the armed forces with ideological
indoctrination, the Chiang government also tried to solve the problem of the military’s
factional struggles by adopting a universal conscription and mandatory retirement rules
for politically influential senior high-ranking officers. Universal conscription was
applied to all Taiwanese males on their 18th birthday. As we can see from Table 2-5 of
Chapter Two, ethnic Taiwanese became predominant at the junior officership and the
private soldier levels. Their integration into the military effectively reduced the problem
of personal loyalty and factionalism within the army. In addition, Chiang Ching-kuo’s
military reform also targeted senior commanders who had been politically influential
figures since the very early years of the KMT government on the mainland. The GPWD
decreed that high-ranking generals at the commandership level could not keep their
position for more than five years. Mandatory retirement rules were thus applied to senior
officers, thereby eliminating the possibility of their political domination.249 The party
reorganization drives continued for three years, until the October 1952 Seventh Party
Congress of the KMT. As a consequence, the KMT gained strong control over the state,
the military, and society until the late 1980s.
With the reorganization of the party under Chiang’s strong and centralized
leadership, the KMT government launched a long-term economic development program
beginning in the early 1950s. In 1951, the KMT government set up the Economic
249 For more detailed information about the military reform in the early years in Taiwan, see
Steve Tsang, “Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang’s Policy to Reconquer the Chinese
Mainland, 1949-1958,” in Steve Tsang ed., In the Shadow of China (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1993); Edward W. Ross, “Taiwan’s Armed Forces,” in Olson and Jurika, Jr., eds.,
The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Chin-lin
Yang, Military Politics in the Transition to Democracy: Changing Civil-Military Relations in the
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Stabilization Board (ESB) to design and implement economic policies. The ESB created
a series of long-term economic plans, from the first plan for Economic Rehabilitation
(1953-1956), to the tenth medium-term plan (1990-1993). Those economic plans were
extremely successful throughout the five decades of KMT’s rule in Taiwan, with average
annual GNP growth rates of 9.2 percent during this period. In addition to the fastest
economic growth among the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) in East Asia, the
KMT government also achieved some of the lowest levels of unemployment and
economic inequality rates in the world.250
Table 3-5: Taiwan’s economic growth, 1953-1986251










One of the most immediate and significant effects of this rapid economic growth
was the lessening of internal security threats, especially from the Taiwanese islanders
who had maintained emotional antagonism against the mainlanders since the February
28th Uprising in which over 6,000 Taiwanese were massacred by KMT forces. The
continued economic prosperity during the 1950s and 1960s changed native Taiwanese to
Republic of China (Taiwan), 1949-1994, Ph. D Dissertation (State University of New York at
Albany, 1996).
250 For the analysis of Taiwan’s economic performance, see P. Ferdinand, “The Taiwanese
Economy,” in Ferdinand, ed., Take-off for Taiwan (London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1996).
251 Hung-mao Tien, “Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan,” in Harvey Feldman,
Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong Kim, eds., Taiwan in a Time of Transition (New York: Paragon
House, 1988), p. 5; Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical
Yearbook (Taipei: Executive Yuan, 1987), p. 2.
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accept the KMT government as a legitimate authority, rather than choose the communist
rule of mainland China. Within a decade of the KMT’s move to Taiwan, domestic
security had significantly improved mainly due to the success of the party and military
reforms and the growing economic prosperity.
In addition to lower domestic threats, international structural changes from the
1960s to the 1980s revolving around Taiwan also lessened external security threats,
especially from the CCP and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At first sight,
developments in the international political and security order during the 1960s and 1970s
seemed to harm Taiwanese security. As soon as Richard Nixon was elected U.S.
president in 1968, he announced the Guam Doctrine, which proposed a gradual de-
escalation of the U.S.’ military commitments abroad, particularly in East and Southeast
Asia.252 Within two years of taking office, Nixon announced his official trip to mainland
China.253 The rapprochement between the United States and Communist China produced
the Shanghai Joint Communique of February 27, 1972, which declared that “The United
States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is
but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States government does not
252 For President Richard Nixon’s Presidential inaugural address, see International Herald
Tribune (January 21, 1969), p. 4.
253 One year before Nixon’s visit, Secretary State Henry Kissinger secretly visited Beijing and
met Chou En-lai to facilitate the Sino-American summit meeting. For Nixon’s détente policy in
East Asia, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from
Nixon to Reagan (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985); Robert D. Schulzinger, Henry
Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Michael Herr,
Dispatches (New York: Knopf, 1977).
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challenge that position. . . the United States reaffirms the ultimate objective of the
withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan.”254
Subsequent actions for the Joint Communique were followed by the United
States’ decision to reduce American military personnel with the withdrawal of two
squadrons of F-4 Phantom jet fighters and the remaining installations from Taiwan by
May 1975. On January 1979, the Carter administration moved its embassy from Taipei
to Beijing, which resulted in an automatic termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954 and the official diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.255 The United States’
rapprochement with Communist China and the de-recognition of the KMT regime was a
genuine shock to Chiang Kai-shek, considering that the United States had been the
guarantor of Taiwan’s security against the communists.
In addition to the US-China rapprochement, another serious setback for the KMT
government occurred in October 1971, when the United Nations General Assembly voted
by a large majority to expel the KMT delegates and, instead, seated the delegates of the
PRC as the legitimate representatives of the Chinese people. At this time, the KMT
regime not only lost the United States but also its diplomatic ties with other major
powers.
254 For the text of the Communique, see Congressional Quarterly, ed., China: US Policy since
1945 (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980), p. 323-325.
255 Even though the official diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan ended,
unofficial ties continued under the unofficial agreements such as the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation. Also the United States continued selling its weapons to Taiwan.
Harvey J. Feldman, “Development of US-Taiwan Relations 1948-1987,” in Harvey Feldman,
Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., Taiwan in a Time of Transition (New York:
Paragon House, 1988), pp. 129-173.
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Table 3-6: Diplomatic Recognition, 1969-1986256
















Until the late 1960s, the KMT regime had been gaining more diplomatic support from
other countries than the CCP. As time passed, however, more countries came to
recognize the growing influence of communist China in the international political arena.
Taiwan’s strategy of providing foreign aid for developing countries to buy diplomatic
support in the UN turned out to be unsuccessful.257 As a result, Taiwan became isolated
while the CCP gained more influence in international relations (see Table 3-6).
An unexpected outcome of Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, however, was the
reduction of security threats from mainland China. When the KMT regime retreated to
Taiwan, its biggest priority was to retake the mainland territory by means of a military
counter-attack. Thus, during the 1950s, all available domestic resources were directed
toward military mobilization, detailed in the previous chapter. After the 1960s, however,
Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy of retaking the mainland became less feasible, as the CCP on
mainland strengthened control over its territory and expanded its influence in the
international arena.
256 Michael Y. M. Kau, “Taiwan and Beijing’s Campaigns for Unification,” in Harvey Feldman,
Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., Taiwan in a Time of Transition (New York:
Paragon House, 1988), p. 188.
257 For detailed description and analysis of Taiwan’s strategy of foreign aid during the 1960s and
1970s, see Chiao Chiao Hsieh, Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations
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Changes in international security and, more importantly, in the mainland forced
the KMT government to adopt alternative foreign policy strategies. Such a change was
reflected as early as 1959, when Chiang Kai-shek stated in his New Year’s Message:
“Now the task of mainland recovery is to be accomplished by efforts which are 70
percent political and only 30 percent military.”258 This address marked an important
change in Taiwan’s foreign policy priority from military to political counter-attack as
Taiwan’s foreign policy priority. Later, the Nixon Administration’s rapprochement with
the CCP and Taiwan’s ejection from the United Nations made the KMT government’s
strategy of political counter-attack an unachievable policy option and, therefore, the
KMT turned its strategic priority to the economic development of Taiwan. By this time,
recovering mainland China by military means became a distant possibility and residence
on the island appeared permanent.
At the same time, the CCP’s approach to Taiwan also showed noteworthy
changes from its strategy of armed liberation to peaceful unification. Throughout the
1970s, Beijing authorities tried to approach Taipei for a dialogue on unification, even
though Taiwan repeatedly rejected Beijing’s proposals for peace talks.259 The PRC’s
conciliatory attitude toward Taipei continued throughout the 1980s, under the leadership
of Deng Xiao-ping. Deng made a series of recommendations such as the “Nine-Point
Unification Proposal.” The CCP also proposed to Taiwanese authorities “three
of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949-1979 (London: The Sherwood Press, 1985), pp. 175-
229.
258 The China Yearbook, 1959-1960, p. 974.
259 As a gesture of appeasement, the Beijing government released Nationalist ‘war criminals’ in
March 1975, which Taiwan refused to grant access to Taiwan. See Peter P. Cheng, “Taiwan
1975: A Year of Transition,” Asian Survey 16: 1 (1976), p. 63.
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exchanges” (postal service, trade, and tourism) and “four contacts” (academic, cultural,
scientific, and sports activities).260 The PRC publicly guaranteed that Taiwan would
enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and the current socio-
economic system would not be interrupted.
Likewise, structural changes in international relations during the 1960s and 1970s
resulted in diplomatic isolation of the KMT regime in Taiwan, while the PRC grew to
become an increasingly influential actor. These changes, however, ironically contributed
to a more favorable threat environment for the Taiwan government. In turn, Taiwan’s
defensive position in this situation led it to abandon the military-first strategy and adopt a
more peaceful economy-first approach throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
In addition to improved internal and external security environments, the KMT
regime also provided strong and stable leadership for the country. First of all, the smooth
transition of power from Chiang Kai-shek to his son Chiang Ching-kuo did not raise a
succession problem or a power vacuum in which the armed forces would have had an
opportunity to intervene in politics. In the transition period, Chiang Ching-kuo’s political
leadership and reform drives were the key to stability, which was made possible due to
Chiang Ching-kuo’s control over the armed forces as a long-time superintendent under
the political commissar system.
Chiang Ching-kuo’s political legitimacy was further enhanced after he began
Taiwanizing the KMT party and governmental branches. As we can see in Tables 2-4
and 2-5 in Chapter Two, the minority mainlanders monopolized the seats in all the
important and high-ranking positions in the party and government, as well as in the
260 Kau, 1988, p. 182.
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military organization. Once Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the presidency, however, ethnic
Taiwanese slowly began to fill the membership in several governmental bodies, including
the Central Standing Committee. As we can see from Table 3-7, the proportion of ethnic
Taiwanese in the Central Standing Committee increased from 14 percent in 1973 to 52
percent in 1988, when Chiang Ching-kuo completed his presidential term. The situation
was similar in the armed forces, where officers of Taiwanese origin began to fill the
higher-ranking positions (see Table 2-5 in Chapter Two).
Table 3-7: Taiwanese in the KMT Central Standing Committee, 1973-1988261





























Likewise, civilian control of the armed forces in Taiwan had been the most stable
among the four cases during the same historical stage. A number of major causal factors
thus enabled strong civilian control of the military during the 1950s through the 1980s, in
which authoritarian leadership was established and army officers became deeply involved
in domestic politics. To begin with, decreasing domestic and international security
threats contributed to civilian leaders’ strong control over the armed forces. Furthermore,
rapid economic growth enabled the KMT government to strengthen its legitimacy among
ethnic Taiwanese. Finally, Chiang Kai-shek’s reform drives removed factional
167
competitions within the KMT party and the army and fortified civilian guidance over the
military.
Chiang Ching-kuo’s political reforms and Taiwanization of the party and the
army, occurring under low security-threat environments, paved the way for successful
liberalization and democratization in the late 1980s, when Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese
native, assumed the presidency and initiated democratic political reforms. In the next
chapter, I will examine civil-military relations in Taiwan during this democratization
period of the 1980s and 1990s.
Conclusions
This chapter analyzed the second historical stage of the military’s domestic
political role in the four cases under study, that is, the dynamics and modes of the
politicized officers’ engagement in domestic political process. In so doing, I divided the
cases into two types: control via the military coup d’etat and the installation of a military
dictatorship in South Korea and Indonesia, on the one hand, and participation under
civilian supervision in the Philippines and Taiwan, on the other. Furthermore, the cases
of participation also revealed differences in the army officers’ relationship with their
civilian masters: a “professionalized pattern” in which civilian leaders endorsed the
military’s organizational unity as was the case in Taiwan, and a “politicized type” in
261 Hung-mao Tien, “Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan,” in Feldman, et al.,
1988, p. 13.
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which civilian leaders controlled the armed forces by manipulating factional struggles
within the military as was in the Philippines.262
In South Korea (1961) and Indonesia (1965), a confluence of key domestic factors
resulted in military coups and military dictatorial rule. That is, the significant causal
elements that precipitated the coups were: (1) civilian leaders’ inability to provide
political and security order, (2) ideological radicalization of civil society actors, and (3)
factional struggles within the military organization.
In South Korea, the Chang Myon government’s inability to maintain domestic
political order and ensuing political crisis caused the 1961 military coup. After Rhee
Syngman resigned from his presidency in the middle of the April Student Revolution of
1960, the parliamentary democracy led by Chang Myon failed to provide effective
leadership both within and outside of the government. In addition, the 1961 coup was
justified by the coup leader Park Jung-hee who charged that the radical and violent civil
society groups were engendering a national security crisis. Coup forces in the army were
able to consolidate the military dictatorship by declaring martial law and the Yushin
constitution in 1972 under increasing security threats from North Korea and decreasing
security commitments from the United States.
Similar factors in Indonesia were also responsible for the 1965 military coup.
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy failed to balance the two polarizing political groups—the
PKI and the ABRI—in the 1960s. Sukarno and the PKI jeopardized the national security
by implementing a series of pro-communist policies in domestic and foreign policy areas.
262 Zoltan Barany, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military: the East European Experience,”
Comparative Politics 30: 1 (1997).
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As ABRI leadership planned to get rid of the Sukarno-PKI coalition, a group of junior
officers, called the Untung group, staged a preventive coup against the ABRI leadership
who opposed Sukarno and the PKI, killing the six highest-ranking generals. The ABRI,
led by General Suharto, put down the coup attempt, placed Sukarno under house arrest,
and banned the PKI. In sum, the coups in South Korea and Indonesia arouse under the
similar structural circumstances such as high security threats, civilian leadership failure,
radical civil society, and factionalized military organization. The results are summarized
in Table 3-8.






























Army officers in the Philippines and Taiwan were as politically prominent as in
the previous two cases. But the armed forces of these two countries did not overturn the
civilian leadership but rather were placed under civilian control. For all the differences,
the two countries shared at least two similarities: strong civilian leadership and the
unified military organization.
In the Philippines during Marcos’ authoritarian rule (1972-1986), the absence of a
coup was largely due to his ability to manipulate high-ranking army officers. Marcos
positioned the officers of his hometown Ilocos region to key posts in the military
institution and promoted them to the highest-ranking officerships. In addition, Marcos
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tried to keep the military institution weak and divided by manipulating and elevating
factional struggles between the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates led by
General Ramos and the ROTC officers headed by General Ver. Later, the balance
between Ramos and Ver turned to Ver’s favor.
Marcos’ personalistic control and factionalization of the military nevertheless
seriously impaired military professionalism, which led to the formation of the Reformed
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM) by a group of junior officers. In
the midst of political turbulence after the assassination of Benigno Aquino, RAM
members planned to overthrow the Marcos regime with a target date of mid-1987. But
the coup attempt was never put into practice because of Marcos’ sudden announcement
of the 1986 presidential election. When the election was inconclusive with both
candidates claiming victory, RAM officers sided with Corazon Aquino and played a
decisive role in overthrowing Marcos. Even though there were no coup attempts during
Marcos’ rule, the RAM officers turned into a stumbling bloc in the democratization era,
carrying out multiple coup attempts, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Finally, Taiwanese civil-military relations demonstrated the most stable civilian
control over political army officers, as the armed forces developed into a unified and
professional organization. Throughout this development, the presence of a strong and
efficient civilian leadership was crucial. In the early years of Taiwan, President Chiang
Kai-shek reformed party-army relations as a vital part of reorganizing the KMT party.
He adopted the political commissar system and positioned his son Chiang Ching-kuo as
the first director. With the commissar system, the Taiwanese army developed into an
ideologically-indoctrinated and cohesive organization controlled by the KMT party. The
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power transition from Chiang Kai-shek to his son was implemented without any major
political crisis or instability. Added to strong political leadership by the KMT, favorable
security conditions also contributed to stable civilian control over the armed forces in
Taiwan.
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Chapter 4. Security Threats, Democratization, and the Military’s
Political Disengagement
Introduction
As examined in the previous two chapters, the four countries under study have
experienced several decades of military involvement in domestic politics, even though
the ways the armed forces became involved were quite different. In South Korea (1961)
and Indonesia (1965), the top brass toppled flagging civilian leadership and dominated
the domestic political arena until democratization replaced the military-dominant regime
with one of democratically elected civilians. In contrast, generals in Taiwan and the
Philippines became deeply engaged in domestic political, administrative, and economic
affairs, but did not attempt to overthrow their civilian masters.
This chapter moves on to the third historical juncture of civil-military relations in
the four countries: military withdrawal from politics during democratization. The four
countries underwent democratic regime transitions in a similar time-span (mid-to-late
1980s), except for Indonesia (late 1990s). However, the ways in which politicized
officers withdrew from politics and relinquished their roles to newly elected civilian
leadership were quite different. South Korea and Taiwan went through more stable and
thorough democratizations, while the other two cases where politicized army officers still
wielded influence in newly established democratic governments encountered unstable,
violent, and less complete regime transitions. This chapter addresses the question of
what factors contributed to the differences in the military’s domestic political role during
and after democratization.
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Rather than relying upon a predominant literature of democratization that takes a
process- or choice-oriented approach,263 I identify structural causes that contributed to
making different modes of military disengagement in the four countries. As suggested in
Chapter One, my theory contends that security threats set the basic parameter of civil-
military relations during the democratization period. More specifically, I expect that low
threat environments at both domestic and international arenas provide favorable structural
conditions for military disengagement and far-reaching democratization, while high
security threats hinder political officers from going back to their barracks, making the
regime transition highly unstable. In this respect, security threats create a structural
condition in which major domestic political actors interact to make certain modes of
democratic regime transition and the military’s political role in this period.
A more complete understanding of democratization in these countries must
include other intervening variables at the domestic level, namely the strength of civilian
leadership, the cohesiveness of military organization, and the strength of civil society.
The military’s political disengagement is more complete when newly elected civilian
leaders exert strong leadership with support from the general public and civil society, and
vice versa. In addition, a unified and professionalized military institution is conducive to
the armed forces’ political disengagement, while the faction-ridden army is more prone to
continue its political influence. Finally, the strength of civil society and its ideological
orientation also affect the democratization process. A robust civil society with a
263 For example, see Juan Linz, Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978); Gullermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence
Whitehead, ed., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Prezeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and
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moderate ideology is a positive force for democratization. But the presence of an
influential civil society can be damaging to a new democracy when civil society actors
endorse radical ideology or create violence and disorder during the democratization
period. In this chapter, I test those hypotheses against four cases.
This chapter is composed of four sections. The first section examines the
military’s political disengagement in South Korea between the 1980s and 1990s, which
covers limited liberalization measures by the military regime in the mid-1980s, the
democratic opening of the “June 29 Declaration” in June 1987, the Roh Tae-woo
presidency as a quasi-civilian government (1988-1992), and Kim Young-sam’s military
reform drives (1993-1997). Section two looks into democratization in Taiwan, which
includes liberalization under Chiang Ching-kuo in the 1980s, democratic reforms under
the Lee Teng-hui presidency during the 1990s, and the inauguration of the Chen Shui-
bian presidency in 2000. The third section explores the Philippines from Marcos’ fall in
February 1986, through the Aquino presidency and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP)’ coup attempts (1986-1991), and finally to the inauguration of Ramos leadership
(1992). Section four discusses the Indonesian regime transition that covers Suharto’s loss
of support from the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) and the public in
the late 1990s and subsequent democratization in recent years. I summarize my major
findings in the conclusion.
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University
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I. South Korea
Since the inception of the Republic, South Korea experienced two military
coups—one in May 1961 by Park Jung-hee, the other in December 1979 by Chun Doo-
whan—and three decades of military dictatorship. The second military dictator, Chun
Doo-whan, suffered from a legitimacy crisis from the beginning, since he and his
followers in the army brazenly crushed democratic movements in the process of taking
over power in 1980.264 Throughout the eight years of Chun’s rule, there was incessant
and growing resistance from civil society, which forced the Chun regime to introduce
limited political and economic liberalization measures to blur the image of his regime as
a military dictatorship. Even though he did not adopt liberalization willingly, Chun Doo-
whan was confident about his regime’s performance, especially in economic and security
policy areas.265 Quite different from Chun’s expectations, however, the limited
liberalization measures provided opposition political leaders and civil society with a
Press, 1991).
264 One prominent example of the Chun regime’s cruelty was his use of the military forces to put
down pro-democracy uprisings in Kwangju in May 1980, in which more than 100,000 people
participated. In the Kwangju Uprisings, 278 demonstrators were reported killed and about 500
were injured, even though exact numbers are not available. For more detailed information about
the Pro-Democracy Uprising in Kwangju, see Sang-yong Jung, et al., Kwangju Minju hangjaeng
(The People’s Struggle for Democracy in Kwangju) (Seoul: Dolbege, 1990); Hanguk Hyondaesa
Saryo Yonguso, Kwangju 5-wol Hangjaeng Saryojip (Complete Collection of the Historical
Materials on the May People’s Uprising in Kwangju) (Seoul: Pulbit Publications, 1990).
265 During the years of 1983-1987, South Korea had average annual economic growth rate of
9.5%, while average inflation rate was low 2.8%. World Bank, World Tables 1993 (Washington
D.C.: World Bank, 1994).
In the security and foreign policy area, the Chun regime enjoyed the most favorable security
environments since the inception of the Republic of Korea, as it surpassed North Korea in terms
of military capability and strengthened its alliance relationship with the Reagan administration.
Hyug-baeg Im, Politics of Transition: Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South
Korea, Ph. D. Dissertation (University of Chicago, 1989), pp. 206-210.
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window of opportunity to push the authoritarian regime for more thorough
democratization.
The democratization period in South Korea can be divided into four phases: (1)
the opposition leaders’ and civil society groups’ push for Chun and the military elites to
declare the “June 29 Declaration” for democratic reform in 1987; (2) the democratic
election and the Roh Tae-woo presidency as a quasi-civilian and quasi-military
government from 1988 to 1992; (3) the Kim Young-sam presidency and democratic
reforms from 1993 to 1997; and (4) democratic consolidation in which opposition leader,
Kim Dae-Jung, was elected to the presidency in 1997. In each phase of democratization
and consolidation, a combination of structural factors—favorable security environments,
strong civilian leadership backed by vibrant but moderate civil society, and
professionalized and cohesive military institution—contributed to successful
democratization and consolidation.
The military dictator Chun Doo-whan adopted limited liberalization measures in
the mid-1980s to moderate civil society’s growing resistance to his authoritarian rule.266
These liberalization measures included, among others, the reinstatement of expelled
professors and university student activists, the rehabilitation of over 200 opposition
politicians, and the release of “security-related” political prisoners.267 The Chun regime
expected it could manage opposition political forces effectively by decentralizing them
266 For the Chun regime’s limited reforms during the mid 1980s, see Hyon-deok Yeo,
“Shingunbu Gwonuijueui Chejeeui Deungjanggwa Jeongchi Galdeung (Emergence of the New
Military Authoritarianism and Political Conflicts)”, in Heung-su Han, ed., Hanguk Jeongchi
Dongtaeron (Korean Political Behavior) (Seoul: Orum, 1996), pp. 293-316.
267 Seong-yi Yoon, “Democratization in South Korea: Social Movements and Their Political
Opportunity Structures,” Asian Perspective 21: 3 (1997), pp. 156-158.
177
and making them fight each other for hegemony among the opposition groups.
Liberalization measures, however, unexpectedly unified and strengthened the opposition
groups. In the 1985 National Assembly election, the ruling Democratic Justice Party
(DJP) failed to gain two-thirds majority in the legislature, which was needed for the
passage of important laws, including constitutional amendments and presidential
elections.268
The immediate impact of the 1985 election was the empowerment of opposition
politicians, including Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, and civil society groups such
as college students, labor unions, and dissident groups. Various opposition forces were
united under the strong leadership of Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung and marched
for a nationwide campaign for democracy, including a constitutional amendment for
direct presidential election.269 The opposition forces’ march for democratization later
included not only radical student activists and labor unions, but also middle-class
citizenry. Civil society groups’ demonstration reached its peak when Chun Doo-whan
suspended any discussion over constitutional reform. Furthermore, Chun nominated Roh
Tae-woo, one of his cohorts in the 11th Korean Military Academy (KMA) and one of the
key members of the 1979 military coup, as his handpicked successor through indirect
presidential election by an electoral college (the so-called “April 13 measure”).
268 In the 1985 National Assembly election (12th), the ruling DJP won 87 seats, while the
opposition New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) got 50 seats and Democratic Korea Party
(DKP) 26. For more detailed analysis of the 12th National Assembly election, see B. C. Koh, “The
1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,” Asian Survey 25: 9 (1985), pp. 883-897; C. I.
Eugene Kim, “The Meaning of South Korea’s 12th National Assembly Election,” Korea Observer
(Fall 1985); C. I. Eugene Kim, “South Korea in 1985: An Eventual Year Amidst Uncertainty,”
Asian Survey 26: 1 (1986), pp. 67-71.
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From the April 13 measure up until late June, there were waves of demonstrations
throughout the country. Various opposition forces united to form the National Coalition
for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC), an umbrella organization that included most
social sectors, from opposition politicians to religious groups and to the labor and
farmers’ unions. In June, the NCDC organized the “People’s Rally to Denounce the
Cover-up of the Torture-Murder and the Scheme to Maintain the Current Constitution” in
which over 240,000 people participated.270 In such a situation, the ruling elites, including
leading army officers, had two options: making concessions to the opposition forces and
furthering democratic openings, or bringing the armed forces to quell the demonstration
movements and tightening the military’s dictatorial rule.
This time, senior army officers were split into two groups: hardliners who
endorsed a strong reaction to the opposition movements to secure the military regime,
and softliners who were afraid of a nationwide political turmoil and thus preferred
democratic reform. The Chun regime and the military chose the softliners’ option and
proclaimed the June 29 Declaration by Roh Tae-woo (discussed below). Several factors
strengthened the softliners’ voices in the military. To begin with, South Korea’s
international environments were not favorable to the hardliners. During the 1980s,
external security threats significantly diminished, as the military balance favored the
269 For the empowerment of the political opposition in the mid 1980, see Won-ki Hwang,
Developmental Dictatorship and Democratization in South Korea: The State and Society in
Transformation, 1987-1997, Ph. D Dissertation (Brown University, 2006), pp. 75-92.
270 During the first half of 1987, there were several occasions of reports on torture and death of
protesters, which bolstered the public’s belief that the Chun regime was nothing more than a
military dictatorship. On May 26, for example, a Father of Catholic Church revealed that a Seoul
National University student, named Park Jong-cheol, had been tortured to death by the police. Ji-
hun Cho, 80-Nyondae Huban Cheongyeon Haksaengundong (The Youth and Student Movements
of the late-1980s) (Seoul: Hyungsung-sa, 1989), p. 16.
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South over the North. Continued economic development in South Korea facilitated its
buildup of military power that surpassed North Korea by the early 1980s. In addition,
South Korean security was strengthened by fortifying its alliance with the United States,
while North Korea lost its major allies as most of the socialist countries began to adopt a
liberal democracy and a market economy. Most importantly, continued social disorder
and harsh repression against civil society groups might threaten the danger of Western
democracies’ withdrawal from the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. 
 On June 29, 1987, Roh Tae-woo, Chun’s hand-picked successor and the ruling
DJP’s presidential candidate, announced “the Declaration of Democratization and
Reforms,” an eight-point democratic reform measure, including a constitutional
amendment for direct presidential elections, political amnesty and a restoration of civil
rights to dissident leaders, protection of human rights, freedom of the press, and social
reforms for a “clean and honest society.”271 Two days later, Chun Doo-whan announced
that he would accept Roh’s reform proposals, which brought sudden political tranquility
to Korean society. Shortly after the declaration, negotiations between Roh Tae-woo and
the opposition leader Kim Young-sam reached an agreement on a constitutional revision.
The draft for a new constitution was written by an eight-member working group,
submitted to the National Assembly, and approved on October 12, 1987. In this respect,
even though democratization movements began from the grassroots’ protests, the
democratization took off as a result of a negotiation between the ruling elites in the
271 Young-whan Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture (New
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 83-84; also see John Kie-Chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest
for Democratization and Economic Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 98-
102.
180
authoritarian regime and the pro-democracy opposition leaders, a process that Samuel P.
Huntington terms “transplacement.”272
With the new constitution, a democratic presidential election was scheduled to be
held on December 16, 1987. At this time, however, opposition forces were split into two
camps following two prominent opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam (Reunification
Democratic Party, RDP) and Kim Dae-jung (Party for Peace and Democracy, PPD).
Thanks to the opposition leaders’ split, the ruling DJP candidate Roh Tae-woo won the
presidential election with only 36 percent of the popular vote, while Kim Young-sam
garnered 28 percent and Kim Dae-jung 27 percent.273 Pundits speculated that, with the
formation of a united front and single candidacy, the opposition would have won the
election easily. As Roh Tae-woo, a former general and leading member of the 1979
military coup, became the president, democracy in South Korea seemed to be put off for
another five years at least until the next presidential election in 1992.
In hindsight, however, the Roh Tae-woo presidency turned out to have a positive
effect on Korea’s democratization, especially the Korean army’s disengagement from
politics.274 During the presidential election period, some senior generals openly declared
that they would not neglect the situation if a left-leaning candidate, Kim Dae-jung, were
272 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 124.
273 For the discussion of the 13th presidential election, see Bret L. Billet, “South Korea at the
Crossroads: An Evolving Democracy or Authoritarianism Revisited?” Asian Survey 30: 3 (1990),
p. 302; Sung-joo Han, “South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization,” Asian Survey 28:
1 (1988), pp. 52-56.
274 For more information on Roh Tae-woo’s Sixth Republic, see Robert E. Bedeski, The
Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstruction in the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae
Woo, 1987-1992 (London: Routledge, 1994).
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elected.275 Roh Tae-woo, a retired general, had close connections to and strong influence
in the army hierarchy. Army officers, in turn, perceived his presidency as unthreatening
to their own interests. They expected that President Roh would secure their
organizational, financial, and political interests even after democratization. President
Roh could secure his leadership in the armed forces by guaranteeing the military’s
institutional autonomy. As a result, even though he was democratically elected, the
military’s presence and influence in his government was pervasive.276 Roh’s presidency
had the effect of avoiding backfire from senior officers in the early stage of
democratization.
In the meantime, changes in external security environment in the late-1980s and
President Roh’s Nordpolitik discouraged the army officers’ political involvement. Since
the end of the Korean War, South Korea had been under constant threat from North
Korea which benefited from the political, economic, and military support of the Soviet
Union and the People’s Republic of China. During the 1980s, however, support from the
two patron states significantly decreased as they undertook their own domestic political
and economic reforms. Furthermore, North Korea became diplomatically isolated from
its East European allies. In this situation, the Roh administration, with a solid security
commitment from the United States, actively sought to open diplomatic relations with
former communist states. Thus, South Korea significantly improved its security, while
275 Carl J. Saxer, “Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control in
South Korea,” Armed Forces and Society 30: 3 (2004), p. 388.
276 For example, retired military officers constituted 20 percent in the Roh cabinet and 7 percent
in the National Assembly. Aurel Croissant, “Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military
in Democratizing Korea,” Armed Forces and Society 30: 3 (2004), p. 366.
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North Korea lost its own diplomatic backyard. This détente mood surrounding the
Korean peninsula, in turn, eliminated the military’s rationale for political engagement.277
Another factor that prevented the armed forces from interfering into domestic
politics was the role of civil society. In the early stage of the democracy movement, all
civil society activities were dominated by radical groups such as college students,
militant blue-collar labor unions, peasants, and the urban poor. Overall, these groups
endorsed radical ideology, demanding not just liberal democracy but a far-reaching
revolution in South Korea, and adopted violent tactics against the military dictatorship.
Before the June 29 Declaration, all the different civil society groups, in spite of their
ideological and tactical differences, were united under a common aim: ending the
military dictatorship. Following the June 29 Declaration, however, these radical civil
society groups were significantly weakened in their influence on the democratization
process.278
While the radical and militant Minjung (people) movements lost their influence in
the political scene after June 1987, other types of civil society began to thrive and led
civil society movements in the post-democratization period. These new civil society
277 For more detailed information about Roh’s Nordpolitik, see Byung-joon Ahn, “South
Korea’s International Relations: Quest for Security, Prosperity, and Unification,” The Asian
Update (New York: Asia Society, 1991); Byung-joon Ahn, “South Korean-Soviet Relations:
Contemporary Issues and Prospects,” Asian Survey 31: 9 (1991); Young-whan Kihl, “South
Korea’s Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activism and Policy Dilemma,” Korea Briefing (New
York: Asia Society, 1991); Hong Liu, “The Sino-South Korean Normalization: A Triangular
Explanation,” Asian Survey 33: 11 (1991).
278 Another reason for the radical groups’ weakening was the fall of communist states in Eastern
Europe. As former socialist countries jettisoned their ideology and adopted liberal democracy
and market economy, the radical Marxist or North Korea’s “Juche” ideology also lost its
popularity in Korean society. For the decline of the Minjung movement, see Gi-wook Shin,
“Marxism, Anti-Americanism, and Democracy in South Korea: An Examination of Nationalist
Intellectual Discourse,” Positions: East Asian Cultures Critique 3 (1995).
183
groups were organized by white collar workers, professionals, intellectuals, and religious
leaders. Rather than pursuing radical social changes, these groups focused on gradual
institutional reforms and adopted legal and nonviolent strategies, dealing with a range of
social issues such as political corruption, consumer rights, environmental degradation,
and free and fair elections.279 These civil society groups contributed to the political and
social stability in the newly democratized Korea, which in turn prevented the military
from intervening in politics.
At the same time, a “grand alliance” among conservative forces on January 22,
1990 provided the Roh government with political stability and strong leadership. Even
though Roh Tae-woo was elected to the presidency through direct election in 1987, he
failed to attain broad support from the public, winning only 36 percent of the popular
vote. To make matters worse, the ruling DJP failed to secure a simple majority in the
National Assembly election in 1988. In the 299-member Assembly, Roh’s DJP won only
125 seats, while Kim Dae-jung’s PPD captured 70 seats, Kim Young-sam’s RDP took 59
seats, and Kim Jong-pil’s New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP, the most
conservative party) 35 seats.280 The 1988 Assembly election result created the so-called
yosoyadae (ruling minority and opposition majority), which led to political gridlock in
the National Assembly. This stalemate, however, was broken with the conservative
279 For moderation of civil society groups in South Korea, see Sun-hyuk Kim, The Politics of
Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
2000); Sun-hyuk Kim, “Civil Society in Democratizing Korea,” in Samuel Kim ed., Korea’s
Democratization (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jang-jip Choi, “Democratization,
Civil Society, and Civil Movements in Korea,” in Jang-jip Choi et al., Understanding Korean
Civil Society (Seoul: Hanul Press, 1996); Jae-chul Lee, Deepening and Improving Democracy:
Association in South Korea, Ph. D Dissertation (University of Missouri at Columbia, 2005).
280 Hong-nack Kim, “The 1988 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,” Asian Survey 29: 5
(1989).
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grand alliance, as President Roh Tae-woo and the ruling DJP, RDP leader Kim Young-
sam, and NDRP leader Kim Jong-pil announced a three party (DJP-RDP-NDRP) merger
and a new Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), leaving Kim Dae-jung’s PPD as the only
opposition. The three-party merger broke the stalemate and restored political stability
and effectiveness.281
Democratization in South Korea reached another turning point in the 1992
presidential election, as Kim Young-sam, the ruling DLP presidential candidate, won the
election. Before the election, President Roh made two important decisions which were
conducive to a stable power transition.282 First, during the campaign, President Roh
announced that he was resigning from his position as the DLP’s president to demonstrate
his commitment to a fair election and peaceful regime change. His resignation from DLP
leadership removed the possibility for senior army officers to interfere in the election
process. Second, he introduced strict election campaign laws, including a reduced
campaign period and limitations on campaign spending. The campaign laws helped end
secret political funds from big businesses (the so-called Chaebol). The Roh Tae-woo
presidency thus helped to solve what Huntington called the “praetorian problem” of the
military’s intervention during the regime transition period. Kim Young-sam, even
though he had been an opposition leader and pro-democracy activist against military
dictatorship for more than three decades, was perceived by army officers as the lesser
evil. He won the 1992 presidential election with 42 percent of the popular vote, while the
281 Jin Park, “Political Change in South Korea: The Challenge of the Conservative Alliance,”
Asian Survey 30: 12 (1990).
282 Hong-young Lee, “South Korea in 1992: A Turning Point in Democratization,” Asian Survey
33: 1 (1992), pp. 35-36.
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opposition candidate, Kim Dae-jung, received 34 percent and Chung Ju-young, the owner
of Hyundai Corporation, 16 percent.283
President Kim Young-sam was in a better position than his predecessor Roh Tae-
woo, the leading participant in the 1979 coup and the second-most powerful man in
Chun’s dictatorial rule. Kim Young-sam began his presidency with a ruling majority in
the National Assembly and strong support from both the general public and civil society
groups.284 As soon as he was inaugurated, President Kim embarked on wide-ranging
political and economic reforms that included the armed forces, anti-corruption, financial
openness, and electoral reforms. The Korean army was the first target of the reform
drive. Even though Roh Tae-woo could secure allegiance from the top brass, the
officers’ loyalty was in return for Roh’s protection of the military’s corporate interest.
Therefore, army officers still possessed enormous influence in politics and institutional
prerogatives under the Roh government.
President Kim’s first priority was to reduce the military’s political power and
institutionalize civilian control of the Korean army. He began the military reform by
reshuffling top personnel so that he could establish firm control over senior army officers.
Shortly after his inauguration, Kim Young-sam contacted several top-ranking senior
officers to discuss these military reforms, and received a positive response from army
leadership. He removed two officers, including Chief of Staff Kim Jin-young and Seo
283 Hanguk Ilbo (Korean Daily Newspaper), December 22 (1992).
284 In the 1992 National Assembly election, the ruling DLP won 116 seats, Kim Dae-jung’s DP
75, Chung Ju-young’s UPP 24 seats. The UPP represented the conservative elements in Korea
and was close to the ruling DLP in its ideological orientation. For the 1992 National Assembly
election results, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, East Asia, March 26
(1992), pp. 22-23.
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Wan-su, the head of the Defense Security Command (DSC), the infamous agency headed
by Chun Doo-whan during the 1979-80 coup d’etat and the backbone of military
dictatorship. Furthermore, President Kim reformed the chain of command in the military
intelligence agencies that were actively involved in domestic politics, including policing
opposition activists and pro-democracy civil society movements.285
To reinforce his control over the armed forces, Kim Young-sam focused on
disbanding the Hanahoe (one mind), a secret association created by Chun Doo-whan and
Roh Tae-woo.286 Originally organized in 1964, the Hanahoe increased its membership
and influence under the patronage of Park Jung-hee in the 1970s. During a power-
vacuum after Park’s assassination in 1979, the Hanahoe executed a military coup and
established Chun’s dictatorial rule. Under the Chun regime, Hanahoe members rose to
the apex of power both within the military hierarchy and in civilian politics.287 President
Kim weakened the Hanahoe by adopting several strategies, including early retirements
and excluding its members from promotions. Within one year of being in office,
President Kim reshuffled over 50 of the highest-ranking officers, in which eight non-
Hanahoe officers rose to division commanders. In the reshuffling process, none of the
Hanahoe members was included in promotion.288
285 Saxer, 2004, p. 393.
286 Sanghyun Kim, “South Korea’s Kim Young Sam Government: Political Agendas,” Asian
Survey 36: 5 (1996), p. 512.
287 The key members of the Hanahoe who conspired the 1979 coup included Kim Bok-dong,
Chong Ho-yong, Choi Song-taek, Kwon Ik-hyon, Son Yong-kil, Roh Chong-ki, Park Gap-yong,
Nam-Chung-su. All of these members monopolized key positions in the army and the
intelligence agencies during the Chun and Roh regimes. See, Eui-sop Song, “Documentary
Hanahoe,” Chugan Hanguk (Weekly Korea), June 1 (1993), p. 29.
288 Oh, 1999, pp. 133-134.
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In eliminating the Hanahoe elements in the army, the Kim government focused
on punishing corrupt officers in the army. A bribery scandal was revealed when the wife
of a navy officer publicly complained that her bribes to an admiral’s wife were
ineffective in her husband’s promotion. When the scandal was publicized by the mass
media, the Kim government grabbed the opportunity to purge politically minded high-
ranking officers for collecting bribes. The result of this scandal was the arrest of more
than a dozen senior officers. Another significant corruption scandal was related to the
purchase of air fighters from the United States as a defense modernization plan. An
investigation by the Board of Audit and Inspection revealed huge sums of secret funds in
two bank accounts of two former defense ministers, which resulted in the further purge of
politicized officers.
Kim Young-sam’s reform also included anti-corruption drives in economic and
financial sectors, which in turn targeted corrupt high-ranking officers. The Kim
government enacted in 1993 the “Real-Name Financial Transaction System” to monitor
financial activities and real estate deals.289 During the three-decades-long military
dictatorship, borrowed or false names were widely used for banking transactions and real
estate registration, which enabled big business owners (Chaebol) to donate large amounts
of untraceable monies to politicians. The Kim government enacted the law to stop this
flow of illegal money. One unexpected outcome of the law was that it enabled
prosecutors to discover a huge amount of secret funds amassed by the former president.
On October 19, 1995, an opposition legislator, Park Kye-dong, disclosed that Roh Tae-
woo held secret funds amounting to about $650 million under forty false-name accounts.
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This incident triggered massive demonstrations throughout major cities,
demanding punishment for both Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo. With the strong
support of the public led by civil society groups, the National Assembly passed a special
law that dealt with the bribery scandals, the 1979 coup d’etat, and the 1980 Kwangju
massacre. Chun Doo-whan, Roh Tae-woo and 14 other generals were accused and found
guilty of rebellion, conspiracy, and corruption. In the trial, Chun was sentenced to death,
Roh to 22 years in prison, and the remaining officers to several years of incarceration.
The punishment of the two military-turned-presidents and other high-ranking generals put
an end to the army officers’ influence in politics. With this trial and a series of other
institutional reforms, firm civilian control over the armed forces was accomplished under
the Kim Young-sam presidency. When Kim Dae-jung, a long-time pro-democracy
activist and opposition leader, rose to the presidency in 1997, the Korean army, in
contrast to the 1987 presidential election, expressed its allegiance to the new president.
Several factors enabled Kim Young-sam’s success in military reform and firm
civilian control. First, the Kim Young-sam presidency was strongly supported by the
general public from the beginning of his term. It was hailed by people as the first
legitimate civilian government since the Second Republic by Chang Myon had fallen in
1961. Even though Roh Tae-woo was elected through the popular presidential election,
his legitimacy was significantly undermined by his previous career in the military—
especially as the leading member of the Hanahoe, one of the December 12 coup plotters,
and the second man in the Chun’s dictatorial rule. In contrast, Kim Young-sam had a
decades-long career as a pro-democracy activist and an opposition leader. At the time of
289 Hanguk Ilbo, August 13, 1993.
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his inauguration, Kim enjoyed over 80 percent approval rates, and garnered support in the
moderate electorate by co-opting several former opposition leaders without losing
support from conservative elements. In the trial against the two previous presidents,
more than 75 percent of people supported prosecuting them.290
Second, ideologically moderate civil society groups that focused their efforts on
institutional reforms also contributed to strengthening Kim’s reform drive and deterring
army officers’ resistance against reform. During the democratization period, civil society
movements drastically changed from radical and violent street demonstrations to
moderate and middle-class dominant civil groups during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
These new civil groups focused on issues such as economic justice, social welfare,
environmental crisis, and women’s rights.291 They strongly supported Kim’s reforms,
and, in turn, Kim adopted the issues they raised. The decline of the Minjung movements
and the rise of middle-class civil groups contributed to a significant decline of physical
violence both by the government and civil society groups.
Third, the existence of a cohesive and professionalized army encouraged stronger
civilian control over the armed forces. During their presidential terms, Chun Doo-whan
and Roh Tae-woo kept the military as a cohesive and professional institution. Even
though South Korea experienced three decades of military dictatorship, the military as an
290 Doh-chull Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), p. 200.
291 Some of the representative civil society groups included the Korean Confederation of Trade
Unions (KCTU, in 1995), Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ, in 1989), Korean
Foundation for Environmental Movement (KFEM, in 1993), and People’s Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD, in 1994). For the discussion of civil society’s change in the
period, see Su-hoon Lee, “Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil
Society,” Pacific Affairs 66: 3 (1993); Sun-hyuk Kim, “Civil Society in South Korea,” Journal of
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institution never intervened in politics. Rather, two coups were staged by a small number
of army officers. When Kim Young-sam reorganized the army, the military as an
institution did not exert veto power except for a small number of Hanahoe officers. The
Hanahoe, in turn, was eradicated and banned under the Kim government.
Finally, low-level security threats in the 1980s provided Korea with a structural
condition that was conducive to democratic reforms and military withdrawal from
politics. Several decades of sustained economic growth led the country to surpass North
Korea in terms of the military strength. Furthermore, South Korea’s Nordpolitik and the
end of the Cold War also significantly lessened security threat conditions in the Korean
peninsula.
II. Taiwan
Throughout its rule in Taiwan, the Kuomintang government had evolved from a
quasi-military government in the 1950s, to a one-party state up until the 1980s, and
finally to a democratic regime with a multiparty system in the 1990s. In all the stages of
its political development, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has demonstrated very
firm civilian control of the armed forces. Prior to democratization, firm civilian control
of the ROC army was attributable to the presence of a strong civilian leadership by the
Chiang family and to the KMT party’s penetration into the military hierarchy using the
political commissar system.292 During this period, army officers were committed to the
North East Asian Studies 15: 2 (1996); Sun-hyuk Kim, “State and Civil Society in South Korea’s
Democratic Consolidation: Is the Battle Really Over?” Asian Survey 37: 2 (1997).
292 Some of the exemplary works on civil-military relations in one-party states are, David J.
Betz, Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe (New York: RoutledgeCurzon,
2004); Rowman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton
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party just as in many communist states, not to the state or to the people, as was revealed
in previous chapters.
On the other hand, establishing democratic control of the military is a crucial
component of democratization. In Taiwan, it had to entail the changes of army officers’
loyalty from the party to the constitution and the state. Even though the fact that curbing
the army’s political power has been an essential element of successful democratization in
Taiwan, there has been insufficient scholarly attention devoted to addressing this
aspect.293 This section explains how Taiwan successfully achieved a stable democratic
transition and, in the process, realized firm civilian control over the armed forces. I
suggest that a confluence of several structural factors—benevolent security environments
in the 1980s, Lee Teng-hui’s strong leadership, the professionalized military, and civil
society’s support for Lee’s democratic reforms—were essential for a smooth regime
transition. This section starts from Chiang Ching-kuo’s liberal reforms in the 1970s and
1980s and the power transition to Lee Teng-hui, and then my focus shifts to his
democratic reforms in the 1990s.
Developments in international politics during the 1970s had two contrasting
consequences in Taiwan, as discussed in Chapter Three. On the one hand, the country
found itself in a difficult international position during the 1970s—diplomatic de-
recognition by most countries, expulsion from the United Nation, and, most importantly,
loss of U.S. security commitment. These international developments harmed the position
University Press, 1967); Zoltan D. Barany, Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990:
the Case of Hungary (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993); Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., Communist
Armies in Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski,
eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982).
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of President Chiang Ching-kuo by creating a legitimacy crisis among domestic audiences.
The KMT government could not anymore claim itself as the only legitimate regime in
China. At the same time, however, détente was also taking shape around the Taiwan
Straits in the 1970s.294 The diplomatic normalization between the United States and
mainland China significantly reduced security threats for the KMT regime. Furthermore,
generational changes in both Taiwan and the mainland (including the death of Chiang
Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung) diminished hostilities between the two governments.295 In
particular, Deng Xiao-ping’s economic reform drives and conciliatory approach to
Taiwan constructed a favorable security environment for the Island. By the 1970s, the
prime objective of the KMT regime was not to retake the mainland territory by military
force but to build a stable and legitimate political entity with a strong economy and
robust defense.296
Decreasing security threats enabled Chiang Ching-kuo to embark on a slow but
steady political liberalization. The focal point of Chiang’s reform was the Taiwanization
of the KMT party, legislative branches, and the army hierarchy, as detailed in the
previous chapter. As a result of Chiang’s reform drives in the 1970s until his death in
293 An exception to this statement is M. Taylor Fravel, “Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-
Military Relations in Taiwan’s Democratization,” Armed Forces and Society 29: 1 (2002).
294 For Deng Xiao-ping’s approach to Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s, see Hung-mao Tien, ed.,
Mainland China, Taiwan, the U.S. Policy (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1983);
King-yuh Chang, A Framework for China’s Unification (Taipei: Kwang Hwa, 1986); Robert G.
Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments after Mao (New York: Praeger, 1986).
295 Generational changes and inter-ethnic marriages blurred the ethnic gap in Taiwan. About 55
percent of Chinese ethnics were born in Taiwan, which means that most of the population in
Taiwan was born in the island. Hung-mao Tien, “Social Change and Political Development in
Taiwan,” in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds., Taiwan in a Time of
Transition (New York: Paragon House, 1988), p. 6.
296 Chiao-chiao Hsieh, Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations of the
Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949-1979 (London: The Sherwood Press, 1985), p. 233.
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1988, KMT rule transformed Taiwan from hard-authoritarianism to soft-authoritarianism
in which political oppression was significantly diminished.
While the early stage of liberal reforms was initiated by the KMT regime itself, it
was the opposition political forces that pushed for a more thorough and profound
democratization. Chiang Ching-kuo’s liberalization brought about a rapid increase in the
political opposition movement, known as tangwai (literally meaning “outside the party”).
Tangwai was a grassroots coalition that was formed by ethnic Taiwanese and demanded
political freedom and independence for the island.297 Tangwai became a major driving
force for democratization, running for the seats in local and provincial assemblies and
raising numerous issues such as farmers’ interests, religious rights, environmental
preservation, and consumers’ rights.298 In pushing the KMT government for more
reforms, tangwai members adopted a moderate strategy and dealt with less politically
sensitive issues such as economic justice, environmental preservation, and labor rights.299
In September 1986, 135 members of the tangwai announced the formation of a
new political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with legislator Fei Hsi-ping
as the party leader. Instead of prosecuting the DPP organizers, the KMT regime took no
action. On the contrary, Chiang Ching-kuo made a surprising announcement as early as
1986, when in an interview with the Washington Post he said he would lift martial law as
297 Yun Fan, “Taiwan: No Civil Society, No Democracy,” in Alagappa ed., Civil Society and
Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2004), p. 165.
298 For tangwai’s role in Taiwan’s democratization, see Fan, 2004; Yun-han Chu, “Social
Protests and Political Democratization in Taiwan,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., The Other
Taiwan: 1945 to the Present (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Teresa Wright, “Student
Mobilization in Taiwan: Civil Society and Its Discontents,” Asian Survey 39: 6 (1999).
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soon as a new national security law could be put into place.300 Earlier that year, President
Chiang appointed an ad hoc committee for further democratic reforms. The committee
recommended several important reform objectives such as ending the ban on opposition
parties, reorganizing the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, and further
Taiwanization and structural reform of the KMT party.301 The committee’s
recommendation set the foundation for democratization in the late-1980s and early-
1990s.
Following the committee’s suggestion, Chiang lifted the four-decades-long
martial law in July 1987, which seriously impacted Taiwan’s democratization in several
ways. With the lifting of martial law, opposition parties became legal and a number of
opposition parties were formed, including the Social Democratic Party, the Green Party,
the Workers Party, the Labor Party, and in 1993 the Chinese New Party, none of which
became influential enough to offer a serious challenge to the KMT until the 1996
presidential election.302 In addition, the KMT government lifted the ban on travel to
mainland China, enabling Taiwanese businesses to invest in and trade with the mainland.
299 During the 1983-1987 period, political issues raised by tangwai constituted just 11 percent of
its initiatives, while environmental, economic, and labor issues amounted to 80 percent. In Fan,
2004, p. 167.
300 With the formation of the DPP, Taiwan had the first multi-party election in the 1986 National
Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections. Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for
Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 126.
301 Murray A. Rubinstein, “Taiwan’s Socioeconomic Modernization,” in Murray A. Rubinstein,
ed., Taiwan: A New History (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 446.
302 For more information on the opposition parties in Taiwan, see Tsu-cheng Chou, “Electoral
Competition and the Development of Opposition in Taiwan,” The Annals 20 (1992); John F.
Copper, “The Role of Minor Political Parties in Taiwan,” World Affairs 155 (1993); Teh-fu
Hwang, “Electoral Competition and Democratic Transition in the Republic of China,” Issues and
Studies 27 (1991); Yu-ming Shaw, ed., Building Democracy in the Republic of China (Taipei:
The Asia and World Institute, 1984).
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Finally, the ending of martial law prohibited army intelligence agencies’ interference in
civilian affairs.
Before lifting martial law, Chiang Ching-kuo carefully prepared for a smooth
power transition by declaring that the Chiang family would never assume leadership in
Taiwanese politics and appointing Lee Teng-hui as his successor upon his death.303 The
appointment of Lee as the next president was a big surprise both within and outside the
KMT, since Lee was an ethnic Taiwanese who did not have a significant support base in
the party. Until Chiang’s death, anxiety about the power succession continued, with
some apprehensions about a possible military coup. Still, several factors permitted
smooth power transition. First, Chiang Ching-kuo himself made clear that there would
be no military government or another “Chiang Dynasty” after his death and that Lee
Teng-hui would be his successor. Second, Chiang’s Taiwanization drive within and
outside the KMT party long before his death provided Lee with a favorable condition for
securing his power base in the party and the army. Third, one year before Lee rose to the
presidency, martial law was lifted so that army officers could not overtly intervene in the
succession process. Finally, right after rising to power, Lee appointed General Hau Pei-
tsun, the most influential figure in the ROC army, as premier.304 As a result of these
factors, 24 senior army officers, including Chief of Staff General Hau, swore loyalty to
Lee upon his inauguration.
303 Lee Teng-hui, a technocrat with Ph. D in economics from Cornell University, was appointed
to Taipei City mayor and governor of Taiwan Province from 1978 to 1981. In 1982, Lee was
selected by Chiang as vice president. Rigger, 1999, pp. 121-122.
304 For General Hau’s political role during democratization, see Yun-han Chu, Crafting
Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992); Fravel, 2002.
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Democratic reforms were further accelerated under Lee Teng-hui’s leadership.
The years from 1988 to 1996, when the direct presidential election took place, were the
most critical years for Taiwan’s democratization. In the summer of 1990, Lee convened
a National Affairs Conference (NAC)—an advisory council for the president—to create a
national consensus on democratic reforms. The NAC reached an agreement on key
reform issues, including: (1) lifting the “Temporary Provisions (the emergency
legislation)”; (2) retiring the ‘old Guards’ in the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly
who had been elected in mainland China before retreating to Taiwan; (3) constructing
proportional representation seats in the Legislative Yuan; and most importantly (4)
electing the president through direct popular election.305
Based on the NAC’s recommendation, President Lee abolished the Temporary
Provisions (or “Period of Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellion”),
officially ending the half-century-long civil war with the communists. The official
termination of the civil war softened Taiwan’s approach to the mainland. In January
1991, the KMT government founded the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to plan and
implement policies toward the mainland. In addition, the ending of the Temporary
Provisions notably reduced the ROC army’s domestic security roles. In 1992, the KMT
regime disbanded the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) which had performed the
army’s internal security and policing responsibilities.306 At the same time, all military
training programs for university students were also eliminated, fostering further de-
militarization of civilian society in Taiwan.
305 Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, “Crafting Democratic Institutions in Taiwan,” The
China Journal 37 (1997), pp. 5-6.
197
In addition to curbing the military’s political and domestic security roles,
President Lee also reformed the legislative bodies. He retired the older members of the
Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly and reformed the electoral systems so that
representatives were to be chosen through popular election. Furthermore, he announced
that Taiwan would have a popular presidential election in 1996.
There are several important elements that enabled President Lee’s successful
democratic reforms and the depoliticization of army officers. The first and most
significant factor was diminishing external security threats surrounding the island during
the democratic reforms. As I mentioned above, authorities from mainland China had
offered conciliatory gestures to their counterparts on the Island since Deng Xiao-ping
rose to power and initiated economic reforms. In response, the KMT leadership,
although slow to react, responded by permitting economic transactions and family visits
to the mainland. The amount of Taiwan-PRC trade reached $1 billion in 1987, even
though it was an indirect trade with the mainland via Hong Kong.307 The subsequent
economic cooperation with the mainland was led by the business community, quite free
from political and security constraints.
As can be seen in Table 4-1, economic transactions across the Taiwan Straits
increased rapidly, leading Taiwan and the PRC toward a deep economic interdependence.
By the mid-1990s, mainland China had become the second biggest trading partner for
Taiwan. In addition to trade, direct investment by Taiwanese businessmen also increased
in the 1990s. Taiwan’s foreign direct investment in the mainland amounted to over $1.2
306 Fravel, 2002, p. 67.
307 James D. Seymour, “Taiwan in 1988: No More Bandits,” Asian Survey 29: 1 (1989), p. 61.
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billion in the final year of the Lee presidency. Such a rapidly forming economic
interdependence was not interrupted by strained political-security relations between the
two states in the mid-to-late 1990s. Rather, growing economic cooperation became the
most significant factor stabilizing Taiwan-PRC relations.
Table 4-1: Taiwan-PRC Economic Exchanges, 1990-1996 (in US $ millions)308
Year Taiwan’s Exports to
PRC
































The second element conducive to Taiwan’s smooth democratic regime transition
was the role of elections in Taiwanese politics. Even though free and competitive
elections were not allowed for most positions in central government—including the
president and other representative bodies—elections at the local and provincial levels
were held from the time the KMT party moved to the island in 1949. During the
democratization era, major democratic reforms revolved around the elections, both for
the presidency and the legislative bodies. The effect of elections in Taiwan’s
democratization was twofold. On the one hand, elections at the local levels provided
Taiwanese elites with an opportunity to expand their political bases at the local level.
These elites later became influential political actors at the national level after organizing
308 Tse-kang Leng, “Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations: The Role of
Private Firms,” Asian Survey 38: 5 (1998), pp. 494-509.
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tangwai, which was a predecessor of the DPP, the first opposition party in Taiwan. The
local elections fostered the grassroots’ rise as an influential force for democratization.


























Notes: In the 1986 election, the DPP candidates were identified as Tangwai because the
DPP was not formally legalized until 1989.
On the other hand, electoral politics in Taiwan also served to legitimize KMT’s
rule. Chiang Ching-kuo’s political reforms and the Taiwanization of the KMT
government aimed at overcoming the legitimacy crisis that came from Taiwan’s
diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the KMT’s electoral
success at all levels created political stability and legitimacy for its rule. Even though the
tangwai nominated legislative candidates at all levels, its winning percentage was
minimal. Even after it turned into the DPP in 1989, it was unable to challenge the
KMT’s dominance.
309 Discrepancies between percentage of popular vote share and percentage of seats come from
the so-called “SVMM elections” (single, nontransferable voting in multi-member districts). For
the SVMM’s influence on Taiwanese elections during democratization, see Rigger, 1999, pp.
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As we can see from Table 4-2, the KMT never lost its majority in the legislative
elections, as the main opposition DPP won only a small number of seats in the
Legislative Yuan during the democratic regime transition. The KMT’s electoral victory
from the legislative bodies at the top to the local governments presented the party with
broad-based public support and legitimacy with little challenge from opposition forces.
The KMT’s electoral victories enabled the government to execute slow, but smooth and
carefully-planned democratic reforms.
Another effect of the KMT’s electoral victories was that it strengthened Lee
Teng-hui’s position within the party. Lee overcame the obstacles of his ethnic Taiwanese
background and narrow support base in the party through electoral victories, and the
careful manipulation and purging of old guards in both the party and the army. In this
process, strong support from civil society groups was vital for Lee’s success in
implementing democratic reforms.
After Lee rose to power in 1988, the major challenges to his leadership and
democratic reform came from inside of the ruling party. During the early years of his
leadership, the KMT realigned itself into two factions: a mainstream group led by Lee
and a non-mainstream faction represented by General Hau Pei-tsun. The two factions
were differentiated by their ethnic backgrounds and foreign policy positions. The
mainstream faction included ethnic Taiwanese and young and reform-minded technocrats
who were ideologically moderate, while the non-mainstream faction was composed of
ethnic Chinese and represented conservative elements. In foreign policy, the mainstream
had taken an ambivalent position, even though it later moved closer to the opposition
103-177; Jaushieh Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum
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DPP’s emphasis on Taiwanese independence. On the other hand, the non-mainstream
was strongly attached to the “one China” principle and placed greater emphasis on
unification with the mainland.310 The ROC army was closely aligned with the non-
mainstream forces in the KMT. Thus, Lee’s political missions included curbing the
influence of not only the non-mainstream faction but also senior army officers who had
strong influence in the party.
As a way of overcoming the resistance from the non-mainstream faction,
President Lee had to appoint the former Chief of Staff, General Hau pei-tsun, who
represented the non-mainstream and the military, as premier in 1990. General Hau had
been the most influential figure in the ROC army, having appointed 75 percent of the
generals when he was on active duty. He opposed further democratic reforms and
Taiwanese independence, suggesting that the army would not tolerate the independence
movement even though it took place through a popular referendum.311 Premier Hau and
the non-mainstream elites demanded that President Lee take legal action against the DPP
and some of the mainstream members by charging them as secessionists. The non-
mainstream faction also insisted that members of foreign-based Taiwanese independence
movements should be barred from entering the island. In the area of political reform, the
non-mainstream faction wanted the transformation to remain at a minimum, including the
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 73-85.
310 For detailed discussion over Taiwan’s relationship with the mainland during the
democratization era, see Muthiah Alagappa, “Introduction: Presidential Election,
Democratization, and Cross-Strait Relations,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Taiwan’s Presidential
Politics: Democratization and Cross-Strait Relations in the Twentieth-first Century (New York:
M. E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 30-38; Xiaobo Hu and Gang Lin, “The PRC View of Taiwan under Lee
Teng-hui,” in Wei-chin Lee and T. Y. Wang, eds., Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in
Taiwan, 1988-2000 (New York: University Press of America, 2003), pp. 277-297.
311 Fravel, 2002, p. 63.
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constitutional amendment that would adopt direct presidential election. Likewise,
opposition to further democratic reforms revolved around the national identity and
independence issues inside the ruling KMT party.
Against their backdrop, however, President Lee successfully strengthened his
position in the KMT by gaining support from mainstream KMT members, the DPP
moderates, and the general public, marginalizing the non-mainstream faction in the party.
The non-mainstream faction lost its influence in the party after General Hau was
dismissed from the premiership and Lee Teng-hui embarked on military reform and
party-army split. In the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, members of the mainstream
KMT party and the DPP formed a grand coalition to oust Hau from the premiership.
Both the KMT mainstream faction and the DPP marshaled support from the native
Taiwanese elites and the general public.
Lee Teng-hui’s democratic reforms culminated in military reforms. For the first
three years of his presidency, he had to appease senior army officers to secure his
political position. The president diminished General Hau’s influence over senior army
officers by retiring him from active military service, appointing him as defense minister
in 1989, and, one year later, assigning him to the premiership to silence the conservative
elements in the ROC army. After the expulsion of Hau from the premiership, the army
officers’ political influence also declined. Lee trimmed the military budget, which led to
a reduction of military personnel. Furthermore, he decreased the military’s
representation in the Central Standing Committee of the KMT. The Lee government
established an Intelligence Committee in the Legislative Yuan to administer the National
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Security Bureau and to control the armed forces.312 While reducing the military officers’
presence in civilian affairs, the KMT also withdrew its influence from the army,
augmenting the military’s institutional autonomy. In October 1993, the Legislative Yuan
passed a law that prohibited political parties from establishing their organizations in the
army.313
President Lee’s political position was finally secured and democratic reforms
reinforced with the 1996 presidential election. In this election, the ruling KMT candidate
Lee Teng-hui won 54 percent of the popular vote, while the DPP candidate Peng Ming-
min garnered only 21 percent.314 Four years later in 2000, Taiwan’s democratization was
finally consolidated as the opposition DPP leader Chen Shui-bian was elected to the
presidency. Clear evidence of the establishment of democratic control over the military
was the army officers’ allegiance to the new president who had radically different foreign
and security policies from what the ROC army had traditionally espoused.315
In sum, four major structural components were conducive to the successful
democratization and the army’s political disengagement in Taiwan. First, decreasing
security threats across the Taiwan Straits in the 1980s created favorable structural
circumstances for democratic reforms. Second, strong leadership by Chiang Ching-kuo
312 Tien and Cheng, 1997, pp. 9-11.
313 Fravel, 2002, p. 68.
314 In the 1996 presidential election, Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun formed the New Party and
garnered 14.9 percent of popular vote. For detailed analysis of the 1996 presidential election, see
Eric P. Moon, “Single Non-transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects of an Electoral
System,” Asian Survey 37: 7(1997), pp. 652-668; Tun-jen Cheng, “Taiwan in 1996: From
Euphoria to Melodrama,” Asian Survey 37: 1 (1997), pp. 43-51.
315 For detailed analysis of the 2000 presidential election results and implications, see Yu-shan
Wu, “Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer,” Asian Survey 41: 1
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and Lee Teng-hui facilitated a robust democratization process and the army officers’
subordination to civilian leadership. Third, the presence of strong but moderate civil
society groups during Lee’s presidency led to a far-reaching institutionalization of
democratic reforms. Finally, the presence of highly cohesive military promoted its
smooth political disengagement.
III. The Philippines
In the previous two cases, I elucidated how a combination of structural factors—
favorable security environments, a strong civilian leadership backed by vibrant civil
society, and a cohesive military organization—brought about stable regime transition and
the depoliticization of the armed forces. The remaining two cases—the Philippines and
Indonesia—reveal a different pattern of democratic regime change. In contrast to the
previous two cases, the remaining cases illustrate a situation in which politicized army
officers became a stumbling bloc for democratization.
Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, the Philippines in the mid 1980s experienced
democratic regime transition without prior liberal reforms or elite compromise under
Marcos’ authoritarian regime. Instead, democratization was prompted after the Reform
the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) sided with Corazon Aquino to topple Marcos. The
RAM’s decision was vital for the end of the authoritarian rule and the installation of a
democratic regime. However, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was never a
pro-democracy group as RAM members or Marcos loyalists staged no less than seven
major coup attempts within the first four years of the Aquino presidency. This section
(2001), pp. 40-48; T. Y. Wang, “Cross-Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan:
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details the dynamics of democratization and military depoliticization in the Philippines
by focusing on Marcos’ ouster and the subsequent regime transition under the Aquino
leadership.
As noted in the previous chapter, the assassination of Benigno S. Aquino in 1983
marked a turning point for Marcos’ downfall. The assassination provoked sweeping
demonstrations by the general public for the first time since the declaration of martial law
in 1972. The Aquino assassination led Filipinos to call “for justice for Aquino, national
reforms, an end to the role of the U.S. in the Philippines, and Marcos’ resignation.”316
The Philippine Catholic Church, under the leadership of Jaime Cardinal Sin, played a
critical role in organizing anti-Marcos demonstrations that were called the “People’s
Power” movement.317 Continued domestic political turmoil after the assassination caused
a massive flight of foreign capital, leading to a serious economic crisis.318 Furthermore,
economic difficulties elevated the armed insurgency operations by the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim separatist movement, and the New People’s Army
(NPA), an armed apparatus for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). As we
can see from Table 2-7 in Chapter Two, the strength of the two insurgency groups
Changing Tactics in a New Reality,” Asian Survey 41: 5 (2001), pp. 716-736.
316 G. Sidney Silliman, “The Philippines in 1983: Authoritarianism Beleaguered,” Asian Survey
24: 2 (1984), p. 154.
317 Jaime Cardinal Sin became a channel of communication among disorganized and competing
opposition forces. Cardinal Sin persuaded Aquino to join the opposition forces and accept a joint
ticket with Salavador Laurel for the 1986 presidential election. Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos
Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 200.
318 Right after the Aquino assassination on August 21, over $700 million capital left the
Philippines. Foreign currency reserves plunged from $2.4 billion to $600 million. Foreign debt
rose to $26 billion, while GNP declined five percent in the following year. See Silliman, 1984, p.
152; Herbert S. Malin, “The Philippines in 1984: Grappling with Crisis,” Asian Survey 25: 2
(1985), p. 203.
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reached its zenith in 1986, seriously threatening both the security of the nation and that of
Marcos’ regime.
In such a crisis situation, the most serious blow to the authoritarian regime was
Marcos’ loss of support in the AFP. His personalistic control over AFP leadership gave
rise to factional struggles among army officers, especially between the PMA (Philippine
Military Academy) and non-PMA graduates. The PMA faction that initiated the RAM
withdrew its support for Marcos and sided with the pro-democracy group represented by
Corazon Aquino. As noted in the previous chapter, RAM members planned a coup
against Marcos as early as October 1985. The shaky support from the AFP forced the
president to declare, on November 3, 1985, a snap election to be held on February 7,
1986.
The announcement was a big surprise to the unprepared and disorganized
opposition forces. Among various opposition leaders, Aquino and Salvador Laurel were
the most prominent figures. Both of them were willing to run in the presidential election,
creating a possibility that the opposition’s vote would be split. In this situation,
prominent opposition leaders such as Vincente Puyat, Francisco Rodrigo, and Cardinal
Sin mediated between Laurel and Aquino to form a united front in the election. Laurel
yielded to Aquino for the presidential candidacy on the condition that they run under the
United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), an opposition umbrella group.319 It was almost
certain that Aquino and Laurel would win the 1986 presidential election considering
Aquino’s tremendous popularity among the general public and united opposition forces.
319 Bernardo M. Villegas, “The Philippines in 1986: Democratic Reconstruction in the Post-
Marcos Era,” Asian Survey 27: 2 (1987), p. 196.
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Since Marcos knew he was heading for a loss, he engaged in various kinds of
electoral fraud such as vote-buying with bribery, mobilizing bureaucrats’ votes, and
terrorizing pro-opposition voters.320 It is estimated that Marcos spent more than $500
million to buy votes. In addition, General Ver and the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
(KBL) party devised to put AFP forces into heavy pro-opposition districts for
psychological terror. Reportedly 264 people were killed and 227 injured during the
election campaign period.321
Even with those election irregularities, the result for the 1986 presidential election
was inconclusive so that both Marcos and Aquino declared a victory. The Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), which was controlled by the ruling KBL party, declared
Marcos’ victory with 54 percent of the popular vote, while the National Movement for
Free Elections (NAMFREL), a citizen watchdog group, announced Aquino’s victory. In
this situation Aquino held a ‘People’s Victory’ rally, in which about one million people
participated to support Aquino’s win.322
The biggest momentum for democratic regime transition occurred when RAM
members revolted against Marcos on February 22, 1986 and sided with Aquino. In this
process, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff General Fidel V.
Ramos played leading roles. Prior to the mutiny, Marcos gave an order to arrest RAM
320 For more information on the 1986 election frauds, see Far Eastern Economic Review
(January 30, 1986), p. 12; Romeo Manlapaz, The Mathematics of Deception: A Study of the 1986
Presidential Election Tallies (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, University of the
Philippines, 1986); Jennifer Conroy Franco, Elections and Democratization in the Philippines
(New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 173-181.
321 Mark R. Thomson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition
in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 142.
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members including those two leaders. Before the arrest, however, Enrile and Ramos
discovered the arrest order and decided to rise up against Marcos. They resigned their
positions in the Marcos government and declared that the 1986 election was fraudulent
and that Aquino was the legitimate winner.323 Not long after Enrile and Ramos
announced their withdrawal from Marcos at Camp Aguinaldo, over 80,000 people
surrounded the Camp to protect the “rebels” from Marcos loyalists’ attempt to take them
into custody.324 A massive defection of AFP officers to the RAM’s side ensued.
Marcos’ plan to attack Camp Aguinaldo failed because of the large human blockade
around the Camp and the AFP’s refusal to follow Marcos’ order. On February 25,
Marcos fled Malacanang, the presidential palace, and Aquino and Laurel organized a
provisional government.
As the first democratically elected president since 1965, Aquino faced an
enormous number of reform imperatives. The first task was to purge Marcos loyalists in
both the government and the AFP. The next was to rebuild democratic institutions with a
new constitution that had been halted with the declaration of martial law in 1972. In
addition, she had to deal with economic difficulties the Philippines had suffered
throughout the Marcos rule. Closely related to the economic condition and political
unrest were the rising insurgency operations by the NPA and the MNLF. Aquino could
not exert a strong political leadership, however, because she failed to unite various
322 See, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, “On the Eve of Dictatorship and Revolution,” in Aurora Javate de
Dios, et al., Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power (Manila: Conspectus, 1988),
pp. 1-125.
323 Carl H. Lande, The Political Crisis,” in John Bresnan, ed., Crisis in the Philippines: The
Marcos Era and Beyond (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 143.
324 Cecilio T. Arillo, Breakaway (Manila: Kyodo, 1986), p. 117.
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political forces that contributed to overthrowing Marcos. The inexperience of the Aquino
leadership, therefore, thwarted democratic reform programs.
The Aquino government was composed of loosely aligned political forces with
different ideologies and political interests. The political coalition included, among
others, RAM officers, conservative politicians, business elites, religious groups, moderate
liberal democrats, and the general public that formed the People’s Power. These diverse
political interests can be categorized into three major factions: (1) conservative
politicians and business elites who were deprived of their political positions and
economic interests under the Marcos dictatorship; (2) RAM officers led by Enrile and
Ramos; and (3) progressive liberal democrats who supported Aquino’s political
reforms.325 The first two factions were predominant in the Aquino government, while the
liberal democrats were the weakest. While these diverse and competing forces
contributed to political pluralism and democratic elements in the government, acute
competition among them deepened elite fragmentation and became a source of weak and
inefficient leadership.
One of the most pressing tasks for the Aquino leadership was to introduce
economic reform, which in turn was closely related with the growing insurgency problem
in the southern provinces of the Philippines. But economic reform was hampered by the
influence of conservative politicians and business elites both in Congress and the Aquino
administration. Rather than undertaking wide-ranging economic reforms, they were only
325 For the detailed information about political factions in the Aquino regime, see David J.
Steinberg, The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press,
1990), p. 148; Walden Bello, “Aquino’s Elite Pluralism: Initial Reflections,” Third World
Quarterly 8: 3 (1986), p. 1020; Kyung-kyo Seo, “Military Involvement in politics and the
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interested in recovering their properties that had been confiscated under the martial law
regime. In the land reform area, for example, a new reform law was introduced by the
land-owning groups led by Congressman Cojuangco, President Aquino’s brother.326 The
law aimed at recovering Aquino’s and other conservative land owners’ agricultural
estates that were confiscated under the Marcos regime. The conservative elites’ influence
in the Aquino government became even stronger after the 1987 congressional elections.
In the elections, 130 out of 200 congressmen belonged to conservative factions called
“traditional political families,” while another 39 were closely related to those families.
Only 37 congressmen had no electoral record prior to 1971.327 The election resulted in a
return to politics by ‘dynastic’ families that controlled the pre-martial law politics, and in
this situation, political and economic reforms were hardly far-reaching.
A more serious stumbling block for the Aquino government was the AFP. Even
though RAM’s decision to turn against Marcos was perhaps the most crucial contributor
to Marcos’ overthrow and the installation of a democratic regime, the RAM was never a
pro-democracy group. The RAM’s choice in favor of pro-democracy forces was made as
a way to unseat the Marcos regime that marginalized RAM officers from key positions in
the AFP. Whatever its motivation, the RAM’s decision to support Aquino was vital for
the installation of a new government, and as such, RAM officers believed that they had
the right to participate in the Aquino government as an equal partner of the civilian
Prospects for Democracy: Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea in Comparative
Perspective,” Ph. D Dissertation (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1993), p. 236.
326 Renato S. Velasco, “Philippine Democracy: Promise and Performance,” in Anek
Laothamatas, ed. Democratization in Southeast and East Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1997), p. 94.
327 John T. Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999), pp. 73-78.
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leadership. In Miranda and Ciron’s survey of 452 AFP officers,328 about 96% of the
respondents agreed that the AFP should play an active role in national development
which includes a secure political environment (72%) and sustained economic growth
(71%). In the same survey, 61 percent of officers believed that army officers had more
apposite capabilities in managing administrative jobs in civilian government than their
civilian counterparts.
At the outset of the Aquino presidency, AFP officers pronounced their allegiance
to the new president. Before long, however, those officers’ support for Aquino quickly
dissolved due to several reasons. The Aquino government failed to conduct major
economic reforms including the land reform. In addition, Aquino failed to mobilize the
People’s Power into her presidential leadership. Strong and united civil society groups
that had real enthusiasm for democratic reform quickly dispersed not long after Marcos
stepped down. Instead, the old conservative factions hijacked the Aquino government.
In this set-up, the president could not eliminate the Marcos loyalists in the government
and the military. Most importantly, Aquino’s defense and security policies infuriated
AFP officers.
Aquino and the AFP disagreed on the counterinsurgency policy toward the
CPP/NPA and the MNLF. The AFP insisted on strengthening the counterinsurgency
program by adopting tough measures, while the civilian leadership preferred more
peaceful means. Aquino enraged the AFP by releasing political prisoners, including the
328 Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines:
Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis,” in J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun
Cheong, eds., Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1988), pp. 163-211.
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CPP leader Jose Maria Sison. Furthermore, the Aquino government set off a ceasefire
and peace talks with the CPP and the MNLF secessionists. In the ceasefire talks, the
Aquino government named only civilian representatives with no military presence. A
ceasefire agreement between the government and the National Democratic Front (NDF),
an umbrella organization of underground leftist groups, reached a 60-day truce effective
on December 10, 1986. But the truce did not last long due to a discrepancy on key
issues. The NDF demanded a share of seats in the Aquino government and the
integration of the NPA militias into the AFP hierarchy. In the same way, the Aquino
government’s peace talks with Moro secessionists also failed, as the MNLF demanded
autonomy of Mindanao and its army independent of the AFP command.329
After the Aquino government’s peace efforts with the insurgents ended in failure,
the NPA and the MNLF resumed their armed uprisings in the late 1980s. According to
Jose M. Sison and the CPP Central Committee, the CPP/NPA possessed about 230,000
fighters and 10 million people who joined communist-organized groups.330 In such a
perilous security situation, the Aquino government further antagonized the AFP by
cutting 14 percent of the military budget in 1986. To make matters worse, Aquino
founded a Presidential Human Rights Commission to investigate human rights abuse
charges against the AFP during the martial law regime. In the views of AFP officers, the
Aquino government was inclined to favor the leftists.
329 Carolina G. Hernandez, “The Philippines in 1987: Challenges of Redemocratization,” Asian
Survey 28: 2 (1989), p. 2 (February 1988), p. 236; Alex Bello Brillantes, “Insurgency and Peace
Policies of the Aquino Government,” PSSC Social Science Information (April-September, 1987),
pp. 3-9.
330 Carolina G. Hernandez, “The Philippines in 1988: Reaching out to Peace and Economic
Recovery,” Asian Survey 29: 2 (1989), p. 159.
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It was not long before segments of the AFP withdrew their support from the
Aquino government and began staging coup attempts. As Table 4-3 illustrates, there
were seven major coup attempts either by RAM members or by Marcos loyalists within
the first four years of the Aquino presidency. There were several important reasons for
those coup attempts: Aquino’s decision to investigate human right abuses by the military
under martial law, the cease-fire and peace negotiations with the CPP/NPA, several left-
leaning members in the administration, and most importantly Aquino government’s
mishandling of security policies.331
Table 4-3: Major Coup Attempts in the Aquino Presidency, 1986-1989332
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In the first coup attempt on July 6, 1986, Arturo Tolentino, Marcos’ running mate
for the 1986 election, occupied the Manila Hotel and declared that Marcos was the
legitimate president. None of the officers who joined the coup were punished. Four
months later, chief of staff General Ramos discovered the second coup plan by RAM
331 Some of the left-leaning members in the administration included, among others, Labor
Minister Aqusto Sanchez, Local Government Minister Aquilino Pimentel, and Executive
Secretary Joker Aroyo. Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian
Rule (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), p. 142.
332 Mark R. Thomson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition
in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 169.
214
officers. It was suspected that Juan Ponce Enrile was behind the two coup plans. After
the second coup, therefore, Aquino fired Enrile. Ramos, with four other senior officers,
submitted to Aquino the ten-point demands, some of which were (1) to increase the
AFP’s counterinsurgency power, (2) to dismiss left-leaning cabinet members, (3) to
reinstitute the National Security Council (NSC), and (4) to fire corrupt officials in the
government.333 The recurring coup attempts forced the Aquino government to accept
most of the AFP officers’ demands. Aquino increased the military budget and payment
by 60 percent and adopted the AFP’s counterinsurgency plan that had been previously
dismissed. In addition, she had to fire several cabinet members who were charged by the
military as leftist sympathizers. Those coup attempts seriously damaged Aquino’s
leadership and the economic conditions in the Philippines throughout the late 1980s.334
Civilian control over the AFP was established only after Fidel Ramos was elected
as president in the 1992 election. As the former chief of staff who gained solid support
from Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates, Ramos successfully curbed the
RAM’s veto power in domestic politics. Ramos’ control over the AFP, however, was
secured by bringing several senior AFP officers into his government.
Even though the Philippines did not return to military-dominant dictatorial rule,
its democratization process was tainted by numerous coup d’etat attempts. In this
section, I identified several major factors that hampered civilian control over the armed
forces during the democratic regime transition. Severe security threats from the growing
333 Casper, 1995, p. 143.
334 The December 1989 coup attempt, for example, severely damaged the economy by shattering
the credibility of the Aquino government among the Filipino and international business
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CPP/NPA and the MNLF insurgency movements created a structural condition for the
AFP to be politically influential. The country’s security threats were further exacerbated
by the Aquino government’s inappropriate handling of security policies. Meanwhile,
weak Aquino leadership provided AFP officers with opportunities to challenge civilian
authority. The once-strong People’s Power movement did not turn into pro-democracy
forces in the Aquino government. On the contrary, conservative political and economic
elites dominated the new regime. In this situation, Aquino could not accomplish far-
reaching political and economic reforms. Finally, the AFP did not develop into a
cohesive and professionalized military institution but suffered from factional struggles
that were fostered by Marcos as a way to secure his control over the AFP. The
factionalized AFP staged numerous coup attempts when the Aquino government failed to
provide strong political leadership.
IV. Indonesia
Once Maj. Gen. Haji Mohammad Suharto and army officers toppled President
Sukarno in 1965, the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of
the Republic of Indonesia) became a dominant player in Indonesian politics, and
remained so until Suharto stepped down from his presidency in 1998. Throughout
Suharto’s presidency, ABRI officers became deeply engaged in domestic political,
administrative, and economic affairs under the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine. Army
officers were guaranteed seats in the National Parliament and in the People’s
Representative Council, an electoral college that selected the president and vice president
communities. For the 1989 coup’s effect on the Philippine economy, see David G. Timberman,
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once every five years. In addition, President Suharto assigned military officers in various
governmental positions at both national and provincial levels. By the mid-1990s, Suharto
employed about 14,000 officers outside the armed forces.335 Throughout 32 years of the
New Order regime, the ABRI played as the backbone of Suharto’s authoritarian rule.
The seemingly resilient New Order regime abruptly ended in the midst of
economic crisis and ensuing social unrests in 1997 and 1998.336 Since Indonesia
launched a democratic regime transition, it faced enormous political, social, and
economic reform tasks: recovering from the 1997 financial crisis, containing inter-ethnic
and inter-religious violence, and building a stable democratic political institution. But the
most significant mission for the new democracy in Indonesia was to reform the ABRI to
become a professional and politically neutral entity. This section illustrates the way in
which severe domestic threats and weak civilian leadership hampered the
democratization process and the complete withdrawal of the military from politics in
Indonesia. This section covers the period from Suharto’s fall to the Megawati
presidency.
“The Philippines in 1990: On Shaky Ground,” Asian Survey 31: 2 (1991), pp. 158-161.
335 In addition to active duty officers, retired officers also held positions: during the final years
of the Suharto presidency, about 50 percent of the provincial governors and over 30 percent of
district heads had military backgrounds. See Annette Clear, “Politics: From Endurance to
Evolution,” in John Bresnan, ed., Indonesia: The Great Transition (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishing, 2005), pp. 146-147.
336 Even though the 1997 financial crisis was the direct cause of Suharto’s fall, organized
opposition forces had been built up since the early 1990s. See, Kastorius Sinaga, “Number of
Local NGO’s Mushrooming,” Jakarta Post (November 2, 1993); Philip Eldridge, Non-
Government Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1995); Edward Aspinall, Student Dissident in Indonesia in the 1980s (Clayton,
Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993); Edward Aspinall, “Indonesia: Civil Society
and Democratic Breakthrough,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Civil Society and Political Change in
Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
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Until 1997, Suharto’s New Order seemed to be robust as he succeeded in
managing political stability and sustained economic growth of over seven percent
throughout his rule. Abruptly, however, an unexpected economic crisis forced all the
major domestic political actors, including the ABRI, to turn against him. The end of the
Suharto’s New Order started from the financial crisis that began in Thailand and soon
spread over to the Philippines, South Korea, and Indonesia. Within a few months of the
financial crisis, the value of the Indonesian rupia plummeted from 2,500 per U.S. dollar
to around 10,000; the stock market plunged from over 700 to nearly 300; and inflation
soared into double digits.337 Right after the financial crisis hit Indonesia, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank offered a package to rescue its
economy.
The IMF and the Suharto government reached an agreement for structural reforms
for the economy as a precondition for the rescue package, but the agreement was not
properly implemented, which only made the situation worse.338 The government’s
inefficient economic policies were mainly due to the corruption of his family and
cronies.339 Suharto, at the age of 76, was quite isolated from everyday politics. At the
height of the economic crisis, he was mainly interested in taking care of the interest of his
337 Judith Bird, “Indonesia in 1997: The Tinerbox Year,” Asian Survey 38: 2 (1998), p. 175.
338 For the IMF’s economic package deal with Indonesia, see Central Banking, Reforming the
IMF: Lessons from Indonesia (http://www.centralbanking.co.uk/publications/pdf/Hanke.pdf);
Hall Hill, The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1999).
339 Against the economic reforms, Suharto’s youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra,
monopolized the national car project; his oldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana announced to
build an expensive triple-decker road. Mohammad Hassan, one of Suharto’s cronies, took back
the plywood industry. R. William Liddle, “Indonesia’s Unexpected Failure of Leadership,” in
Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris, eds., The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp. 17-18.
218
inner-circle. The inefficiency and corruption of his government put him in a politically
difficult situation, since he had identified himself as the “father of development.”
Corruption had been tolerated by people only so long as the economy continued thriving
under Suharto’s leadership.340 With the economy in deep trouble, however, Suharto
could not claim his legitimacy for his authoritarian rule any more.
The economic crisis spread over to a nationwide political crisis in early 1998, as
college students organized massive anti-Suharto demonstrations. At the early stage of
demonstrations, student protests were small in size and centered on economic issues such
as inflation and unemployment. But the protest soon evolved into radicalized and violent
anti-Suharto demonstrations as ordinary citizenry joined. The demonstrations turned into
riots when lower-class people felt emboldened, committing property damage and killing
over 1,000 people in Jakarta alone.341 The riot in Jakarta was targeted on the ethnic
Chinese community that comprised about 4 percent of the population but controlled up to
70 percent of the Indonesian economy.342 Violent protests led the already flagging
economy into an even deeper crisis due to a large-scale capital flight after attacks on
ethnic Chinese.
In the midst of economic crisis and violent demonstrations, Suharto was
unanimously reelected as president by the People’s Representative Council on March 10,
1998. By this time, however, he could not carry on his presidency. Three former vice
340 Clear, 2005, p. 153.
341 Violent riots were quite frequent throughout the 1990s even before the 1997 economic crisis
began. Elizabeth Fuller Collins, “Indonesia: A Violent Culture?” Asian Survey 42: 4 (2002);
Lowell Dittmer, “The Legacy of Violence in Indonesia,” Asian Survey 42: 4 (2002); Susan
Berfield and Dewi Loveard, “Ten Days that Shook Indonesia,” Asiaweek, July 21 (1998).
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presidents pleaded with him to resign and yield the power to Vice President B. J Habibie.
Furthermore, Suharto could not form a new cabinet because, among the 45 people who
were nominated, only three accepted the president’s offer. On May 20, 1998, Suharto
met General Wiranto, the army chief of staff and defense minister, and notified him that
he would resign.343 General Wiranto guaranteed that the ABRI would protect and honor
him. On the next day, Suharto stepped down and turned his presidency over to Vice
President Habibie.
The fall of Suharto and the subsequent power transition was so abrupt and
spontaneous that the Habibie leadership was not well-prepared to carry out political and
economic reforms. The interim Habibie government had to deal with numerous
challenging problems such as the severe economic crisis, violent demonstrations, inter-
ethnic and inter-religious clashes, and separatist movements in Aceh, Papua, and East
Timor. After Suharto stepped down, the ABRI remained the most powerful and best
organized political institution in Indonesia. In this respect, it is worth pondering why
there was no military coup attempt by the ABRI even through Indonesia suffered from
numerous security challenges and the ill-functioning civilian leadership in post-Suharto
years.
To account for the ABRI’s relatively passive role in the regime transition period,
one needs to revisit the Suharto-ABRI relationship in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the
ABRI became the key partner of Suharto’s New Order and filled prominent positions in
the government, its political power and its institutional autonomy were significantly
342 Adam Schwarz, “Introduction: The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Schwarz and
Paris, eds., 1999, p. 2.
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diminished during the latter half of the Suharto’s rule. During this period, Suharto
reduced his dependence on the ABRI by forming a political coalition with various groups
such as the Islamic groups, economic technocrats, and his own palace clique including
his family. The number of active military officers in Suharto’s cabinet declined during
the last ten years of his rule.344 The ABRI’s political influence further shrank after
Suharto dismissed General Murdani, who wielded great power and charismatic leadership
as armed forces commander (1983-1988) and minister of defense and security (1988-
1993). Suharto further strengthened his grip on the army by reshuffling large numbers of
senior officers and appointing as armed forces commander General Feisal Tanjung, a
man personally loyal to the president. Personal ties and political loyalty were the key
criteria of promotions and assignments.345
In addition to its diminished influence in the Suharto government, the ABRI was
still far from being built up as a cohesive and professionalized institution. The lack of
organizational unity came mainly from its guerrilla warfare experience against the Dutch
colonial forces in the 1940s. During the war of independence, the guerrilla forces were
organized as independent units that were under the leadership of local commanders,
rather than a hierarchical and centralized command structure. Such a horizontal ordering
of the ABRI continued until the Suharto era as a form of territorial command structure, as
I explained in Chapter Three. Moreover, Suharto’s manipulation of the Islamic groups
created a schism along religious lines in the ABRI: the so-called red-and-white faction
343 Judith Bird, “Indonesia in 1998: The Pots Boils Over,” Asian Survey 39: 1 (1999), p. 29.
344 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto (London: Routledge, 1993), p.
25.
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led by General Wiranto that represented the nationalist and secular segment, and the
green faction led by Suharto’s son-in-law Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto that
endorsed modernist Muslims. Suharto consciously manipulated the factional struggles so
that no consensus emerged within the army leadership.346 The lack of cohesion and
strong leadership in the ABRI prevented army officers from dominating the political
transition of 1998.347
In the first stage of democratic regime transition, the ABRI itself embarked on a
military reform to reformulate itself as a cohesive and professional institution. In 1999,
the ABRI proposed 14 points of military reform including, among others, separation of
the police from the armed forces, complete withdrawal from civilian political affairs,
separation from the Golkar Party, political neutrality during elections, and focus only on
its external security mission.348 In the course of the reform, the ABRI aimed to recover
from its tainted image among the general public and to be cherished as the defender of
the national interest.
Even though the ABRI was not strong enough to dominate post-Suharto politics,
weak and divided civilian leadership impeded the establishment of a democratic political
institution and firm civilian control over the armed forces. The 1999 parliamentary
345 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges,
Politics, and Power (RAND: National Security Research Division, 2002), p. 38.
346 For detailed information about factions within the ABRI, see, Takashi Shiraishi, “The
Indonesian Military in Politics,” in Schwarz and Paris, eds., 1999, pp. 76-82.
347 Another reason for the ABRI’s inability to intervene in politics after Suharto stepped down
was its tainted image among the general public. Apart from rampant corruption, the ABRI
enraged the Indonesian people by killing four university students who demonstrated against
Suharto.
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elections showed how far Indonesia’s political spectrum was fragmented. Over 100
parties had been formed before the election, among which 48 political parties were
eligible to participate in the election. Of the 48 parties, 19 parties were based on or had
close ties with Islamic organizations, three with Christian groups, nine with socialist-
oriented bands, and 17 with Pancasila ideology.349 In the election, no parties were able
to gain a majority as the popular votes were distributed almost evenly to five major
parties.350
After 17 months of the interim Habibie presidency, Abdurrahman Wahid was
elected as president through the General Session of the National Assembly in October
1999. Even though he was the first democratically elected leader, Wahid’s presidency
endured only for 20 months before he was forced to step down and hand over the
leadership to vice president Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001. Wahid was politically
weak after he alienated himself from the coalition groups that brought him to the
presidency. In particular, he antagonized the two largest and most influential parties in
the National Assembly: the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian
348 Jusuf Wanandi, “Challenge of the TNI and Its Role in Indonesia’s Future,” in Hadi Soesastro,
Anthony L. Smith, and Han Mui Ling, eds., Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the
Megawati Presidency (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 94-95.
349 For detailed information about those 48 political parties, see Kathleen E. Woodward, Violent
Masses, Elites, and Democratization: The Indonesian Case, Ph. D Dissertation (Columbus: The
Ohio State University, 2002), pp. 340-342.
350 PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle)
won 34 percent of the vote; Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) won 22 percent; PKB
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party), 12 percent; PPP (Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan, Development Unity Party), 10 percent; and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional,
National Message Party), 7 percent. See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs,
The 1999 Presidential Election, MPR General Session and Post-Election Development in
Indonesia (Washington D.C.: National Democratic Institute, November 28, 1999), p. 39; R.
William Liddle, “Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored,” Asian Survey 40: 1 (2000), pp. 32-39.
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Democracy Party-Struggle) led by vice president Megawati, as well as the former ruling
Golkar Party.351
Wahid’s weak leadership provided the ABRI with an opportunity to reclaim its
own political influence. In 2001, for example, Wahid’s attempt to appoint Lt. General
Wirahadikusumah as army chief of staff failed when 46 army generals blocked the
appointment by threatening to resign. Furthermore, ABRI officers played an influential
role in the impeachment of Wahid, initiated by the People’s Representative Council in
May 2001. After Wahid’s fall, the Council elected Megawati to replace him. In this
power transition, the military’s withdrawal of support for Wahid and approval of
Megawati played a key role.
The weakness of the civilian leadership in the post-Suharto Indonesia mainly
came from the disentanglement of civilian political leaders and civil society groups. Not
only were civil society groups fragmented and violent, but civilian political elites could
not garner support from civil society. Civil society groups were thriving in the post-
Suharto period, but they could not form a united front as a pro-democracy force. Their
failure was mainly due to the fact that they were formed along ethnic and religious
lines.352 One distinctive characteristic of Indonesia’s democratization was the power
transition through the elite negotiation. Even though Suharto was forced to transfer
power to Vice President Habibie, his resignation occurred after an agreement between
351 Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p. 42.
352 For the discussion of civil society’s role in the post-Suharto Indonesia, see Edward Aspinall,
“Indonesia: Transformation of Civil Society and Democratic Breakthrough,” in Alagappa, ed.,
2004, pp. 61-95; Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime
Change in Indonesia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Robert Hefner, Civil Islam:
Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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Suharto and the ABRI leader General Wiranto. After Habibie, Wahid’s presidency was
possible only due to a compromise among key political leaders. Such a power transition
via elite negotiation averted any serious political crisis or power vacuum, but at the same
time it inevitably alienated civil society groups. Without the support of civil society, the
civilian leadership was destined to be weak.
Besides the inefficient civilian leadership, continuing internal security threats
provided the ABRI with an opportunity to regain its political influence during the
democratization period. Domestic security conditions progressively deteriorated in the
midst of political turmoil. The domestic instability had multiple sources. The most
serious disturbance came from the resurgence of Islamic political organizations and
related Islamic gangs and militias. The renaissance of militant Islam in the post-Suharto
period had its origins in Suharto’s mobilization of Muslims to broaden his political
support base and counterbalance the ABRI. During the latter years of his rule, Suharto
identified himself as the defender of Islamic interests.353 The influence of militant
Muslim organizations further expanded under the Habibie presidency as he mobilized
those groups to strengthen his political support base.
The resurgence of Islamic organizations inevitably intensified inter-ethnic and
inter-religious conflicts after Suharto’s fall. The inter-ethnic violence was mainly
targeted on the ethnic Chinese community that controlled most economic wealth in
Indonesia. It was not limited to Jakarta but spread to other regions such as the Central
Sulawesi, Moluccas, and Ambon, in which Christian and Muslim groups launched attacks
353 Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p. 84.
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and counter-attacks, killing hundreds.354 Governors in those regions declared a truce, but
it did not prevent a resurgence of violence. The police were unable or unwilling to stop
the inter-ethnic violence.355
Another source of domestic insecurity came from separatist movements in several
provinces such as Papua (or Irian Jaya), East Timor, and Aceh, threatening the state’s
territorial integrity. All of these regions had had decades-old independence movements.
The separatist movement in Aceh, which had its roots in the Darul Islam rebellion in the
1950s, resurfaced in the late 1980s when Acehnese militias, who had been trained in
Libya, formed the GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement) and resumed
the separatist movement. Even though the Suharto government could contain the
Acehnese separatism in the early-1990s, the post-Suharto instability provided the GAM
with another opportunity to launch pro-independence guerrilla warfare.356 Papua militias,
even though less serious than in Aceh, also formed the OPM (Organisasi Papua
Merdeka, Free Papua Organization) and waged an independence guerrilla warfare.357
Finally, East Timor formed an independent government after three decades of
independence struggle. In sum, post-Suharto instability provided several separatist
militia groups with an opportunity to resume intensified clashes with the ABRI and the
regional police force.
354 John McBeth and Oren Murphy, “Bloodbath,” Far Eastern Economic Review, (July 6, 2000),
pp. 20-22.
355 R. William Liddle, “Indonesia in 2000: A Shaky Start for Democracy,” Asian Survey 41: 1
(2001), p. 215.
356 International Crisis Group, “Ending Repression in Irian Jaya,” (September, 2001), available
at <http://www.crisisweb.org>.
357 Human Rights Watch, “Violence and Political Impasse in Papua,” (July, 2001), available at
<http://www.hrw.org>.
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A direct effect of worsening domestic security threats was the ABRI’s renewed
political influence in newly democratized Indonesian politics. In the midst of multiple
security threats from separatist movements and inter-ethnic violence, President Megawati
encouraged army officers to take any step necessary to contain the regional disturbances
and not to worry about human rights abuses. Megawati amended the constitution to
restrict retroactive legislation, exonerating army officers of past human rights abuses.358
Furthermore, she redirected her commandership to Army Chief of Staff General
Endriartondono Sutarto, who brought into the government several ABRI officers who
were influential in the Suharto’s New Order regime. Hundreds of active and retired
officers, in a more audacious stride, proposed a bill that allowed the ABRI leadership to
take any military action without reporting to the president for one day. Even though
Megawati could strengthen her presidency by establishing close ties with the ABRI, it
eventually resulted in boosting army officers’ influence in politics and weaker civilian
control over the military.
In 10 years of democratic trial as of 2007, there have been no coup attempts or
takeover of political power by the ABRI in Indonesia. It does not, however, necessarily
mean that Indonesia’s democratization process had been smooth and complete. The
democratically elected leaders’ control over the armed forces as a crucial component of
democratic consolidation was far from complete in Indonesia, as once weakened army
officers regained their prerogatives in a newly democratized government. The resurgence
of ABRI officers’ political influence in the past few years was due mainly to two reasons.
First, the newly elected political leaders—Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati—could not
358 Clear, 2005, p. 179.
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exert strong political leadership, nor strengthen democratic institutions. The lack of
strong civilian leadership was mainly due to the extremely fragmented political parties
and civil society groups along religious and ethnic cleavages. Second, the weak civilian
leadership had to deal with increasing multiple security threats, from inter-ethnic and
inter-religious violence to separatist militia movements in several regions. In the midst of
heightening domestic security threats, the once-constrained ABRI obtained an
opportunity to regain its political influence in a newly democratized country.
Conclusions
This chapter has examined the democratization process in four Asian countries
and the military’s withdrawal from politics as its crucial component. Even though the
armed forces’ political role in the four states in general decreased, the processes and
degrees of the withdrawal have been different from one country to another. On the one
hand, South Korea and Taiwan went through a stable, complete democratic regime
transition with democratically elected civilian leaders’ control over army officers in the
1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, armed forces in the Philippines and Indonesia
wielded strong influence in the direction and extent of the democratic regime transition. I
identified three major structural causes that made a difference in the regime transition:
domestic and international security threats, the strength of civilian leadership and its
relationship with civil society, and the cohesiveness of military organization. In general,
security threats set the basic tendency of the armed forces’ relative political influence in
the regime transition period. Challenging security threats during democratic regime
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transition provided the armed forces with opportunities to expand their political
influence, while low threats strengthened civilian leaders’ control over the military.
Table 4-4: Security Threats and Military’s Political Influence during Democratization
Cases Security Threats Military’s Political Influence
S. Korea/Taiwan Low External/Low Internal Weak military presence in politics
Philippines/Indonesia Low External/High
Internal
Strong military presence in
politics
Given the threat environments, it was the strength of a newly elected civilian
leadership that determined the degree of civilian leaders’ control over the army. In turn,
the strength of the civilian leadership was heavily influenced by the strength and unity of
civil society. Finally, organizational unity and professionalism of the armed forces had
an effect on their political attitude.
South Korea went through a stable and far-reaching democratization and
established firm civilian control over the army in the 1980s and 1990s. First of all,
security environments in the Korean peninsula turned in favor of South Korea by the
early 1980s. The South’s military strength surpassed its Northern counterpart after two
decades of steady and fast economic growth. In addition, dissolution of Cold War
hostility and South Korea’s diplomatic opening toward former socialist countries through
Nordpolitik significantly reduced security threats in Korea. Given the low level of
security threats, it was the strength of civilian leadership that played a decisive role in the
regime transition. The Kim Young-sam presidency successfully conducted far-reaching
democratic reforms including that of the military institution. Kim’s reform was possible
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due to support from a strong civil society and formation of a grand coalition that
encompassed both conservative and liberal political forces. Finally, the presence of a
cohesive and professionalized military enabled the civilian leadership to conduct a
comprehensive military reform for strong civilian control over the armed forces.
Taiwan went through a similar path of regime transition with South Korea, even
though the regime transition launched differently. While democratization in South Korea
started from a mass public demand for political freedom, Taiwan’s regime change was
initiated and implemented by the top political leadership. In spite of the differences in
the modes of regime transition, both countries underwent stable and extensive
democratization. Similarly to South Korea, Taiwan enjoyed favorable security
environments both domestically and internationally. Most significantly, the PRC’s
attitude toward Taiwan dramatically changed after Deng Xiao-ping’s rise to power and
the economic reforms of the late 1970s. In addition, strong leadership by Chiang Ching-
kuo and his successor Lee Teng-hui implemented slow but steady liberalization and
democratic reform for two decades without a major interruption. Finally, the cohesive
and professionalized ROC army created a constructive environment for reforms in civil-
military relations.
In stark contrast, the Philippines and Indonesia went through a difficult
democratization period, and army officers played influential political roles during and
after the regime transition. Democratization in the Philippines gained momentum in
early 1986 when RAM officers turned against Marcos and sided with Aquino. And,
given its decisive role in the democratic openings, the AFP was eager to exert an
influential role in the new Aquino government. The AFP’s political influence expanded
230
under increasing domestic security threats by the NPA and the MNLF. Furthermore, the
weak and divided Aquino administration provided RAM officers and Marcos loyalists
with an opportunity to stage several coup attempts. The factionalized AFP organization
became a stumbling block for democratic consolidation and civilian control over the
army.





























Finally, the Indonesian case demonstrated a path of democratization similar to the
Philippines. The fall of Suharto’s leadership and subsequent political turmoil
deteriorated domestic security threat environments as inter-ethnic and religious violence
as well as separatist movements in several provinces put the country in an unmanageable
situation. In such an extreme security threats, the weak and divisive leadership was not
able to carry out extensive democratic reforms. The political leadership in democratizing
Indonesia came apart further as political elites mobilized civil society groups that were
based on religious and ethnic cleavages. The ABRI also lacked institutional cohesiveness
and professionalism due to its territorial command structure and factional struggles. The
ABRI, which showed willingness to reduce its political influence, regained its political
power under the Megawati presidency in the midst of severe domestic threats and ill-
functioning civilian leadership.
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In summary, favorable security environments were conducive to a stable and
wide-ranging democratization, while mounting security challenges prevented the military
from retreating from politics. Given the security threats, the strength of civilian
leadership was the most crucial factor that determined the direction and extent of
democratization and civilian control over the armed forces. In turn, the strength of
civilian leadership was conditioned by the presence and support of civil society. Finally,
the presence of a cohesive and professionalized army institution led to a more complete
political disengagement of army officers.
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Chapter 5. The Future of Civil-Military Relations: Security Threats, the
Military, and the Prospects for Democratic Consolidation
Introduction
In the previous three chapters of empirical analysis, I examined the rise and fall of
the military’s domestic political role in four Asian countries in the last six decades. In
the first historical stage, I explored how security threats in the state-building process
(1940s-1950s) made the armed forces politically influential institution. I explained how a
confluence of structural conditions—security threats, strength of the civilian leadership,
and the unity of the military—resulted in different manifestations of the military’s
political role: control via coup d’etat and military dictatorship in South Korea and
Indonesia, on the one hand, and participation under the civilian guidance in Taiwan and
the Philippines, on the other in the second phase (1950s-1970s). The third stage of civil-
military relations (1980s-1990s) covered different modes of the military’s withdrawal
from politics during democratization: army officers’ subordination to the democratically
elected civilian leadership in South Korea and Taiwan, and the officers’ political
influence during and after the regime transition.
In this final empirical chapter, I analyze the military’s domestic political role in
the post-democratization era and its implications for democratic consolidation in the four
Asian countries. Even though the four states have undergone a democratic transition for
the last two decades, the so-called “praetorian problem” is still a vital concern that they
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need to overcome.359 In light of my theoretical arguments and empirical findings in the
previous chapters, this chapter identifies the current state of the military’s political role in
the four countries and scrutinizes major structural barriers to the democratic civilian
leaders’ control over the armed forces.
This chapter is composed of four sections. In the first section, I explain the
political role of the Korean army in the democratic consolidation era. Even though the
possibility of a military coup and a return to military dictatorship is now quite remote,
South Korea still must cope with some challenges to securing stable civilian control of
the military, including the North Korean threat and the problem of institutionalizing
democratic norms and practices. The second section deals with the Taiwanese case,
where stable democratic regime transition does not necessarily guarantee the military’s
subordination to the civilian leadership due to problems such as the Taiwanese identity
problem, its relationship with mainland China, and ailing civilian leadership.
The third and fourth sections focus on the Philippine and Indonesian cases. While
the cases of South Korea and Taiwan present a low probability of the military’s influence
or domination, the remaining countries have to cope with politicized armed forces, which
create more daunting challenges to the newly elected civilian regimes. Both countries
face higher probabilities for the military to regain political influence in the foreseeable
future. In both countries, domestic security threats, weak civilian leadership, and
factionalized militaries provide officers with opportunities to expand their political
influence. The final section is a conclusion in which major findings are summarized.
359 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 231-253.
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I. South Korea
The democratization process that was initiated by civil society brought to an end
the three-decades-long military dictatorship and installed a democratic regime in South
Korea. Even though democratization in Korea began from below with demonstrations by
students and labor unions in the mid-1980s, subsequent regime change was followed by
negotiations at the elite level. That is, the “transplacement” mode of transition brought a
stable and far-reaching democratization and consolidation.360 Furthermore, stable
democratization was conducive to reforming the armed forces toward a politically neutral
and professionalized organization by the 1990s.
After two decades of democratic reforms, South Korea is now considered a
consolidated democracy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Kim Young-sam
presidency (1993-1997) set the course for democratic consolidation by carrying out
extensive political institutional and electoral reforms. As I noted, the most important part
of consolidation was military reform. President Kim Young-sam successfully disbanded
the clandestine Hanahoe (one mind) faction in the army, thereby getting rid of politicized
officers and building up a unified and professionalized armed forces. The democratic
regime transition concluded when the opposition leader and long-time pro-democracy
activist, Kim Dae-jung, became president in 1998. The top brass, who had openly
warned against the possibility of his becoming president in the 1988 election, now readily
expressed their allegiance to the new president.
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Table 5-1: Post-Democratization Civil-Military Relations in South Korea
Indicators Status
Civilian Control Indicators










 Clear pledge of the military’s loyalty to the
constitution and democratically elected presidents
(Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun)
 No evidence of the military’s partisan affiliation; no
military role in the elections
 Small number of retired officers in the National
Assembly and the Department of Defense (no active
military personnel in government)
 External security mission (defending the country
against potential North Korean attack); no internal
security missions
 No military participation in domestic policymaking;
military’s continuing influence in foreign and
security policymaking
Challenges to Civilian Control
• Security challenges




• Role of civil society
 Military confrontation with North Korea (nuclear
issues); widening rifts in US-ROK alliance
 Ideological and regional polarization; corruption
charges; decreasing public support for the civilian
leadership
 Highly cohesive, professionalized military institution
 Strong and ideologically moderate civil society;
increasing influence in government policymaking
The question remains whether the democratic consolidation in South Korea will
be deepened further, and whether civilian control over the armed forces will become a
given reality. I suggest that, even though the military’s direct appropriation of political
power is highly unlikely, there are several structural impediments to the democratic
360 Huntington suggests that democratization through negotiation, or “transplacement,” is less
violent and therefore most suitable for democratic consolidation. Huntington, 1991, p. 276.
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control of the armed forces, such as the increasing security challenges from North Korea,
declining security alliance with the United States, rising social costs of economic
restructuring in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, and weak civilian leadership.
The indicators of the current civil-military relations in Korea are summarized in Table 5-
1.
As Table 5-1 shows, major indicators of civilian control over the armed forces
demonstrate that the military’s political participation is minimal. When Kim Dae-jung
became the first president from the opposition party in 1998, the army leadership
pronounced its loyalty to him. Five years later, President Roh Moo-hyun also secured the
military’s allegiance. This is significant in that both presidents came from the far left
side of the ideological spectrum in the eyes of the conservatives and the army. This
indicates that the military’s loyalty to the constitution and the democratically elected
leaders was now firmly established. In addition, the military has never played a role in
the election processes since the inception of democratization, but instead maintained
political neutrality.
Even though active military officers do not participate in political affairs, retired
officers hold several positions in the executive and legislative branches and have
influence in policymaking process. In the executive branch, about 9.7 percent of the
cabinet officials have military backgrounds, while 2.7 percent of retired military officers
are positioned in the National Assembly.361 They have close personal connections with
the army leadership and often represent the institutional interests of the military. In
361 Carl J. Saxer, ‘Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control in
South Korea,” Armed Forces and Society 30: 3 (2004), p. 366.
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addition, the top brass in the army has influence in foreign and security policymaking,
given the presence of a constant threat from North Korea and civilian leaders’ lack of
knowledge about national security affairs.
Even though civilian control of the military is not questioned in Korean politics,
there are still two major structural barriers for civilian leaders to establish a stable
democratic control mechanism. They are: (1) security challenges from North Korea; (2)
weaknesses of civilian leadership (ideological and regional cleavages, corruption, and the
loss of public support).
As discussed in the previous chapter, South Korea benefited from favorable
security environments during the years of democratic regime transition and military
reform (1986-1996) more than any in other periods of its history. During the 1980s, the
military balance between the two Koreas turned in favor of the South. In addition, the
end of the Cold War and the ensuing détente surrounding the Korean peninsula provided
South Korea with an opportunity to expand its political and economic relationship with
former communist states including the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and mainland
China, and to do so without losing U. S. security commitments. The favorable security
conditions during this period eliminated the military’s justification for political
involvement and empowered civil society and pro-democracy groups.
During the Kim Dae-jung presidency (1998-2002), however, two contrasting
security situations developed. On the one hand, the Kim Dae-jung government’s
Sunshine policy toward North Korea seemed to bring a reconciliation between the two
Koreas. The Sunshine policy signifies a refutation of war or major military conflict as a
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means of the reunification.362 The Kim government’s policy initiative separated political-
military issues from economic cooperation and focused on economic aid to poverty-
stricken North Korea. The policy gave rise to the summit meeting between Kim Dae-
jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. The summit meeting produced
the North-South Joint Declaration in June 2000, which included the roadmap to Korean
reunification, reunion of separated families, and expansion of economic, social, and
cultural exchanges.363 The summit meeting concluded with a promise that Kim Jong-il
would visit Seoul in the near future.
The Sunshine policy and the North-South summit meeting, however, failed to
create a peace-building mechanism in the Korean peninsula, and several obstacles remain
to developing peaceful relations between the two Koreas. First of all, the Sunshine policy
was unsuccessful in mobilizing support from domestic audiences. The Grand National
Party (GNP), the opposition conservative party, strongly criticized Kim’s northern policy
for its unilaterally conciliatory attitude. A series of belligerent moves by North Korea
reinforced the opposition GNP’s criticism. In the first year of the Kim Presidency, there
were several incidents of North Korean spy submarines’ infiltration into the South. To
make matters worse, North Korea test-fired a multi-stage, long-range rocket missile,
called Daepodong 1, across the northern islands of Japan with debris reaching close to
362 Office of the President, Republic of Korea, Government of the People: Selected Speeches of
President Kim Dae-jung, vols. 1-2 (Seoul: ROK Government). For more detailed analysis of the
Kim Dae-jung governemnt’s Sunshine policy, see Chung-in Moon, “Between Ideals and Reality:
An Interim Assessment of the Sunshine Policy,” Pyonghwa Ronchong (On Peace) 4: 1 (2000);
Chung-in Moon and David Steinberg, eds., Kim Dae Jung Government and Sunshine Policy
(Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999); Chung-in Moon, “The Kim Dae Jung Government’s
Peace Policy toward North Korea,” Asian Perspective 25: 2 (2001).
363 Korea Unification Bulletin 2: 1 (2000), p. 1; Chung-in Moon, “The Sunshine Policy and the
Korean Summit: Assessments and Prospects,” East Asian Review 12: 4 (2000), pp. 22-29.
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Alaska.364 In the following year, North Korean patrol boats crossed the Northern Limit
Line of the West Sea, a U.N-demarcated borderline, causing an exchange of fire.365
North Korea’s hostile behavior strengthened the opposition GNP and the
conservatives in South Korea. The GNP’s political strength grew further after it won a
majority of seats in the 2000 National Assembly election, while the ruling Millennium
Democratic Party (MDP) lost its majority status.366 The 2000 National Assembly
election resulted in yosoyadae (ruling minority and opposition majority), a situation
where the opposition GNP took offense to President Kim’s northern policy by mobilizing
the anti-North Korean and anti-communist ethos among the people.
While the Kim Dae-jung government was trying to muddle through its
relationship with an unpredictable North Korea, the George W. Bush administration’s
North Korea policy dealt a heavy blow to President Kim’s Sunshine policy. The United
States charged that North Korea had violated the 1994 Agreed Framework and secretly
continued a nuclear project.367 In turn, North Korea perceived growing threats from the
364 Yong-Chool Ha, “South Korea in 2000: A Summit and the Search for New Institutional
Identity,” Asian Survey 41: 1 (2001), pp. 138.
365 In this incident, one North Korean battleship was destroyed and five others were severely
damaged. Young-Kwan Yoon, “South Korea in 1999: Overcoming Cold War Legacies,” Asian
Survey 40: 1 (2000), p. 165.
366 In the 2000 National Assembly election, the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP)
won 35.0% of the total vote and 115 seats out of 273; the Grand National Party (GNP) won 39%
of popular vote and 133 seats; and the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) won 9.8% of total votes
and 17 seats. Young-whan Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and
Culture (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 16.
367 In the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to freeze its nuclear development
program and accept the IAEA inspection. In return, North Korea would receive crude oil and
new light-water reactors from the United States until 2003. Derek McDougall, The International
Politics of the New Asia Pacific (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 141-147; C. S.
Eliot Kang, “North Korea’s International Relations: The Successful Failure?” in Samuel S. Kim,
ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2004), pp. 287-292.
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Bush administration’s tougher policy, since Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union
address included North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, as a member of the “axis of evil”
that endangers international security and promotes global terrorism.368 The Bush
administration’s tough stance on North Korea is likely to have accelerated Kim Jong-il’s
nuclear development program.
In the midst of confrontations between the United States and North Korea, Kim
Dae-jung found himself in a diplomatically difficult position. If he sided with Bush, it
would isolate the North and precipitate North-South confrontation, nullifying the
Sunshine policy. If the South voted for North Korea, it would infuriate the United States,
which had been South Korea’s long-time ally. In this situation, Kim Dae-jung tried to
negotiate with both sides: keeping the Sunshine policy alive and alleviating Bush’s
hostility toward North Korea. When President Kim visited Washington D.C. in 2001 for
a summit meeting with President Bush, Kim urged Bush to resume direct talks with
North Korea, which Bush responded negatively due to the North’s “lack of
transparency.”369 So Kim Dae-jung’s visit produced no positive results, as North Korea
continued pursuing nuclear technology and the United States continued its unwillingness
to negotiate with the rogue state.
The Bush administration’s hostility toward North Korea contributed to
strengthening anti-Americanism among the general public in Korea. Many South
Koreans believed that Bush’s North Korean policy destabilized the security of the Korean
368 The White House, 2002 State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002, (web:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/7672.htm).
369 David Sanger, “Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won’t Resume Now,” New York Times
(March 8, 2001).
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peninsula. In a public opinion survey conducted in 2002, a majority of Koreans believed
that the United States was more dangerous for the Korean security than North Korea.370
Anti-Americanism was further intensified when two Korean middle school girls were
killed by an American armored vehicle on duty for a military exercise. The two soldiers
responsible for the accident were later acquitted by an American military court.371
The presidential election occurred in December 2002, at the height of anti-U.S.
demonstrations in South Korea. Roh Moo-hyun, a human rights lawyer and labor
movement activist during democratization, was elected by mobilizing the anti-American
sentiment, along with a progressive ideology, among the younger generations.372
President Roh widened diplomatic rifts with the United States. As a result, the current
US-South Korean alliance relationship is at its lowest point in the past 50 years.
The cracks in the U.S. alliance put heavier security burdens on South Korea. The
United States announced its plan to relocate its troops stationed in the DMZ farther south
and left open the possibility of withdrawing its troops completely from South Korea.373
Even though the top brass did not directly threaten the President, they began to express
their concerns about the foreign and security policies. The North Korean issue and
difficulties within the US-ROK alliance give burdens to the civilian leadership, and civil-
military discrepancies have appeared in security policy-conceptions in recent years.
370 Victor D. Cha, “Shaping Change and Cultivating Ideas in the US-ROK Alliance,” in Michael
H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia
(Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004), pp. 136-137.
371 Hong-young Lee, “South Korea in 2002: Multiple Political Dilemmas,” Asian Survey 43: 1
(2003), p. 74.
372 In the election, Roh Moo-hyun won the election with 49.9% of popular votes; the opposition
candidate Lee Hoi-chang garnering 46.6%. For the 2002 Presidential Election results, see
Republic of Korea, National Election Commission (web: http://www.nec.go.kr).
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While security challenges have put civilian leadership in a difficult situation,
several other factors in the domestic political front have held down the strength of
civilian leadership. The biggest challenge for the current civilian leadership is how to
overcome society’s ideological and regional polarization. In its early period of
democratization, the Kim Young-sam presidency was able to incorporate diverse
economic and ideological elements in the society by forming the grand conservative
alliance, as discussed in the previous chapter. President Kim solved the ‘praetorian
problem’ by forming an alliance with the conservative ruling Democratic Justice Party
(DJP), which represented the conservatives and included active and retired generals. In
the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-jung became the president for the first time as an
opposition leader in Korean history. President Kim represented moderate and
progressive elements of the society. Furthermore, current President Roh Moo-hyun has
adopted socio-economic policies that are favorable to the lower classes, which have
resulted in an ideological polarization of Korean society. In the ideological
confrontation, the government finds it increasingly difficult to mediate the diverging
interests within society.
Another challenge to the strength of civilian leadership comes from political
cleavages along regional identities. The democratic regime transition was dictated by the
so-called ‘three Kims’, including the former presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-
jung, and the opposition leader Kim Jong-pil. These three Kims mobilized the decades-
long regional animosity between Honam and Youngnam to rise to power. All the post-
democratization elections were determined by the candidates’ regional identities, thus
373 Anna Fifield, “US to Delay Troop Cuts in S Korea,” Financial Times (October 5, 2004).
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dividing the country into two political camps and significantly weakening presidents’
ability to garner the nationwide support.374
Added to these structural constraints on President Kim’s leadership, incessant
corruption charges surrounding presidents further weakened their moral ground. The
Kim Young-sam presidency, even with its relentless anti-corruption drives, was tainted
by several corruption charges among the President’s close aides.375 The direct effect of
the corruption scandals in the Kim Young-sam government was the significant decline of
the public’s support for the president. Kim Young-sam began his job with over 90
percent of the public’s approval in 1993, but concluded with meager 10 percent of
approval.376 The Kim Dae-jung presidency followed the same path. A Nobel Peace Prize
winner and decades-long pro-democracy activist, Kim Dae-jung’s moral cause was also
374 For the discussion of regionalism in Korean politics, see Kap-yun Lee, Hangukeui
Seonkeowa Jiyeokjuui (Korean Elections and Regionalism) (Seoul: Orum Press, 1998); Kisuk
Cho, “Regionalism in Korean Elections and Democratization: An Empirical Analysis,” Asian
Perspective 22: 1 (1998); David C. Kang, “Regional Politics and Democratic Consolidation in
Korea,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Democratization (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), pp. 161-180; Byung-kook Kim, “Jiyokjuuiwa Jeongchi Gaehyuk (Regionalism and
Political Reform),” in Sang-sup Park, ed., Segyehwarul Jihyanghanun Hanguk Jeongchi
(Globalization and Korean Politics) (Seoul: Nanam: 1996), pp. 40-57; Eunjung Choi, “Economic
Voting vs. Cleavage Voting in the United States, Korea, and Taiwan,” Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2005.
375 For example, among others, Kim Young-sam’s closest advisor, Hong In-gil, was charged
with his involvement in a loan scandal associated with Hanbo Steel Company. In another case,
the President’s second son, Kim Hyun-chul, was convicted of receiving bribes from Chaebols.
Chung-in Moon and Jongryn Mo, “The Kim Young-Sam Government: Its Legacies and Prospects
for Governance in South Korea,” in Chung-in Moon and Jongryn Mo, eds., Democratization and
Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), p.
402; B. C. Koh, “South Korea in 1996: Internal Strains and External Challenges,” Asian Survey
37: 1 (1997), p. 6.
376 Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. xxxi.
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lost in numerous corruption scandals involving two of his three sons and several close
assistants.377
Despite these structural barriers to civilian control of the military, the South
Korean case nevertheless promises the best prospects for stable civilian control of the
military among the four Asian countries under study. That is, stable civilian control is
buttressed by the presence of active and influential civil society and the unified and
professionalized army organization. The military’s political neutrality—even in the
strained security situation and continuing corruption charges—may be a testimony to the
military’s near-complete depoliticization in South Korea. Future civil-military relations
in the country will be shaped by the structural opportunities and constraints presented
above.
II. Taiwan
Taiwan’s three-decades-long liberal reforms (1970s-1990s) and subsequent
democratization (1990s-current) have transformed the country from a one-party
dictatorship to a multi-party democracy. Taiwanese liberalization and democratization
represent an ideal case of the so-called “transformation” mode of regime transition, in
which democratization was carried out by elite compromise.378 Democratic reforms in
Taiwan, although slow, were conducted under the strong political leadership of Chiang
Ching-kuo (1975-1988) and Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000). The elite-initiated political
reforms brought political stability with no major disruptions during the regime transition.
377 Kihl, 2005, pp. 282-283.
378 Huntington, 1991, p. 113.
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This does not, however, mean that the Taiwanese army’s shift of its loyalty from
Chiang Ching-kuo and his KMT party to a new constitution and the democratically
elected civilian leadership can be taken for granted. This was especially the case when
the new leadership had Taiwanese ethnic background. During the democratic reforms in
the early 1990s, President Lee had to adopt several policies to alleviate the conservatives
and the military’s potential threats to the regime. Immediately after assuming the
presidency, for example, Lee Teng-hui granted massive promotions to the military
leadership. In addition, the President had to appoint General Hau Pei-tsun to defense
minister in 1989 and as premier in the following year to moderate the conservative forces
in both the KMT and the army.379
Against this backdrop, however, Taiwan’s political and military reforms benefited
from favorable structural conditions. Mainland China’s conciliatory attitude toward
Taiwan created a favorable security situation, which facilitated democratic reforms.
Since Deng Xiao-ping rose to power in 1979, the PRC made constant efforts to expand
social and economic exchanges with the island. With the easing of security challenges
from the mainland, the KMT government disbanded the Taiwan Garrison Command
(TGC) that enabled the military to monitor the civilian society, ending the Taiwanese
army’s internal policing missions in 1992. Furthermore, the expansion of economic and
social exchanges between the two political entities made military and coercive pressures
an unfeasible approach in dealing with each other.
379 Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, ‘Taiwan’s Domestic Political Reforms: Institutional
Change and Power Realignment,” in Gary Klintworth, ed., Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the
1990s (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 14.
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On the domestic political front, President Lee Teng-hui successfully strengthened
his political power by building a consensus around democratic reforms with the National
Affairs Conference (NAC) in the early 1990s, as discussed in the previous chapter.
Furthermore, the KMT’s success in presidential and legislative elections throughout the
1990s provided the Lee leadership with strength and stability. In the meantime, the
Taiwanese army developed into a cohesive and professionalized institution, which
precipitated army officers’ depoliticization. In sum, a combination of favorable security
situation, strong presidential leadership, and a professionalized army gave rise to stable
democratization without major backfires from the military.
Taiwan has become a consolidated democracy with the inauguration of the Chen
Shui-bian presidency. In the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian, the leader of the
opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the presidency by defeating Lien
Chan of the ruling Kuomintang Party and James Soong, an independent candidate.380
Chen’s victory was a milestone in Taiwan’s political development in that it brought to an
end five decades of KMT rule. The DPP started from the tangwai as a grassroots
organization by ethnic Taiwanese and endorsed political freedom and Taiwan’s
independence from the mainland. In this respect, the DPP has endorsed radically
different domestic and foreign policy packages than the KMT regime has pursued.
380 The election, however, was very close one. Chen Shui-bian won the presidency with just
39.3% of the popular vote, while James Soong registered 36.8% and Lian Chan gained 23.1%.
Yu-shan Wu, “Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer,” Asian Survey
41: 1 (2001), pp. 41-43.
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After two decades of democratic reforms, the current state of civil-military
relations in Taiwan signifies stable civilian control and military officers’ political
neutrality, as summarized in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2: Post-Democratization Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan381
Indicators Status
Civilian Control Indicators










 Official expression of loyalty to the constitution and
democratically elected leadership (Lee Teng-hui and
Chen Shui-bian)
 Military closely tied with the KMT; minimal
influence in elections
 No active military personnel in civilian government
(several retired officers in security-related positions)
 Complete withdrawal from internal security mission;
focus on threats from the mainland
 Military’s influence in foreign and security
policymaking; minimal in domestic policies
Challenges to Civilian Control
• Security challenges




• Role of civil society
 Externally, increasing threats from PRC;
domestically, ethnic identity issues
 Ethnic cleavages between Taiwanese and
mainlanders; corruption charges
 Highly cohesive, professionalized military
 Strong but ideologically moderate civil society
groups
381 For more detailed description of the Taiwanese civil-military relations in the post-
democratization era, see M. Taylor Fravel, “Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military
Relations in Taiwan’s Democratization,” Armed Forces and Society 29: 1 (2002), pp. 63-75.
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As noted in Table 5-2, two democratically elected presidents, Lee Teng-hui and Chen
Shui-bian, both of whom are ethnic Taiwanese, secured the armed forces’ loyalty to their
leadership and the constitution. This is significant in that the army leadership is
represented by ethnic Chinese and supports radically different foreign policy strategies
from the current civilian leadership. The two presidents have endorsed Taiwan’s
independence from the Mainland, while the army leadership has championed the “one
China” policy and reunification.382 Even with such differences in terms of national
identity and security policy, the army leadership has not officially questioned the civilian
leaders’ authority.
Army officers, however, have exerted influence in domestic political and security-
related policymaking process during and after democratization. Retired generals
occupied leadership positions in various security-related institutions such as the Ministry
of National Defense, the National Security Council, and the National Security Bureau
throughout the 1990s. In addition, President Lee Teng-hui appointed several active and
retired generals as “special presidential advisors” or “strategic advisors” as a way of
securing the control over army leadership.383 Even though the army officers’ presence in
civilian administration was quite pervasive during the 1990s, their political influence has
been significantly decreased.
Still the most difficult task of the military’s depoliticization was how to separate
the Taiwanese army from the ruling KMT party. The KMT regime tightened its control
382 John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “National Identity and Taiwan’s Mainland China Policy,” Journal of
Contemporary China 13: 40 (2004); Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan’s National Identity Politics and the
Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey 44: 4 (2004).
383 Fravel, 2002, p. 66.
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over the armed forces by introducing a political commissar system right after retreating to
Taiwan. The commissar system enabled the KMT to penetrate deeply into the army
organization and conduct ideological indoctrination throughout the rule of Chiang Kai-
shek and his son Ching-kuo. At the same time, the officers’ penetration into the party
hierarchy was pervasive, holding positions in key governmental bodies including the
Central Standing Committee and other central and local administrative institutions.
Because of the party-army interpenetration, separating the two bodies has proved to be
the most difficult task during the democratic reforms of the 1990s. Even though the
KMT formally disengaged from the military and the military attained institutional
autonomy, informal interpenetrations are still persistent due to unofficial and personal
connections between the two institutions.
What will Taiwanese civil-military relations be like in the near future? What
factors will promote or obstruct democratic consolidation and civilian control over the
military? The future of civil-military relations in Taiwan will be largely shaped by three
major factors: (1) security challenges from the Mainland; (2) weakening civilian
leadership due to ethnic cleavages and corruption; and (3) party-army relations, as
summarized in Table 5-2.
The biggest challenge to Taiwan’s democratic consolidation and the strong
civilian hold of the military organization comes from the cross-Taiwan Straits relations
that were badly strained during the last decade. Taiwanese democratization and military
reforms benefited from favorable security relations with the Mainland during the 1980s
and 1990s. The PRC’s policy toward Formosa Island changed from tense hostility
(1950s-1970s) to one of the “Peace Offensive” and mutual accommodation (1980s-
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1990s).384 Détente was followed by growing economic interdependence and social and
personal exchanges, as the mainland broaden domestic economic reforms.
The decade of mutual accommodation, however, turned into mutual hostility and
military intimidation, when, in the summer of 1995, the PRC test-fired missiles and
carried out a massive-scale military exercise in the Taiwan Straits in protest of President
Lee’s visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. From Beijing’s perspective, Lee Teng-
hui’s visit to the United States was a clear violation of the 1972 Shanghai Joint
Communique that was signed by the Chinese Communist Party and the United States
recognizing the “one China” policy. When the Communique was pronounced, Chiang
Ching-kuo welcomed the “one China” formula and publicly opposed Taiwan’s
independence. President Lee also followed Chiang’s Mainland policy during the early
years of his presidency by objecting to the idea of Taiwan’s independence.
In the mid 1990s, however, Lee Teng-hui swiftly changed his position by openly
announcing that the Republic of China was a sovereign state and making diplomatic trips
to several countries.385 The Lee government openly adopted the “two-state doctrine.”
Feeling betrayed, Jiang Zemin launched missile tests and military exercises in the waters
near Taiwan. Furthermore, President Lee’s shift in foreign policy increased tensions
between the PRC and the Clinton administration.
The installation of the Chen Shui-bian presidency in 2000 further increased
tensions across the Taiwan Straits. For the mainland government, Chen Shui-bian was
384 Cal Clark, “Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Election: The End of Chen Shui-bian’s “Strategic
Ambiguity” on Cross-Strait Relations,” East Asia 21: 4 (2004), p. 26.
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the last presidential candidate that it hoped to be elected to the presidency in the 2000
elections.386 Right before the 2000 presidential election, the PRC declared in a white
paper that it would embark on military attacks in any one of the three conditions, known
as the “three ifs.” The white paper declared that the PRC would resort to military means
(1) if Taiwan declared independence; (2) if Taiwan were invaded and occupied by
foreign countries, or (3) if Taiwan refused indefinitely to conduct negotiations on the
issue of unification.387 Even though the PRC’s direct military attack on Taiwan remains
implausible, continuing tensions across the Straits has created a troubling security
dilemma between the two Chinese governments.
Chen Shui-bian’s foreign policy position has created serious tensions as much in
the domestic political front as in its relationship with the mainland. The Chen regime’s
pro-independence position and the mobilization of ethnic identity issues for political
purposes have widened political cleavages and could weaken its leadership strength in the
long run.388 Identity issues are closely related to both the foreign policy controversy over
385 Xiaobo Hu and Gang Lin, “The PRC View of Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui,” in Wei-chin Lee
and T. Y. Wang, eds., Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000
(Lanham: University Press of America, 2003), p. 278.
386 T. Y. Wang, “Cross-Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan,” Asian Survey 41: 5
(2001), p. 716.
387 Taiwan Affairs Office, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” People’s Daily
Online (February 21, 2000), at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/; another available source is the
Embassy of the PRC in the United States, at http://wwww.china-embassy.org/eng/7114.html.
388 For the ethnic identity’s influence in the Taiwanese electoral politics in recent years, see John
Fuh-Sheng Hsieh, “National Identity and Taiwan’s Mainland China Policy,” Journal of
Contemporary China 13: 40 (2004); Joseph Y. S. Cheng and Camoes C. K. Tam, “The Taiwan
Presidential Election and Its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations: A Political Cleavage
Perspective,” Asian Affairs 32: 1 (2005); Deborah A. Brown, ed., Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential
Election: Implication for Taiwan’s Politics, Security, Economy, and Relations with the Mainland
(New York: Center for Asian Studies, St. John’s University, 2001); Shelley Rigger, From
Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001);
Marie Taciana and Leila Fernandez Stembridge, eds., China Today: Economic Reforms, Social
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the independence/reunification issue and Taiwan’s relationship with the mainland. In the
2004 presidential election, for example, the incumbent Chen Shui-bian secured his
second presidential term by mobilizing anti-China sentiments and the notion of
Taiwanese nationalism.389 Political elites’ mobilization of identity and independence
issues further exacerbated the political cleavages based on ethnic communities.390
Furthermore, the DPP’s control of government significantly constricted the possibility of
diplomatic negotiations with the mainland authority.
The future of civil-military relations in Taiwan will be shaped by three major
structural forces. First, cross-Taiwan Strait relations will influence the military’s political
role in the near future. Confrontational relations with the mainland may give senior
officers political voices, as discrepancies rise between civilian leadership and the military
over how to negotiate with the PRC. Second, civilian control of the military in Taiwan
will also depend on how civilian leadership can overcome socio-political cleavages along
the ethnic lines. Civilian leadership will find it increasingly difficult to control army
officers if civilians intensify ethnic cleavages for their own political purposes. Finally,
the future of civil-military relations in Taiwan will depend on establishing institutional
autonomy and separation between the KMT party and the military.
Conflict, and Collective Identities (London: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2003); Yun-han Chu,
Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992).




Democratization in the Philippines began in 1986 with the overthrow of the
authoritarian Marcos regime and the installation of the democratically elected Aquino
regime. The so-called “People Power” was so overwhelming that President Marcos and
his military forces could not control the pro-democracy movement. The People Power
was also influential enough to bring spillover effects to other Asian countries’
democratization movements, including South Korea, Pakistan, and Burma.
Even though the People Power provided important momentum for the downfall of
the authoritarianism, it was the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) that played a
decisive role in the Marcos ouster and subsequent democratization. And, as such, the
AFP presumed that it would maintain powerful role in the democratically elected Aquino
government. Factions within the AFP, either Marcos loyalists or the Reformed Armed
Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM), or both, staged nine major coup attempts
during six years of the Aquino presidency to regain political domination. The nascent
democratic regime was severely incapacitated by the fragmented and violent political
forces: the Marcos loyalists and pre-martial oligarchs on the far-right, and the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF) on the extreme
left. In such a fragmented political climate, the Aquino regime failed to mobilize the
People Power for her democratic reforms. Furthermore, the growing insurgent
movements by the CPP’s New People’s Army (NPA) and the Muslim Moro National
390 Cheng and Tam, (2005), p. 20.
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Liberation Front (MNLF) provided the AFP with a window of opportunity to regain its
political influence in the Aquino government.391
The AFP’s threat to the regime significantly decreased after Fidel Ramos, retired
general and Defense Minister in the Aquino regime, became president in 1992. President
Ramos successfully secured the AFP’s loyalty, but only by bringing many of the top
military brass into his government. As a result, the armed forces—either active or retired
officers—continue to play an influential role in politics even after two decades of
democratic trials. In this section I survey the military’s political role in the post-
democratization period: from the Ramos presidency (1992-1997) to the current Aroyo
presidency (2001-current). In doing this, I identify major barriers to the democratic
control over the AFP and prospects for democratic consolidation.
The current status of civil-military relations in the Philippines can be
characterized as weak civilian control over the armed forces, since officers still exert
substantial influence in politics. Even with the two decades-long democratization,
civilian leaders have failed to secure army officers’ political neutrality and allegiance to
the constitution and democratically elected leadership.
391 For more information about the armed insurgency movements by the NPA and the
MNLF/MILF, see Rosanne Rutten, “Revolutionary Specialists, Strongmen, and the State: Post-
Movement Careers of CCP-NPA Cadres in a Philippine Province, 1990s-2001,” South East Asia
Research 9: 3 ( 2001); Mark R. Thomson, “The Decline of Philippine Communism: A Review
Essay,” South East Asia Research 6: 2 (1998); Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Options in the Pursuit of
a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the Southern Philippines,” Asian Survey 41: 2 (2001);
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weaknesses of a Power-based
Approach in Conflict Resolution,” Philippine Political Science Journal 21: 44 (2000); Jacques
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Table 5-3: Post-Democratization Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines
Indicators Status
Civilian Control Indicators










 Lack of loyalty to the constitution and democratically
elected leadership (2003/2006 coup attempts)
 Officers’ personal ties with civilian politicians
mobilization of soldiers to influence elections
 No active military personnel in government; several
retired officers in key governmental positions and the
legislative branch
 Continued internal security and policing missions
(major threats from communists and Muslims)
 AFP’s influence in internal security and
counterinsurgency programs
Challenges to Civilian Control
• Security challenges




• Role of civil society
 Increasing domestic threats from the CPP/NPA and the
MNLF/MILF (armed conflicts with the insurgents;
terrorist bombings and kidnappings for ransom)
 Weak civilian leadership (corruption; cronyism; civil
society’s withdrawal of support for presidents)
 Lack of institutional unity and professionalism
 Strong, but minimal influence in governmental
policymaking (dominated by cartelized elites); strong
civil society, a burden to government
As Table 5-3 illustrates, there are multiple challenges that civilian leaders in the
Philippines must overcome to attain democratic control over the AFP. The most serious
challenge is posed by domestic security threats, coming from the Communist NPA
insurgencies, Muslim MNLF/MILF secessionist movements, and several other groups
that are engaged in bombings and kidnap Filipinos and foreign tourists for ransom.
Bertrand, “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement is
Fragile,” Pacific Affairs 73: 1 (2000).
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The communist insurgency movements reached their peak during the mid-to-late
1980s, in the midst of political turmoil and continuing economic crisis. During the
Aquino presidency in the late 1980s, the NPA forces spread their armed uprisings
throughout the archipelago when the peace efforts between the Aquino government and
the CPP failed, as discussed in the previous chapter. At the same time, communist forces
expanded their influence in the Aquino government and the general public, in which over
ten million were reported to join the communist party’s regional organization.
The communist and Muslim insurgency movements, however, had significantly
decreased after Ramos rose to the presidency in 1992. There are several reasons that CPP
and NPA’s influence weakened in the early 1990s. First, the decline of communist armed
insurgents was related to the broader international context of the demise of communist
regimes worldwide with the end of the Cold War. Second, the communist insurgents
suffered from factional infighting over leadership and differences in ideology and
logistics.392 Finally, sound economic conditions under the Ramos presidency
strengthened the moderate factions’ voice within the CPP and NPA. Moderates within
the NPA tried to increase their influence through electoral success rather than armed
fighting. At the same time, steady economic growth weakened the CPP’s influence
392 The split in the CPP and NPA throughout the 1990s had been over the issues of insurgency
strategy and leadership. The CPP founder Jose Maria Sison remained faithful to the Maoist-style
armed struggle, while the moderates in the Party preferred expanding its influence through the
legal and electoral means. The factional struggles also significantly weakened the Muslim
separatist movements. For the CPP’s internal divisions, see John McBeth, “Internal
Contradictions: Support for Communists Wanes as Party Splits,” Far Eastern Economic Review
26 (August, 1993); Patricio N. Abinales, ed., The Revolution Falters: The Left in the Philippine
Politics after 1986 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Joel Rocamora, Breaking Through:
The Struggle within the Communist Party of the Philippines (Manila: Anvil Press, 1994);
Kathleen Weekley, The Communist Party of the Philippines 1968-1993: A Story of Its Theory and
Practice (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001).
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among the Filipinos. Political stability under Ramos presidency brought fast economic
growth and low inflation rates.393
Upon assuming the presidency in 1992, Fidel Ramos formed the National
Unification Commission (NUC) to initiate a peace process. The NUC brought together
various insurgency groups including the RAM rebels, the National Democratic Front
(NDF), and the Muslim secessionist leaders. In the NUC conference, Ramos launched
his peace initiative by releasing most of the rebel leaders.394 But the peace process did
not progress because of the factional struggles inside the insurgency groups. On the one
hand, factional infightings significantly diminished the rebels’ influence. On the other
hand, factional struggles and the lack of unified leadership made the peace negotiation
process much more complicated. The communist umbrella organization NDC suffered
from factional struggles between the Maoist line led by Sison and the Manila Rizal
Committee, which pursued moderate approaches. Within the Muslim secessionist
movements, the MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, was split into several factional lines with
different strategies. A Muslim group led by Abu Sayyaf, for example, opposed the
MNLF’s peace negotiation with the Ramos government and pursued a more violent
strategy, kidnapping foreigners and Christians and carrying out bombings.395 Still
393 In 1996, for example, the Philippines GDP growth recorded 5.9%, and inflation rate 8.4%.
Carolina Hernandez, “The Philippines in 1996: A House Finally in Order?” Asian Survey 37: 2
(1997), pp. 209-210.
394 In August 1992, Ramos government released 65 communist leaders, 68 RAM rebel soldiers,
and several other dissident leaders. Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., “The Philippines in 1992: Ready for
Take Off?” Asian Survey 33: 2 (1993), pp. 226-227.
395 In 1994, for example, a Muslim group led by Sayyaf kidnapped over 70 Christians and
bombed the Philippine Airlines 747. Jeffrey Riedinger, “The Philippines in 1994: Renew Growth
and Contested Reforms,” Asian Survey 35: 2 (1995), p. 211.
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another Muslim fragment, Muslim Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), also focused on
armed struggles with the Philippine armed forces.
After five years of a long peace negotiation process, the Ramos government and
the MNLF reached a peace agreement in 1996, which also precipitated peace negotiations
with the MILF and the communist NDF.396 With the peace agreement, the MNLF
insurgents were integrated into the regular AFP in 1997 and Misuari became an important
political supporter for President Ramos. The six years (1992-1997) of the Ramos
presidency was the uniquely stable regime that secured civilian leaders’ control over the
AFP, reduced domestic security threats by the communist and Muslim insurgents, and
achieved stable economic growth.
Political stability and economic growth, however, did not outlive the Ramos
presidency. The vulnerable Philippine economy was hardest hit by the Asian financial
crisis of 1997, which began in Bangkok but quickly spread to other Asian countries,
including Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea. The economic difficulties and changes
of civilian leadership provided insurgency groups with a window of opportunity to
expand their influence and armed struggles. In these circumstances, officers in the AFP
began to regain their political influence in the Estrada presidency (1998-2001) and the
Aroyo presidency (2001- current). Deteriorating domestic security situations caused by
the revival of insurgency movements in recent years are closely related with the weak and
corrupt civilian leadership.
396 Amando Doronila, “The MNLF Joins Mainstream Politics,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (July
19, 1996), p. 9.
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In the 1998 presidential election, Joseph Estrada, a former movie star, won the
presidency with 40% of the total popular vote among eleven presidential candidates, the
largest electoral victory in the history of Philippine presidential elections.397 The Estrada
presidency was radically different from his predecessor in terms of political ideology.
Estrada rose to the presidency with the slogan of Erap para sa mahirap (Erap is for the
poor).398 His campaign pledged to narrow the grave inequality gap between the rich and
poor.
Even though the populist slogan had been extremely effective in the election, the
Filipinos’ support for Estrada quickly evaporated due to rampant corruption and the
President’s favoritism to his cronies. In the “liberalization” of the airline industries, for
example, the reform focused on giving benefits to Philippine Airlines, a company
controlled by his close friend Lucio Tan. The same story repeated itself in banking
industry reforms, which gave preferential benefits to the presidential friend George Go.
During the years of the Estrada presidency, about 90% of companies were owned by the
top 20 stockholders, who were often connected with one another through family ties.399
In three years of his presidency, there were constant rumors of corruption and political
scandals and, in this milieu, rumors of military coup d’etat.
President Estrada was impeached by a Senate trial on January 20, 2001. Estrada’s
impeachment was triggered by Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson’s revelation that
397 For the 1998 presidential election, see Claro Cortes, “New President in the Philippines,”
<web: http:www.abcnews.com/sections/world/DailyNews/philippines980529.html/>.
398 Gabriella R. Montinola, “The Philippines in 1998: Opportunity and Crisis,” Asian Survey 39:
1 (1999), p. 67.
399 David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the
Philippines (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 175-180.
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he paid bribes to the president. The disclosure of bribery inflamed mass demonstrations,
which were led by the Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Aroyo (who resigned from the
Estrada cabinet), two former presidents (Aquino and Ramos), and civil society groups
that included the Roman Catholic Church and the business community.400 Similar to the
1986 situation in which the People Power and a segment of the AFP overthrew the
Marcos dictatorship, the military played a decisive role in Estrada’s resignation. In
January 19, at the height of the anti-Estrada demonstration, Armed Forces Chief of Staff
General Angelo T. Reyes formally declared the AFP’s withdrawal of support for the
president. The next day, Estrada stepped down and departed the Malacanang Presidential
Palace.
After Estrada was impeached, Vice President Aroyo assumed the fourth
presidency and was reelected in the 2004 presidential election.401 The new president,
however, was no better than her predecessor. The other presidential candidates charged
President Aroyo with election fraud and filed a formal lawsuit for a recount of votes. The
allegations led to a serious political crisis in 2004, in which former President Aquino and
civil society groups organized another “People Power” movement to impeach President
Aroyo. Even though the impeachment did not take place, the Aroyo regime was
paralyzed by the lack of legitimacy.
400 Mel C. Labrador, “The Philippines in 2000: In Search of a Silver Lining,” Asian Survey 41: 1
(2001), p. 224.
401 In the 2004 presidential election, the incumbent president Aroyo won 40% of total vote,
Fernando Poe, Jr, a movie actor, 36.5%, and three other candidates, 25% combined. Temario C.
Rivera, “The Philippines in 2004: New Mandate, Daunting Problems,” Asian Survey 45: 1 (2005),
p. 127.
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Degenerating domestic security conditions in recent years, along with the
reappearance of insurgency movements and the failing civilian leadership, provided the
AFP with opportunities to regain its political power. For the last decade, numerous
retired officers were appointed in key governmental positions or entered the legislative
body by winning popular votes. More seriously, there have been constant rumors of
military coup d’etat. In 2003, for example, a group of 300 AFP officers staged a coup
demanding the resignation of President Aroyo, Defense Secretary General Angelo Reyes,
and AFP intelligence Chief Brigadier General Victor Corpus. This so-called “Oakwood
coup” attempt ended with no major physical violence and the coup leaders were arrested.
Three years later in 2006, a group of AFP officers led by Brigadier General Danilo Lim
and Marine Colonel Ariel Querubin planned another coup to overthrow the corrupt
civilian authority.402 The coup attempt did not materialize because President Aroyo
declared a state of emergency and co-opted senior AFP officers to secure the military’s
loyalty to her.
Twenty years of democratic regime transition in the Philippines did not achieve
democratic consolidation. On the contrary, the country still suffers from the constant
possibility of military coup d’etat. As my theory suggests, increasing domestic security
threats in the coming years will make civilian control over the AFP much harder. In
addition, weak and corrupt civilian leadership provides the AFP with a continuing
opportunity to overthrow civilian government via coup d’etat. These three structural
barriers—worsening domestic security threats, failing civilian leadership, and
402 A. Lin Neumann, “Philippines: Military on the Move,” Asia Times (February 28, 2006).
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factionalized AFP—preclude any possibility to attain democratic control over the AFP
and democratic consolidation in the Philippines in the near future.
IV. Indonesia
Democratic regime transition in Indonesia was activated with the sudden downfall
of the authoritarian Suharto regime in the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and subsequent
violent demonstrations. The regime transition was so unpredictable and unprepared that
the political situation was extremely volatile. Furthermore, the democratization process
was tainted by numerous instances of inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence throughout
the archipelago and independence movements in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua. Under
such pervasive violence and degenerating domestic security conditions, the
ABRI(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) regained its political influence in the
post-democratization era, as discussed in the previous chapter.
After a decade of democratic reforms, the ABRI now plays an influential role in
domestic political and economic affairs. As Table 5-4 shows, the democratically elected
leadership has not secured the ABRI’s loyalty to the regime or to the newly written
constitution.403 On the contrary, ABRI officers openly express their own political views
and sometimes overwhelm democratically elected civilian leadership. The impeachment
of President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001, for example, was an outcome of the ABRI’s
403 It took four years (1999-2002) to revise the constitution in Indonesia. With the new
constitution, the president is elected through the direct popular election, not by the People’s
Consultative Assembly that had voted to elect the president since the Suharto era. The 2004
presidential election was the first election that Indonesian people directly elected Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono as their president.
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withdrawal of support for the president.404 ABRI officers played a decisive role in the
impeachment process when Wahid challenged the People’s Consultative Assembly’s
decision to remove him from the presidency due to his corruption and mishandling of
violent conflicts. When President Wahid planned to declare a state of emergency, the
army leadership publicly opposed it and threatened to intervene in politics.405 The
impeachment was partly a reaction from the ABRI against the Wahid government’s
attempt for military reforms, including the dismissal of General Wiranto from his
leadership in the army and the appointment of the reform-minded officers in key
positions.
The ABRI, once it conducted self-imposed reforms in the late 1990s, regained its
political influence in the power transition process from Wahid to Megawati Sukarnoputri,
daughter of the founding father and former President Sukarno and vice president in the
Wahid government. President Megawati learned from the impeachment the lesson that
marginalizing the ABRI in important political decisions could backfire and she brought
several retired ABRI officers into key positions in her cabinet. For instance, she
appointed as coordinating minister of political and security affairs Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, who had played a key role in resisting Wahid’s declaration of a state of
emergency in 2001. She also hired as minister of home affairs Hari Sabarno, who had
been decisive in mobilizing military and police factions in the legislative body to support
404 Aleksius Jemadu, “Democratisation and the Dilemma of Nation-building in Post-Suharto
Indonesia: The Case of Aceh,” Asian Ethnicity 5: 3 (2004), p. 325.
405 Michael S. Malley, “Indonesia in 2001: Restoring Stability in Jakarta,” Asian Survey 42: 1
(2002), p. 125.
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Megawati.406 As a result, ABRI officers regained their political influence not only in the
Megawati cabinet but also in local administrative positions.
Table 5-4: Post-Democratization Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia
Indicators Status
Civilian Control Indicators










 Lack of ABRI’s loyalty to the constitution and
democratically elected leaders
 ABRI officers openly express their political views;
frequent civil-military conflict in internal security
policy issues; keeps dwifungsi doctrine
 Officers actively engaged in central and local
administrative positions; ABRI officers automatically
guaranteed seats in the Parliament
 Focus on domestic security missions; suppressing
secessionist movements; widespread involvement in
local economic affairs
 Active and retired officers actively participate in
several non-security policymaking
Challenges to Civilian Control
• Security challenges




• Role of civil society
 Threats to the national disintegration; regional
secessionist movements (East Timor, Aceh, Papua);
inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts; terrorism
 Weak civilian leadership (fragmentation of political
parties along the religious, ethnic, and regional
cleavages)
 Lack of institutional unity and professionalism;
regain its political influence in the post-
democratization era
 Violence-prone civil society groups; aggravate
political fragmentation
406 Malley, 2002, p. 126.
265
Even though the Megawati presidency brought some level of political stability, it
was achieved at the expense of democratic values and practices in Indonesian politics.
Under Megawati’s presidency, several former officials under the Suharto regime regained
their influence in post-democratization politics. She appointed Bambang Kesowo as
cabinet secretary and state secretariat, which had been the main instrument for executive
power under the Suharto leadership. She also named as minister of administrative reform
Feisal Tamin, who had served in the Ministry of Home Affairs under Suharto.
Furthermore, Megawati reestablished a State Information Agency that was in charge of
controlling the mass media.407 The Megawati presidency seemed to go back to Suharto’s
New Order era by appointing numerous retired and active ABRI officers and Suharto’s
close acquaintances to key positions in her cabinet.
As noted, the Indonesian case presents the most difficult challenges to
democratization and democratic consolidation in which civilian leaders establish firm
control over the armed forces and restructure the organization into a professionalized and
politically neutral body. The biggest challenge to institutionalizing democracy and
civilian control over the army is the degenerating domestic security conditions in the
aftermath of the authoritarian Suharto’s fall. The most daunting challenge to Indonesia
has been the problem of nation-building. With over 1,000 inhabited islands, over 300
ethnic groups, and several different religions, Jakarta regimes have struggled with
separatist movements throughout the archipelago. National disintegration has further
increased due to the Dutch colonial power’s divide-and-rule policies. Sukarno’s
407 “Information Minister Ponders New Ways to Rein in Media,” Jakarta Post (December 29,
2001).
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eradication of parliamentary democracy and the installation of authoritarian Guided
Democracy in the late 1950s was an attempt to overcome possible national disintegration
by the Muslim separatist movements in the outer islands. Subsequently, Suharto’s New
Order had effectively mobilized ABRI forces to suppress any separatist movements with
heavy-handed tactics. Suharto could sustain the territory as a unified nation-state by
using both sticks and carrots: suppressing any independence movements and at the same
time providing social and economic benefits to those provinces.
The fall of Suharto’s New Order regime and the onset of a grave economic crisis,
however, provided several regions with a momentum for assertion of independence. The
first region that gained independence was East Timor. Under increasing international
pressure, the central government gave East Timorese a referendum, in which 78.5% the
voters opposed the government’s offer of political autonomy and preferred total
independence. The independence was achieved as U.N. troops were dispatched to
control the territory. In this process, however, thousands of East Timorese were killed by
the pro-Indonesia militias that were trained and equipped by the ABRI.408
The independence of East Timor produced three significant effects. First,
President Wahid’s decision to give independence to the East Timorese enraged ABRI
officers who had strongly espoused the territorial integrity of the state from the beginning
of the Republic. The President’s decision was made without consultation with the army
leadership, which made the ABRI leadership withdraw its support from the president and
side with Megawati. Second, East Timorese independence sent a clear signal to other
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regions that had been pursuing independence such as Aceh and Papua (or Irian Jaya),
making internal security conditions much worse. Finally, degenerating security
conditions provided the ABRI with windows of opportunity to regain its political
influence. President Megawati formed a strategic alliance with the ABRI to secure her
political position and to cope with the pro-independence movements throughout the outer
islands.
The ABRI’s influence in politics further expanded when Yudhoyono, a retired
ABRI officer, succeeded Megawati through the first direct presidential election in 2004,
by obtaining 60.6% of the votes, against the incumbent’s 39.4%.409 Under Yudhoyono’s
leadership, a number of retired ABRI officers held positions in the government, including
the home affairs minister. At the same time, several of the old Suharto-era politicians
and government officials filled important positions in the current government.410
Why, then, did active and retired ABRI officers and Suharto’s cronies come to
regain their political influence in post-democratization Indonesian politics? There are
several reasons. First, degenerating domestic security conditions provided the ABRI with
an opportunity to reassert its political authority. Second, all the presidents after Suharto’s
408 For more detailed information about the independence process in East Timor, see Ann Marie
Murphy, “Indonesia and Globalization,” Asian Perspective 23: 4 (1999), pp. 229-259; R. William
Liddle, “Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored,” Asian Survey 40: 1 (2000), pp. 39-40.
409 In the 2004 presidential election, there were two rounds of voting. Initially, there were five
presidential candidates: (1) Partai Demokrat’s Yudhoyono winning 33.6%; (2) PDI-P’s
Megawati, 26.6%; (3) Golkar’s Wiranto, 22.2%; (4) Amien Rais of the Partai Amanat Nasional
(PAN, National Mandate Party), 14.7%; and (5) the incumbent vice president Hamah Haz, 3%.
Since there was no candidate who garnered an absolute majority, a runoff election was held
between Yudhoyono and Megawati, in which the former candidate won the majority vote. R.
William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono,” Asian Survey 45: 1 (2005), pp. 119-121.
410 Baladas Ghoshal, “Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto
Indonesia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26: 3 (2004), p. 514.
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fall found it difficult to mobilize support from pro-democracy civil society groups. Three
decades of Suharto’s dictatorial rule effectively precluded any possibility to form
influential civil society groups. Instead, pro-governmental groups such as the Golkar
Party and military organizations dominated the societal arena. Moreover, civil society
groups in the post-democratization era pose a heavy burden to the civilian leadership.
They are divided along the ethnic and religious cleavages and, because of that, produce
conflicts and violence.411 Therefore, civil society groups are not the source of
strengthening civilian leadership but rather the source of political liability.
Finally, but equally important, political parties, like civil society groups, are
fragmented along ethnic and religious faultlines so that no one president can secure a
majority in the legislative body. In the 1999 parliamentary election, the first democratic
election since 1955, there were 48 political parties in which 21 parties won at least one of
the 462 seats.412 President Wahid’s ruling PKB gained only 11% of the parliamentary
seats. The 2004 parliamentary election also showed extremely fragmented parties, in
which 11 parties took at least 2% of the parliamentary seats. President Yudhoyono’s
Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party) won only 7.5% of the total popular votes.413 In such
an extreme fragmentation of political parties, it is almost impossible to form a stable
411 For the discussion of civil society’s role in Indonesian politics, see Elizabeth Fuller Collins,
“Indonesia: A Violent Culture?” Asian Survey 42: 4 (2002); Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto:
Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2005); Edward Aspinall, “Indonesia: Transformation of Civil Society and Democratic
Breakthrough,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding
and Contracting Democratic Space (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
412 Liddle 1999, pp. 32-22.
413 Liddle and Mujani, 2005, p. 120.
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coalition government. In this situation, the ABRI is perceived by civilian leaders as the
most attractive and effective coalition partner to govern the society.
In sum, democratization in Indonesia represents the most difficult case for
democratic consolidation and stable civilian control over the armed forces. Extremely
precarious internal security conditions provide the ABRI with justification for its
continued role in civilian political affairs. In domestic politics, fragmented political
structure weakens civilian leaders’ power vis-à-vis the military leadership. At the same
time, incapacitated civilian leaders find the ABRI as a strategic partner to govern the
country. Because of these circumstances, the ABRI will continue to exert its political
influence, and institutionalizing democratic control of the military in Indonesia will be
unlikely in the near future.
Conclusions
This chapter addressed the civil-military dynamics in the four countries after
democratic regime transitions. Furthermore, in light of my theoretical arguments and
empirical findings in the previous chapters, this chapter presented prospects for the
military’s political role in the near future. Currently, South Korea and Taiwan
demonstrate stable and firm civilian control over the armed forces and further democratic
consolidation. On the other hand, the Philippines and Indonesia suffer from the lack of
civilian control of the military, making post-democratization politics complicated.
For the four cases under study, one major barrier to establishing firm civilian
control of the military is, as my theory suggests, challenging security threat
environments. For the South Korean and Taiwanese cases, favorable security conditions
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in the early years of democratization facilitated far-reaching democratic reforms
including the army’s depoliticization. On the contrary, democratization in the Philippines
and Indonesia was tarnished by mounting internal conflicts and violence: the communist
insurgents and Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines and inter-ethnic/religious
conflicts and separatist movements in Indonesia. In the latter two cases, intimidating
domestic threats provided politicized officers with justifications for regaining their
political influence.
Even though South Korea and Taiwan benefited from favorable security
environments during the early years of democratization, the ensuing security challenges
now pose a significant hurdle for the civilian leaders’ control over the army.
Internationally, South Korea faces threats from North Korea, a regime that suffers from a
devastated economy and isolation from the international community. Taiwan’s current
and future security conditions are even more unpredictable. President Chen Shui-bian’s
mobilization of Taiwanese ethnic identity and independence issues for his political
purposes provokes belligerent attitudes from Beijing. Civilian control of the military in
the two cases will be dependent upon how these countries deal with the international
security challenges. In the meantime, internal threats in the Philippines and Indonesia
pose even more direct and grave challenges to civilian leaders’ control of the politicized
officers. In the Philippines, domestic insurgency movements make civilian control of the
military increasingly difficult, as it focuses on internal security and non-military
missions. Similarly, the ABRI’s internal security roles and non-military missions enable
it to assume more active positions in political, administrative, and economic affairs.
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While the security threats set the general patterns of the military’s political
influence, two major domestic factors—strength of civilian leadership and unity of
military organization—determine a more specific aspect of civil-military relations. In
terms of the strength of civilian leadership, all four countries are still struggling with
building democratic institutions and norms in replacement of old authoritarian regimes.
South Korea and Taiwan demonstrate a more stable and institutionalized democratic
leadership, while the other two cases are still struggling with the lack of workable
political institutions. The strength of civilian leadership directly affects the civilian
leaders’ ability to control army officers. Extremely weak civilian leadership in the post-
democratization Philippines and Indonesia makes it difficult to attain the military’s
obedience.
At the same time, the unity of the military organization impinges on army
officers’ political orientation. Unified and professionalized armed forces promote army
officers’ depoliticization and political neutrality, making civilian control easier.
Otherwise, civilian elites find it difficult to control a factionalized military, and officers’
struggles often precipitate political participation. Armed forces in South Korea and
Taiwan developed into a unified and professionalized body during the early years of
democratization, which in turn led to the army’s political neutrality. In contrast, armed
forces in the Philippines and Indonesia suffer from the lack of the military’s
organizational unity and professionalism, which makes civilian leaders difficult to control
to this day.
The empirical evidence suggests that future civil-military relations in the four
countries will be shaped by major structural preconditions, such as security threats, the
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strength of civilian leadership, and the unity of the armed forces. Considering these
structural compositions, South Korea and Taiwan are more likely to secure democratic
consolidation and control over the armed forces. Indonesia and the Philippines,
meanwhile, will continue to struggle with constructing viable democratic regimes and




The purpose of this dissertation is to explain the rise and fall of the military’s
domestic political role in four Asian countries: South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and
Indonesia. I analyzed army officers’ domestic political roles by dividing the four
countries into four historical stages: (1) army organization during the state-building
process (1940s-1950s); (2) modes of military intervention in politics (1960s-1970s); (3)
armed forces’ withdrawal from politics during democratization (1980s-1990s); and (4)
civil-military relations in the post-democratization era (1990s-current). In comparing the
cases in each historical stage, I first examined how domestic and international security
threats influenced three major domestic political actors: civilian leadership, the military,
and civil society. I then analyzed how dynamic interactions among these domestic
political actors shaped a more specific manifestation of the army’s political influence.
This dissertation attempts to overcome the limitations of previous institutionalist
theories on civil-military relations that focus on domestic political conditions such as
societal factors, military factors, or both. Instead, this project started from the
proposition that security threats, whether domestic or international, affect army officers’
domestic political actions. This should be the case because the military is first and
foremost an institution concerned with security that directly responds to internal and
external security threats to the state. Security threats as the primary independent variable
shape the relative power relationship between the military organization, civilian
leadership, and civil society. In turn, divergent interactions among these domestic
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political actors account for different manifestations of civil-military relations. In this
respect, these actors do not signify independent variables by themselves but intervening
variables that are shaped by security threats.
My structural theory suggests that high security threats in the domestic or
international arena generate a structural condition for the military to be politically
influential, while low security threats run counter to its political influence. The first
effect of growing security threats is the expansion of the military organization. High
threats, moreover, give civilian leaders structural incentives to become more authoritarian
and take coercive measures to rule society, because general security threats in many cases
coincide with security threats to regime survival. In this situation, civilian leaders
mobilize armed forces into politics to cope with security challenges to both the regime
and the state. As a result, one outcome of high security threats is the expansion and
strengthening of the state apparatus that monopolizes the means of physical violence. In
this situation, civil society’s political role becomes minimal. By the same logic, then,
low security threats also force a reevaluation of the military’s role in politics. In this
condition, civilian leaders’ attempts to bring army officers into politics generally meet
strong resistance from domestic audiences. When security threats are low, civil society
groups’ pressure against authoritarian regimes and the military becomes more and more
influential.
While security threats set the basic tendencies of the military’s political influence,
a more detailed aspect of civil-military relations is determined by intervening variables at
the domestic level. The first intervening variable at the domestic level is the
cohesiveness of the military organization. A unified military institution is conducive to
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stable civilian control and promotes military professionalism and institutional autonomy,
while a factionalized army is detrimental to professionalism and officers’ political
neutrality. The second intervening variable is the strength of civilian leadership. Strong
civilian leadership overall generally translates into strong civilian control of the military,
while weak and divided leadership breeds the armed forces’ intervention in politics. The
final intervening variable is the strength of civil society. A strong and ideologically
moderate civil society contributes to strong civilian control of the military. On the
contrary, civil society groups that advocate a radical ideology or adopt a strategy of
physical violence make civilian control of the armed forces more difficult.
To test these theoretical arguments, I conducted a structured-focused comparative
analysis of civil-military relations in four Asian countries by dividing them into four
historical stages. Overall, empirical evidences strongly support my theoretical
arguments, as summarized in Table C-1 and Table C-2.
Table C-1: Security Threats and the Military’s Domestic Influence, Summary of Results
High External Threats Low External Threats

















As Table C-1 summarily shows, the armed forces wielded strong political influence in the
structural conditions of Q1 (High External/High Internal), Q2 (Low External/High
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Internal), and Q3 (High External/Low Internal). Only in the structural condition of Q4
(Low External/Low Internal) was civilian control of the military stable and firm.
Moreover, further specific features of civil-military relations were determined by three
major domestic variables, as summarized in Table C-2.










































































Civil-military relations in South Korea have evolved during the last six decades
over three distinct periods: (1) the rise of the politically influential military during state-
building (1950s), (2) politicized officers’ domination of civilian politics (1960s-1980s),
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and (3) their withdrawal from politics and subordination to democratically elected
civilian leadership (1990s). In the first phase, extreme internal and external security
threats during the state-building period brought about the expansion of the army
organization. In particular, the Korean War (1950-1953) had tremendous impacts on the
armed forces and their political roles. The war resulted in vast expansion of the army,
with almost 700,000 soldiers consuming over 50 percent of total governmental spending.
In addition, the war left the democratically-elected President Rhee Syngman as an almost
omnipotent figure in Korean politics. During and after the war, President Rhee increased
his political power by amending the constitution to become a president-for-life. On
numerous occasions, he mobilized army officers into politics to suppress any political
opposition. He also purposefully aggravated factional struggles within the army as a way
of controlling politicized officers. Overall, extreme security threats in the state-building
period in South Korea brought about an increasingly authoritarian civilian leadership,
expansion of the military organization, and politicization of army officers by the
authoritarian civilian leadership.
Once becoming a politically influential body under the President Rhee Syngman’s
rule, senior army officers played a decisive role in Rhee’s downfall. President Rhee was
forced out in the middle of the April 19th Student Revolution in 1960, which erupted as a
demonstration to the Rhee regime’s authoritarian repression, corruption, and fraud in the
1960 presidential election. The Rhee government declared martial law and brought
heavily armed military forces to put down the demonstration. But the police and the
military did not follow the President’s order and, instead, forced him to step down.
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With the ouster of Rhee Syngman, South Korea restored democracy with a
parliamentary political system under the leadership of Prime Minister Chang Myon. The
new regime, however, was too weak and incompetent to deal with the multiple problems
that had intensified under the Rhee government such as economic corrosion, factional
struggles within the ruling circle, and radical student protesters. The Chang regime was
riven between two political extremes: radicalized college students and pro-communist
groups on the left, and conservative anti-communist forces including senior army officers
on the right. Restored political freedom provided pro-communist groups with
opportunities to expand their influence in society, worsening domestic security
conditions. The Korean army also continued to suffer from factional struggles fostered
by Rhee Syngman’s exploitation of factional competition. When the Rhee regime
collapsed, a group of junior officers led by Park Jung-hee attempted to cleanse old and
corrupt senior officers by organizing a ‘Purification’ campaign within the military.
When the Chang government failed to provide political order, General Park Jung-
hee and his followers carried out a military coup on May 16, 1961. General Park
consolidated his dictatorial rule in the following years by declaring the Yushin
(revitalization) constitution in October 1972, abolishing the National Assembly and
outlawing any type of political activity. The Yushin was justified when security
conditions were grave due to North Korean armed infiltrations into the South and the
Nixon Doctrine. In this historical period, the installation of a military dictatorial rule in
South Korea was a combination of three structural conditions: the failure of civilian
leadership, a factionalized military, and a radicalized civil society that exacerbated poor
security conditions.
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The military’s withdrawal from politics during democratization was precipitated
by improving security conditions in Korea in the 1980s. Previously, the military’s
dictatorial rule had been justified by the presence of constant threats from a hostile North
Korea. Since the beginning of the 1980s, however, the military balance between the two
Koreas turned in favor of the South, thus making anxiety about North Korea an
unconvincing justification for dictatorship. Moreover, the end of the Cold War and South
Korea’s diplomatic ties with the former communist countries during the democratization
process drastically improved the country’s security conditions.
The changing security environments empowered pro-democracy political elites
and civil society groups vis-à-vis the military. Even though democratization in Korea
started from the radical Minjung (people) movements from below, subsequent democratic
transition was followed by elite compromise, which led to a stable regime transition. At
the same time, civil society’s support for democratic reform was vital to the
democratically elected leaders’ military reform, as was the case in the Kim Young-sam
presidency (1993-1997). President Kim mobilized civil society’s support for disbanding
the Hanahoe (one mind) faction in the military and purging politically influential senior
officers, including two former presidents (Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo).
Meanwhile, the existence of a cohesive and professional army encouraged stronger
civilian control of the military during and after democratization. A concurrence of three
major structural conditions contributed to South Korea’s successful military
depoliticization: favorable security environments, strong civilian leadership supported by
civil society, and the unified and professionalized army.
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2. Taiwan
The Kuomintang (KMT) government also faced multiple domestic and
international security challenges from the beginning of its formation in the 1910s.
During the stay on mainland China, the KMT had to fight influential provincial warlords
and the Japanese invasion in the 1920s and 1930s as well as wage a long battle with the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its revolutionary army. When World War II ended,
the KMT and the CCP entered into an intense civil war (1945-1949) until the former lost
and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Due to these security challenges, army officers played
important political, administrative, and economic roles in the KMT government from the
earliest days of the Republic.
The KMT regime had to cope with even more daunting domestic and international
security challenges after its retreat to Taiwan. Domestically, KMT forces provoked a
deterioration of internal security conditions by adopting heavy-handed tactics against the
native Taiwanese, leading to the violent February 28th Uprising in 1947. This incident
aggravated tensions between Chinese mainlanders and ethnic Taiwanese and became a
major source of domestic instability. In the meantime, more daunting security challenges
came from the CCP, which wanted to conclude the civil war and achieve complete
unification of the territory. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) posed grave threats to the KMT in Taiwan. At the same time, the KMT
government also wanted to continue the civil war to retake the mainland territory. The
nationalist government used considerable domestic resources for military buildup. To
this end, it installed military bases with 100,000 troops in the islands of Quemoy and
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Matsu and carried out bombing raids and guerrilla warfare in the southern part of the
mainland.
In such a perilous security condition, all the political powers were concentrated in
one man, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In the early years of the KMT on the
mainland, Chiang secured his political power within the party by mobilizing army
officers’ support. He established the Whampoa Military Academy in the 1920s and
expanded his connections with senior army officers. After the retreat to Taiwan, the
army assumed a more prominent political role, especially as security challenges
continued to grow. The KMT regime declared martial law in 1949 and created the
Taiwan Garrison Command in the following year, which gave the military the right to
intervene in social and political affairs. Similar to the South Korean case, domestic and
international security challenges for the KMT regime resulted in the organizational
expansion of the Taiwanese army and its political role. At the same time, security threats
created an autocratic regime in Taiwan, concentrating political powers within Chiang
Kai-shek’s hands.
In contrast to the South Korean case, however, the Taiwanese army never
attempted to overthrow the civilian leadership, even though army officers’ penetration in
civilian political arena was almost omnipresent. The first structural condition that
precluded the military’s political domination was the strength of civilian leadership by
Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo. Strong civilian leadership came from
Chiang’s successful reforms of the KMT party and the army. In the area of party reform,
he focused on removing age-old factions and establishing a highly centralized and
ideologically indoctrinated organization. In the area of military reform, he focused on
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eliminating factional competitions and strengthening the party’s control over the army by
introducing a political commissar (or warfare) system.
Changing security environments surrounding Taiwan enhanced political
liberalization during the 1970s and 1980s. Changes in international relations during the
1970s resulted in diplomatic isolation of the KMT regime, while the PRC became an
increasingly influential actor. Ironically, these changes had two contrasting effects: (1)
the KMT was forced to give up a military means to deal with PRC, and (2) the KMT
encouraged political liberalization as a way of solving the legitimacy crisis both
domestically and internationally. Chiang Ching-kuo’s political reforms focused on
“Taiwanizing” the KMT party and the army. From the early 1970s, ethnic Taiwanese
began to fill important positions in the party, including the Central Standing Committee.
They also began to occupy higher-ranking positions in the military.
The two decades of Taiwanization under Chiang’s leadership precluded any
succession problem during the power transition from Chiang to Lee Teng-hui, an ethnic
Taiwanese. The biggest challenge for Taiwan’s democratization, however, was to reform
KMT party-army relations. Prior to democratization, the KMT became deeply engaged
in military affairs with the political commissar system, while senior army officers held
prominent positions in the party, including the Central Standing Committee. Lee Teng-
hui curbed senior officers’ influence with adept political skills: appointing General Hau
Pei-tsun as premier and, at the same time, mobilizing political support from the
opposition Democratic Progressive Party and civil society groups. Lee Teng-hui
conducted military reforms without facing any backfire from army leadership, because
the Taiwanese army had developed into a cohesive and professionalized body long before
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democratic reform began. In short, the military’s withdrawal from politics during
democratization in Taiwan was facilitated by three major structural conditions: lessening
internal and external security threats, strong civilian leadership, and the unified and
professionalized Taiwanese army.
3. The Philippines
In 1946, the Philippines achieved sovereign statehood after years of American
tutelage. The Philippines began its republic with a democratic political regime and a
politically neutral military. From the 1940s up until the late 1960s, the Philippines did
not face any serious security challenges mainly due to its geographic isolation from the
Asian continent and the security commitment from the United States. During this period,
democratically elected presidents firmly controlled the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), which was small in size and politically neutral.
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, two domestic insurgency movements
became influential and posed threats to the Ferdinand Marcos government: the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People’s Army (NPA) which
aimed at overthrowing the regime and establishing a communist government, as well as
the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which fought to create an
independent Muslim state in Mindanao. Rising domestic insurgency movements
provided President Marcos with justification for the declaration of martial law in 1972.
Marcos soon extended his presidential tenure beyond the constitutional limit and
centralized political power within his hands. At the same time, mounting security threats
led to the expansion of the AFP and its political role. AFP officers assumed important
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political, administrative, judicial, and economic positions in the Marcos regime. During
the 1970s, rising internal security challenges stirred the expansion of the AFP
organization, an increasingly authoritarian civilian leadership, and army officers’ deep
penetration into civilian political affairs.
Even though the Marcos government did not face any coup attempt throughout
years of martial law, his personalistic control over army officers seriously damaged
professionalism and aggravated factional struggles in the AFP. Officers who either came
from Ilocos or were personally connected to the President or his wife were promoted to
the highest positions in the AFP hierarchy. While these officers received enormous
benefits and monopolized key commandership positions, other officers who were non-
Ilocos or unclear in their loyalty to the President were assigned to areas outside Metro
Manila, where they conducted dangerous counter-insurgency warfare with the communist
NPA and the Muslim MNLF. A group of junior officers outside Marcos’ inner circle
formed a clandestine fraternity, Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement
(RAM).
RAM officers led by General Fidel Ramos and General Juan Ponce Enrile played
a decisive role in ending the Marcos dictatorship and instituting a democratic regime.
When both Marcos and Corazon Aquino declared victory in the inconclusive 1986
presidential election, RAM members revolted against Marcos and sided with Aquino.
Even though the “People Power” rally created a momentum for democratization, it was
the AFP that enabled the democratic regime transition. Because of their prominent role
in Marcos’ ouster, RAM officers became influential in the Aquino government.
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As the first democratically elected president since 1965, President Corazon
Aquino tried to enact a number of important reforms: purging Marcos loyalists in both
the government and the AFP, rebuilding a democratic institution with a new constitution,
and recovering from severe economic crisis. She was successful in none of these tasks
due to her weak and inefficient leadership. Still, the leadership crisis in the Aquino
government centered on disagreements with the AFP over the counterinsurgency
programs regarding the NPA and the MNLF. The AFP insisted on rough measures
against the rebels, while the Aquino government preferred peaceful means. Aquino
incited the AFP by releasing political prisoners, including the CPP leader Jose Maria
Sison, and initiating a ceasefire and peace talks with the CPP and the MNLF.
Negotiations between the government and the National Democratic Front (NDF), an
umbrella organization of underground leftist groups, resulted in a 60-day truce effective
December 10, 1986. But the truce agreement did not last long due to a discrepancy on
key issues. The NDF demanded a voice in the Aquino government and the integration of
NPA militias into the AFP organization. Similarly, the Aquino government’s peace talks
with the Moro secessionists also failed when the MNLF demanded the autonomy of
Mindanao and the integration of its army into the AFP organization. Security conditions
significantly deteriorated after Aquino government’s peace efforts with the insurgents
ended in failure, and the NPA and the MNLF expanded their armed uprisings in the late
1980s.
It was not long before segments of the AFP withdrew their support from Aquino.
RAM members or Marcos loyalists staged seven major coup attempts within the first four
years of the Aquino presidency. The recurring coup attempts forced the Aquino
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government to accept most of the AFP officers’ demands, increasing the military budget
by 60 percent and accepting the AFP’s counterinsurgency plan.
Civilian control over the AFP was established only after Fidel Ramos was elected
president in 1992. As a former chief of staff with strong support from Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) graduates, Ramos curbed the RAM’s influence in domestic politics.
His control over the AFP, however, was secured by bringing in several senior AFP
officers to his government. Even though the Philippines did not return to military rule, its
democratization process was tainted by numerous coup attempts and handicapped by a
weak civilian leadership.
4. Indonesia
Indonesia also had to cope with extreme domestic security threats from the
beginning of its independence in 1949. After five years of war with Dutch forces,
Indonesia started as a parliamentary democracy with multiple parties. This parliamentary
democracy, however, did not last long due to its inability to deal with multifaceted
security challenges, coming from ethnic and religious conflicts as well as threats of
territorial disintegration. One of the major security threats was the Darul Islam uprisings,
aimed at creating an Islamic Republic in Indonesia and later spread to other regions such
as Aceh and South Sulawesi.
Faced with the possibility of national disintegration, President Achmad Sukarno
abolished the parliamentary system and declared “Guided Democracy” in 1957,
concentrating political authority within the President. At the same time, he declared
martial law and brought the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Republic of
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Indonesia Armed Forces) into politics and let them play key administrative and economic
roles. In this situation, the ABRI, led by General Abdul Haris Nasution, declared the
“Middle Way” doctrine that justified ABRI’s political participation as an equal partner
alongside civilian leadership. In sum, the state-building period witnessed growing
internal threats, which resulted in the installation of authoritarian “Guided Democracy”
and the expansion of ABRI’s political influence.
President Sukarno’s Guided Democracy successfully contained major internal
security threats by declaring martial law and bringing ABRI officers into politics. Under
Guided Democracy, the ABRI exercised strong political power so that President Sukarno
felt threatened by politically influential officers. He formed a political coalition with the
PKI (Partai Kommunis Indonesia, the Indonesian Communist Party) to curb ABRI’s
political dominance in his government. The Sukarno-PKI coalition made several
important political decisions that intensified the ABRI’s concern for national security.
First, the “Crush Malaysia” campaign, or so-called Konfrontasi, created diplomatic
disputes with major Western powers, including the United States and Britain. Second,
the PKI-initiated land reform (aski sepihak, unilateral action) raised violent conflicts
between PKI-led peasants and regional landlords aligned with regional military units.
Third, the Sukarno regime’s foreign policy isolated itself from major Western powers,
which in turn caused an economic crisis in the early 1960s. Finally, Sukarno-PKI lifted
martial law in 1963 and planned to downsize the ABRI and its budget.
When generals in the ABRI were plotting a coup d’etat to topple Sukarno, a group
of pro-PKI officers launched a preemptive coup in 1965, killing most of highest-ranking
officers. Out of this situation, Major General Haji Mohammad Suharto contained the
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coup forces and best controlled the political crisis. The ABRI took over political power
from President Sukarno and put him under house arrest. Suharto declared a “New
Order,” in which the ABRI played an extensive role in Indonesian politics until 1998. In
sum, the ABRI coup and establishment of military dictatorial rule in Indonesia was an
outcome of the convergence of three major factors: civilian leadership’s failure to provide
political and security order, influential but violent civil society, and the ABRI’s dwifungsi
(dual function) doctrine.
Suharto’s New Order regime (1968-1998) abruptly ended in the middle of an
economic crisis and ensuing social unrest, and the Vice President B. J. Habibie succeeded
the presidency. The power transition was so unexpected that the Habibie leadership was
not prepared to carry out political and economic reforms. Various problems that had
been dormant under the New Order began to surface, forcing the new government to deal
with violent demonstrations, inter-ethnic and inter-religious clashes, and separatist
insurgency movements in Aceh, Papua, and East Timor. The democratically elected
leaders, plagued by weak leadership, failed to control these crises.
Multiple internal security threats provided the ABRI with an opportunity to regain
political influence. Immediately following Suharto’s fall, the ABRI was accused of
corruption and human rights abuses during the authoritarian rule. ABRI leadership
therefore attempted to reformulate the institution as a cohesive and professionalized body
and limit its political role in the early years of democratization. Before long, however,
the ABRI began to regain its political influence, when President Abdurrahman Wahid,
the successor to Habibie, was forced to step down after less than two years of his
presidency. The ABRI withdrew its support for Wahid due to the differences between
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the president and the military leadership in dealing with the domestic insurgency
movements in the outer islands.
The ABRI recovered its political influence under the Megawati presidency (2001-
present). President Megawati found the ABRI to be an attractive political ally to face
political, economic, and security problems. The President lacked support from political
parties and civil society groups, which were highly fragmented along ethnic and religious
cleavages. Therefore, she brought ABRI leadership to her government to compensate for
her political weakness. The ABRI’s voice has become even bigger as the new
democratic regime has faced increasing inter-communal violence, separatist movements,
and terrorist threats in recent years.
II. Security Threats and the Future of the Military’s Political Role
In light of my theoretical arguments and empirical analyses for the first three
historical stages, the final empirical study illustrates the current status and future
prospects of civil-military relations. Among the four empirical cases, South Korea
represents the most stable civilian control of the military in the post-democratization
period, followed by Taiwan. In contrast, the Philippines and Indonesia have highly
unstable civil-military relations, as army officers wield enormous political influence in
the post-democratization political scene.
After two decades of democratic reforms, South Korea is now entitled to be called
a consolidated democracy. The most crucial part of democratic reform was rebuilding
the military into a professionalized and politically-neutral body by disbanding the
clandestine Hanahoe (one mind) faction. Three major structural conditions in South
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Korea reinforce stable civilian control of the military in the post-democratization era: (1)
favorable security conditions, (2) strong civilian leadership backed by civil society
groups, and (3) a cohesive and professionalized army. In the meantime, challenges for
civil-military relations in the near future will come from highly unpredictable North
Korea, whose instability has the potential to create serious political and security crises.
Taiwan successfully reached democratic consolidation when the Taiwanese army
withdrew its influence in the KMT party and central and provincial governments in the
1990s. The key to military reform was the splitting of the institutional interpenetration
between the KMT party and the army, as well as the redirection of the army’s allegiance
away from the KMT and toward the constitution and democratically elected civilian
leadership. Unlike the South Korean case, however, Taiwan will face barriers to
institutionalizing democratic control of the military. Major complexity in Taiwanese
civil-military relations comes from two major structural constraints. The first is
weakening civilian leadership that comes from ethnic cleavages between Chinese
mainlanders and ethnic Taiwanese. The second is growing security threats from the
mainland government revolving around the Taiwanese independence issue.
In the case of the Philippines, the AFP wields enormous political power even after
two decades of democratic government. Civilian leaders in the Philippines have failed to
secure army officers’ political neutrality and allegiance to the government and
constitution. There have been several coup attempts against current President Gloria
Macapagal-Aroyo (2001-present). Prospects for civilian control of the military in the
Philippines are pessimistic in all structural conditions. First, growing internal security
threats by communist insurgents and Muslim separatist movements provide the AFP with
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opportunities to expand its political influence. Second, civilian leadership suffers from
corruption, cronyism, and the failure to build workable democratic institutions. Finally,
the AFP is still divided into factions based on school and regional background, which
make civilian control and monitoring over the military even more difficult.
Indonesia features the most pessimistic scenario for future civil-military relations.
The ABRI, which once conducted self-imposed institutional reforms, reclaimed its
political authority during the impeachment of President Wahid in 2001. Like the
Philippines, Indonesia faces many structural barriers in establishing civilian control of the
military. First, post-democratization Indonesia is plagued by growing internal security
threats arising from inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence, secessionist movements in
Aceh and Papua, and terrorist bombings by extremist Muslim organizations. Second,
civilian leaders find it hard to reach political consensus due to extremely fragmented
political parties and civil society groups. Finally, the ABRI lacks organizational unity
and effective command structure, which makes civilian control extremely ineffective.
III. Theoretical Conclusions
As the summary of empirical findings demonstrates, my theoretical arguments
provide a better explanation of civil-military relations in the four countries under study
than the perspectives of institutionalist theories and Michael Desch’s structural theory.
All the institutional theories—developmental, military-centric, and synthetic—take for
granted a predominant military organization in society. The empirical evidence,
however, reveals that not all developing countries possessed a strong military
organization that could overpower the civilian political authority. Rather, this study
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showed that many developing countries’ armed forces, originally small in size, turned
into a predominant institution under growing security threats, especially in the cases of
the Philippines (1940s-1960s) and South Korea (1940s-1950s). Thus, examining changes
in military organization under certain security conditions provides a deeper understanding
of historical roots of the military’s political role.
The major limitations of institutionalist theories come from the fact that they
identify domestic variables—civilian leadership, military organization, and civil
society—as primary independent variables that directly shape the military’s political role.
Instead, this empirical study proved that these domestic factors are not independent
variables by themselves but rather intervening variables that are affected by another
independent variable: security threats. The empirical studies confirmed that security
threats determine these domestic actors’ relative power position and their political
incentives and constraints, which in turn shape the military’s domestic political role.
At the same time, the empirical results showed that the causal relationships in my
theory are more convincing than Michael Desch’s theoretical arguments. The empirical
study illustrated that Desch’s causal statements are reversed or inconclusive at best.
Desch’s theory has explanatory power over only parts of the third stage of the empirical
analysis: the military’s withdrawal from politics during democratization. Desch’s theory
has explanatory power over the cases of the Philippines in the 1980s-1990s and Indonesia
in the 1990s, which suffered from high internal/low external threats during
democratization. But his theory is inconclusive in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan
in the 1980s and 1990s, both of which attained strong civilian control of the military
under favorable internal and external security environments.
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All other empirical cases except for the third historical stage disprove Desch’s
causal logic, which suggests that high external/low internal threats produce the strongest
civilian control of the military while low external/internal threats produce mixed results.
The empirical analysis demonstrates that high threats either in internal or external arena
make the military politically influential, as can be seen in South Korea (1950s-1970s),
Taiwan (1950s-1970s), the Philippines (1960s-1990s), and Indonesia (1950s-1990s). In
addition, the results show that low threats in both arenas produce the strongest civilian
control of the military, as were the cases in South Korea (1980s-1990s), Taiwan (1980s-
1990s), and the Philippines (1940s-1960s).
This study shows that bringing the variable of security threats into the study of
civil-military relations provides us with a deeper understanding of the military’s political
role. At the same time, since the army is a security institution uniquely positioned at the
intersection between domestic politics and international relations, the security-threat
variable can provide a road through which international relations and comparative
politics can meet. As this study demonstrates, security threats shape the military
organization and its political influence (outside-in). In turn, we can consider the military




Abinales, Patricio N., ed. 1996. The Revolution Falters: The Left in the Philippine
Politics after 1986. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Abinales, Patricio N., and Donna J. Amoroso. 2005. State and Society in the Philippines.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Abrahamsson, Bengt. 1972. Military Professionalization and Political Power. Beverly
Hills: Sage Publication.
Abueba, Jose Veloso. 1976. “Filipino Democracy and the American Legacy.” Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 428.
Acheson, Dean. 1950. Speech on the Far East (January 12).
Adelman, Jonathan R., ed. 1982. Communist Armies in Politics. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Aguero, Felipe. 1995. Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in
Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Ahn, Byung-joon. 1991. “South Korea’s International Relations: Quest for Security,
Prosperity, and Unification.” The Asian Update. New York: Asia Society.
---------------. 1991. “South Korean-Soviet Relations: Contemporary Issues and
Prospects.” Asian Survey 31: 9.
Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. 2001. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of
the Military in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. 2001. Taiwan’s Presidential Politics: Democratization and
Cross-Strait Relations in the Twentieth-first Century. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. 2004. Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and
Contracting Democratic Space. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Allison, John M. 1969. “Indonesia: Year of the Pragmatists.” Asian Survey 9: 2.
Anderson, Benedict, and Ruth McVey. 1971. A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1,
1965, Coup in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
295
Andreski, Stanislav. 1968. Military Organization and Society. London: Routledge.
Armacost, Michael H., and Daniel I. Okimoto., eds. 2004. The Future of America’s
Alliances in Northeast Asia. Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center.
Arrilo, Cecilio T. 1986. Breakaway. Manila: Kyodo.
Asia Times.
Aspinall, Edward. 1993. Student Dissident in Indonesia in the 1980s. Clayton: Centre of
Southeast Asian Studies.
---------------. 2004. “Indonesia: Civil Society and Democratic Breakthrough,” in Muthiah
Alagappa, ed. Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and
Contracting Democratic Space. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
---------------. 2005. Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in
Indonesia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Baker, Richard W., M. Hadi Soesastro, J. Kristiadi, and Douglas E. Ramage, eds. 1999.
Indonesia: The Challenge of Change. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Bank of Korea, The. 1961. Monthly Report (March). Seoul, South Korea.
---------------. 1962. Economic Statistics Yearbook. Seoul, South Korea.
---------------. Various years. Kyongje Tonggye Nyonbo (Annual Economic Statistics).
Barany, Zoltan. 1993. Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990: the Case of
Hungary. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
---------------. 1997. “Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European
Experience.” Comparative Politics 30: 1.
---------------. 1999. Dilemmas of Transition: The Hungarian Experience. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Bedeski, Robert E. 1994. The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and
Reconstruction in the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992. London:
Routledge.
Bello, Walden. 1986. “Aquino’s Elite Pluralism: Initial Reflections.” Third World
Quarterly 8: 3.
296
Berfield, Susan, and Dewi Loveard. 1998. “Ten Days that Shook Indonesia.” Asiaweek,
July 21.
Berry, William E. 1986. “The Changing Role of the Philippine Military during Martial
Law and the Implications of the Future,” in Edward Olson and Stephen Jurika, Jr.,
eds. The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Bertrand, Jacques. 2000. “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996
Peace Agreement is Fragile.” Pacific Affairs 73: 1.
Betz, David J. 2004. Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe. New York:
RoutledgeCurzon.
Billet, Bret L. 1990. “South Korea at the Crossroads: an Evolving Democracy or
Authoritarianism Revisited?” Asian Survey 30: 3.
Binder, Leonard, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian Pye, Sidney Verba,
and Myron Weiner. 1971. Crises and Sequences in Political Development.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bird, Judith. 1998. “Indonesia in 1997: The Tinerbox Year.” Asian Survey 38: 2.
---------------. 1999. “Indonesia in 1998: The Pots Boils Over.” Asian Survey 39: 1.
Bourchier, David, and John Legge, eds. 1994. Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and
1990s. Monash University, Australia: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 31.
Bourchier, David, and Vedi R. Hadiz. 2003. Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader.
New York: Routledge.
Bradner, Stephen. 1961. “Korea: Experiment and Instability.” Japan Quarterly 8: 4.
Bresnan, John, ed. 1986. Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bresnan, John, ed. 2005. Indonesia: The Great Transition. New York: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishing.
Briggs, Walter. 1963. “The Military Revolution in Korea: On Its Leader and
Achievements.” Koreana Quarterly 5.
Brillantes, Alex B. 1993. “The Philippines in 1992: Ready for Take Off?” Asian Survey
33: 2.
297
Brown, Deborah A., ed. 2001. Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential Election: Implications for
Taiwan’s Politics, Security, Economy, and Relations with the Mainland. New
York: Center for Asian Studies, St. John’s University.
Bullard, Monte R. 1997. The Soldiers and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in
Taiwan’s Development. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Burton, Sandra. 1989. Impossible Dream: The Marcoses, the Aquinos, and the Unfinished
Revolution. New York: Warner Books.
Casper, Gretchen. 1995. Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Cavendish, Patrick. 1969. “The “New China” of Kuomintang,” in Jack Gray, ed. Modern
China’s Search for Political Form. London: Oxford University Press.
Celoza, Albert F. 1997. Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of
Authoritarianism. Westport: Praeger.
Central Banking. Reforming the IMF: Lessons from Indonesia
(http://www.centralbanking.co.uk/publications/pdf/Hanke.pdf)
Central Election Management Committee, Republic of Korea. 1964. Daehanminguk
Seongosa (History of Elections in Korea). Seoul: Central Election Management
Committee.
Cha, Victor D. 2004. “Shaping Change and Cultivating Ideas in the US-ROK Alliance.”
In Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds. The Future of America’s
Alliances in Northeast Asia. Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center.
Chan, Steve. 2005. “Taiwan in 2004: Electoral Contests and Political Stasis.” Asian
Survey 45: 1.
Chang, David W. 1965. “U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan.” Asian Survey 5: 3.
Chang, King-yuh. 1986. A Framework for China’s Unification. Taipei: Kwang Hwa.
Cheng, Hsiao-shih. 1990. Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of
Control. Boulder: Westview.
---------------. 1990. “The Polity and the Military: A Framework for Analyzing Civil-
Military Relations in Taiwan.” Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy 5: 1.
298
Cheng, Joseph Y. S., and Camoes C. K. Tam. 2005. “The Taiwan Presidential Election
and Its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations: A Political Cleavage Perspective.”
Asian Affairs 32: 1.
Cheng, Peter P. 1976. “Taiwan 1975: A Year of Transition.” Asian Survey 16: 1.
Cheng, Tun-jen. 1997. “Taiwan in 1996: From Euphoria to Melodrama.” Asian Survey
37: 1.
China Yearbook, The. 1959-1960. Taipei: China Publishing Company.
---------------. 1979. Taipei: China Publishing Company.
Cho, Ji-hun. 1989. 80-Nyondae Huban Cheongyeon Haksaengundong (The Youth and
Student Movements of the late-1980s). Seoul: Hyungsung-sa.
Cho, Kiuk. 1998. “Regionalism in Korean Elections and Democratization: An Empirical
Analysis.” Asian Perspective 22: 1.
Choi, Eunjung. 2005. “Economic Voting vs. Cleavage Voting in the Unite States, Korea,
and Taiwan.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, Chicago, IL.
Choi, Jang-jip. 1996. ‘Democratization, Civil Society, and Civil Movements in Korea,”
in Jang-jip Choi, et al. Understanding Korean Civil Society. Seoul: Hanul Press.
Choi, Po-sik. 1996. “Je-5 Gongwhaguk Jeonya: 12.12. Pyon (The Eve of the Fifth
Republic: The 12.12 Period.” Wolgan Choson (May).
Choi, Seung-whan, and Patrick James. 2005. Civil-Military Dynamics, Democracy, and
International Conflict: A New Quest for International Peace. New York:
Palgrave.
Chou, Tsu-cheng. 1992. “Electoral Competition and Development of Opposition in
Taiwan.” The Annals 20.
Chu, Yun-han. 1992. Crafting Democracy in Taiwan. Taipei: Institute for National Policy
Research.
---------------. 1994. “Social Protests and Political Democratization in Taiwan,” in Murray
A. Rubinstein, ed. The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present. New York: M. E.
Sharpe.
---------------. 2004. “Taiwan’s National Identity Politics and the Prospects of Cross-Strait
Relations.” Asian Survey 44: 4.
299
Chung, Joseph S. 1972. “North Korea’s Seven Year Plan (1961-1970): Economic
Performance and Reforms.” Asian Survey 12: 6.
Chung, Kyung-cho. 1962. New Korea: New Land of the Morning Calm. New York:
McMillan.
Clare, Kenneth G., et al. 1969. Area Handbook for the Republic of Korea. Washington
DC: GPO.
Clark, Cal. 2004. “Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Election: The End of Chen Shui-bian’s
“Strategic Ambiguity” on Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations.” East Asia 21: 4.
Clear, Annette. 2005. “Politics: From Endurance to Evolution,” in John Bresnan, ed.
Indonesia: The Great Transition. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing.
Collins, Elizabeth Fuller. 2002. “Indonesia: A Violent Culture?” Asian Survey 42: 4.
Congressional Quarterly, ed. 1980. China: US Policy Since 1945. Washington DC:
Congressional Quarterly Inc.
Copper, John F. 1990. Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Boulder: Westview Press.
---------------. 1993. “The Role of Minor Political Parties in Taiwan.” World Affairs 155.
Cortes, Claro. 1998. “New President in Philippines.”
<web: http:www.abcnews.com/sections/world/DailyNews/philippines980529.html/>.
Cottey, Andrew, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forester. 2002. “The Second
Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations.”
Armed Forces and Society 29: 1.
Council for Economic Planning and Development. 1987. Taiwan Statistical Yearbook.
Taipei: Executive Yuan.
Cribb, Robert, ed. The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali.
Monash University: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, No. 21.
Croissant, Aurel. 2004. “Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in
Democratizing Korea.” Armed Forces and Society 30: 3.
Crouch, Harold. 1988. The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 2nd ed. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
300
Daroy, Petronilo Bn. 1988. “On the Eve of Dictatorship and Revolution,” in Aurora
Javate de Dios, et al. Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power.
Manila: Conspectus.
Davidson, Gary M. 2003. A Short History of Taiwan: The Case for Independence.
Westport: Praeger.
Decalo, Samuel. 1976. Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Desch, Michael. 1996. “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” International
Organization 50: 2.
---------------. 1996. “Threat Environments and Military Missions,” in Larry Diamond and
Marc F. Plattner, eds. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press.
---------------. 1999. Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security
Environment. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, Larry. 1996. “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal of Democracy 7: 3.
Diamond, Larry, and Marc Plattner, eds. 1993. The Global Resurgence of Democracy.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
---------------. 1996. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Dickson, Bruce J. 1993. “The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang
on Taiwan 1950-1952.” The China Quarterly 133.
Dios, Aurora Javate de, et al. 1988. Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s
Power. Manila: Conspectus.
Dittmer, Lowell. 2002. “The Legacy of Violence in Indonesia.” Asian Survey 42: 4.
Djiwandono, Soedjati, and Yong Mun Cheong, eds. 1988. Soldiers and Stability in
Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Doherty, John F. 1982. Who Controls the Philippines Economy: Some Need Not Try as
Hard as Others. Manoa: University of Hawaii Press.
Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A Daily). 
 
301
Doronila, Amando. 1996. “The MNLF Joins Mainstream Politics.” Philippine Daily
Inquirer (July 19). 
 
Douglas, William A. 1963. “Korean Students and Politics.” Asian Survey 3: 12.
Downing, Brian M. 1992. The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of
Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Drakeley, Steven. 2005. The History of Indonesia. Westport; Greenwood Press.
Economic Planning Board. Various years. Major Statistics of Korean Economy. Seoul,
South Korea.
Eldridge, Philip. 1995. Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation in
Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Fabros, Wilfredo. 1988. The Church and Its Social Involvement in the Philippines 1930-
1972. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Fan, Yun. 2004. “Taiwan: No Civil Society, No Democracy,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed.
Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting
Democratic Space. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Far Eastern Economic Review.
Feaver, Peter. 1996. “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the
Question of Civilian Control.” Armed Forces and Society 23: 2.
---------------. 1999. “Civil-Military Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science 2.
---------------. 2003. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Feith, Herbert. 1962. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Feldman, Harvey J. 1988. “Development of US-Taiwan Relations 1948-1987,” in Harvey
Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong Kim, eds. Taiwan in a Time of
Transition. New York: Paragon House.
Ferdinand, P. 1996. “The Taiwanese Economy,” in P. Ferdinand, ed. Take-Off for
Taiwan. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Fifield, Anna. 2004. “US to Delay Troop Cuts in Korea.” Financial Times. (October 5). 
302
Finer, Samuel E. 1962. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 1992. Daily Report: East Asia. March 26.
Fossum, Egil. 1967. “Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups d’Etat in
Latin America.” Journal of Peace Research 3.
Franco, Jennifer Conroy. 2001. Elections and Democratization in the Philippines. New
York: Routledge.
Fravel, M. Taylor. 2002. “Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in
Taiwan’s Democratization.” Armed Forces and Society 29: 1.
Gaddis, John Lewis. 2005. The Cold War: A New History. New York: The Penguin Press.
Garthoff, Raymond L. 1985. Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from
Nixon to Reagan. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution.
George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennet. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in
the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Galicia-Hernandez, Carolina. 1979. The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the
Philippines: 1946-1976. Ph. D. Dissertation: State University of New York at
Buffalo.
Geertz, Clifford, ed. 1963. Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in
Asia and Africa. New York: Free Press.
Ghoshal, Baladas. 1982. Indonesian Politics 1955-1959: The Emergence of Guided
Democracy. New Delhi: K P Bagchi & Company.
---------------. 2004. “Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto
Indonesia.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26: 3.
Giordano, Pasquale T. 1988. Awakening to Mission: The Philippine Catholic Church
1965-1981. Quezon City: New Day.
Ha, Yong-Chool. 2001. “South Korea in 2000: A Summit and the Search for New
Institutional Identity.” Asian Survey 41: 1.
Hadiz, Vedi R. 2003. Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader. New York:
RoutledgeCurzon.
303
Han, Bae-ho. 1993. Hangukeui Jeongchiguajunggwa Byonhoa: Gwonuijeui
Saengsunggua Jeongae (Changes in Korean Political Process: Establishment and
Development of the Authoritarian Regime). Seoul: Bupmoon-sa.
Han, Sung-joo. 1974. The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
---------------. 1980. “South Korea and the United States: The Alliance Survives.” Asian
Survey 20: 11.
---------------. 1988. “South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization.” Asian
Survey 28: 1.
Han, Yong-won. 1993. Hangukeui Gunbu Jeongchi (Military Politics in Korea). Seoul:
Daewang-sa.
---------------. 1996. “5.16 Coup D’tat eui Balsaengkwa Jeongaekwajeong (The Genesis
and Evolution of the 5.16 Coup D’etat),” in Bae-ho Han, ed. Hanguk Hyondae
Jeongchi Ron II: Je 3-Gonghwagukeui Hyongseong, Jeongchi Kwajeong,
Jeongchaek (Contemporary Korean Politics II: The Genesis, Political Process,
and Policies of the Third Republic). Seoul: Orum.
---------------. 2000. “Gunbu-ui jedo-jok Sungjanggua Jeongchijeok Haengdongjuui (The
Rise of the Military Institution and Its Political Activism),” in Bae-ho Han, ed.
Hanguk Hyondae Jungchiron I (Contemporary Korean Politics I). Seoul: Orum.
Hanguk Hyondaesa Saryo Yonguso. 1990. Kwangju 5-wol Hangjaeng Sayrojip
(Complete Collection of the Historical Materials on the May People’s Uprising in
Kwangju). Seoul: Pulbit Publications.
Hanguk Ilbo (Hanguk Daily).
Hardy, Richard P. 1984. The Philippine Bishops Speak (1968-1983). Quezon City:
Maryknoll School of Theology.
Hedman, Eva-Lotta. 2001. “The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil,” in Muthiah
Alagappa, ed. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Role of the Military in
Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hefner, Robert. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Henderson, Gregory. 1968. Korea: The Politics of Vortex. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
304
Hernandez, Carolina G. 1979. The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the
Philippines, 1946-1976. Ph. D. Dissertation: State University of New York at
Buffalo.
---------------. 1988. “The Philippines in 1987: Challenges of Redemocratization.” Asian
Survey 28: 2.
---------------. 1989. “The Philippines in 1988: Reaching out to Peace and Economic
Recovery.” Asian Survey 29: 2.
---------------. 1997. “The Philippines in 1996: A House Finally in Order?” Asian Survey
37: 2.
Herr, Michael. 1977. Dispatches. New York: Knopf.
Hill, Hall. 1999. The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies.
Hindley, Donald. 1964. “Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for
Motives.” Asian Survey 4.
Hoadley, J. Stephen. 1975. Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-Military
Relations in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing.
Holt, Robert T., and John E. Turner. 1975. “Review: Crisis and Sequences in Collective
Theory Development.” American Political Science Review 69: 3.
Hong, Yong-pyo. 2000. State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee
and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea, 1953-1960. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Hsieh, Chiao C. 1985. Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations
of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949-1979. London: The Sherwood press.
Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 2004. “National Identity and Taiwan’s Mainland China Policy.”
Journal of Contemporary China 13: 40.
Hu, Xiaobo, and Gang Lin. 2003. “The PRC View of Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui,” in
Wei-chin Lee and T. Y. Wang, eds. Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in
Taiwan, 1988-2000. New York: University Press of America.
Huebner, Jon W. 1987. ‘The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan.” The China Quarterly 110.
Human Rights Watch. 2001. “Violence and Political Impasse in Papua.” Available at
<http://www.hrw.org>.
305
Hunter, Wendy. 1996. State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role
in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. United States Institute of Peace.
---------------. 1997. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
---------------. 1998. “Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian
Argentina and Chile.” International Studies Quarterly 42: 2.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
--------------. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
---------------. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Hwang, Teh-fu. “Electoral Competition and Democratic Transition in the Republic of
China.” Issues and Studies 27.
Hwang, Won-ki. 2006. Developmental Dictatorship and Democratization in South
Korea: The State and Society in Transformation, 1987-1997. Ph. D. Dissertation:
Brown University.
Im, Hyug-baeg. 1989. Politics of Transition: Democratic Transition from Authoritarian
Rule in South Korea. Ph. D. Dissertation: University of Chicago.
Institute for International Security Studies. 1987. The Military Balance. London: IISS.
International Crisis Group. 2001. “Ending Repression in Jaya.” Available at
<http://www.crisisweb.org>.
International Herald Tribune (January 21, 1969).
Jakarta Post. 2001. “Information Minister Ponders New Ways to Rein in Media.”
(December 29).
Jackman, Robert W. 1978. “The Predictability of Coup D’etat: A Model with African
Data.” American Political Science Review 72.
Janowitz, Morris. 1962. The Professional Soldier. New York: Free Press.
306
---------------. 1964. The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
---------------. 1977. Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jemadu, Aleksius. 2004. “Democratization and the Dilemma of Nation-building in Post-
Suharto Indonesia: The Case of Aceh.” Asian Ethnicity 5: 3.
Johnson, Thomas H., Robert O. Slater, and Pat McGowan. 1984. “Explaining African
Military Coups D’etat, 1960-1982.” American Political Science Review 78: 3.
Jun, Jin-sok. 2001. “South Korea: Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control,” in
Muthiah Alagappa, ed. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role
of the Military in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Jung, Sang-yong, et al. 1990. Kwangju Minju Haangjaeng (The People’s Struggle for
Democracy in Kwangju). Seoul: Dolbege.
Kang, C. S. Eliot. 2004. “North Korea’s International Relations: The Successful Failure?”
in Samuel S. Kim, ed. The International Relations of Northeast Asia. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Kang, David C. 2002. Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea
and the Philippines. London: Cambridge University Press.
---------------. 2003. “Regional politics and Democratic Consolidation in Korea,” in
Samuel S. Kim, ed. Korea’s Democratization. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Kau, Michael Y. M. 1988. “Taiwan and Beijing’s Campaigns for Unification.” in Harvey
Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds. Taiwan in a Time of
Transition. New York: Paragon House.
Kerr, George H. 1965. Formosa Betrayed. Boston: Riverside Press.
Kessler, Richard J. 1988. “Development and Military: Role of the Philippine Military in
Development,” in J. Soedjati Djiwandono, and Yong Mun Chong, eds. 1988.
Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies.
---------------. 1989. Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
307
Kihl, Young-whan. 1991. “South Korea’s Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activism and
Policy Dilemma.” Korea Briefing. New York: Asia Society.
---------------. 2005. Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture.
New York: M. E. Sharpe.
Kim, Byung-kook. 1996. “Jiyokjuuiwa Jeongchi Gaehyuk (Regionalism and Political
Reform),” in Sang-sup Park, ed. Segyehwarul Jihyanghanun Hanguk Jeongchi
(Globalization and Korean Politics). Seoul: Nanam.
Kim, C. I. Eugene. 1985. “The Meaning of South Korea’s 12th National Assembly
Election.” Korea Observer.
---------------. 1986. “South Korea in 1985: An Eventual Year Amidst Uncertainty.” Asian
Survey 26: 1.
Kim, Hong-nak. 1989. “The 1988 Parliamentary Election in South Korea.” Asian Survey
29: 5.
Kim, Jung-won. 1976. Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kim, Kwang-oong. 1988. “Hanguk Min Gun Gwanryo Elite ui Ideology wa Jungchi (The
Korean Politics and the Ideology of the Civilian and Military Elites).” Kyekan
Kyunghyang (spring).
Kim, Samuel S., ed. 2003. Korea’s Democratization. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Kim, Samuel S., ed. 2004. The International Relations of Northeast Asia. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Kim, Sanghyun. 1996. “South Korea’s Kim Young Sam Government: Political
Agendas.” Asian Survey 36: 5.
Kim, Se-jin. 1971. The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press.
Kim, Se-jung. 1996. “Gunbu Gwoneuijui Saengseonggwa Jeongae: Je 3-4
Gonghwagookeui Jeongchigwajeonge Daehan Gwonryokjeongchijeok Jeopgeun
(Creation and Development of Military Authoritarianism: A Power Politics
Approach to the 3rd and 4th Republic),” in Hung-soo Han, ed. Hanguk Jeongchi
Dongtae Ron (Political Behavior in Korea). Seoul: Orum.
308
Kim, Sun-hyuk. 1996. “Civil Society in South Korea.” Journal of Northeast Asian
Studies 15: 2.
---------------. 1997. “State and Civil Society in South Korea’s Democratic Consolidation:
Is the Battle Really Over?” Asian Survey 37: 2.
---------------. 2000. The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
---------------. 2003. “Civil Society in Democratizing Korea,” in Samuel Kim, ed. Korea’s
Democratization. London: Cambridge University Press.
Kingsbury, Damien. 1998. The Politics of Indonesia. New York: Oxford University
Press.
---------------. 2003. Power Politics and the Indonesian Military. New York: Routledge.
Klintworth, Gary, ed. 1994. Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s. St. Leonards: Allen
& Unwin.
Koh, B. C. 1985. “The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea.” Asian Survey 25: 9.
---------------. 1997. “South Korea in 1996: Internal Strains and External Challenges.”
Asian Survey 37: 1.
Kolkowicz, Rowman. 1967. The Soviet Military and the Communist Party. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Kolkowicz, Rowman, and Andrzej Korbonski, eds. 1982. Soldiers, Peasants, and
Bureaucrats. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Korea, Republic of. 1956. History of the Department of National Defense. Seoul:
Sungkwang-sa.
Korea, Republic of. 2000. Korea Unification Bulletin 2: 1.
Korea, Republic of. Military Revolutionary Committee. 1961. A Statement by the
Military Revolutionary Committee.
Korea, Republic of. National Election Commission <web: http://www.nec.go.kr>.
Kposowa, Augustine J., and Craig Jenkins. 1993. “The Structural Sources of Military
Coups in Postcolonial Africa, 1957-1984.” American Journal of Sociology 99.
309
Kristiadi, J. 1993. “The Armed Forces,” in Richard W. Baker, M. Hadi Soesastro, J.
Kristiadi, and Douglas E. Ramage, eds. Indonesia: The Challenge of Change.
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Kroef, Justus M. van. 1965. The Communist Party of Indonesia. Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press.
Labrador, Mel C. 2001. “The Philippines in 2000: In Search of a Silver Lining.” Asian
Survey 41: 1.
Lande, Carl H. 1986. “The Political Crisis,” in John Bresnan, ed. Crisis in the
Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Laothamatas, Anek, ed. 1997. Democratization in Southeast and East Asia. New York:
St. Martin’s Press.
Lasswell, Harold. 1941. “The Garrison State.” American Journal of Sociology 46.
Lee, Chong-sik. 1980. “South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of a New Authoritarian
Order.” Asian Survey 21: 1.
Lee, Dae-kyu, Kyu-hui Hwang, and In-hyuk Kim, eds. 2001. Bikyo Goonbu Jeongchi
Gaeip Ron (Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention in Politics). Busan:
Dong-A University Press.
Lee, Hong-young. 1992. “South Korea in 1992: A Turning Point in Democratization.”
Asian Survey 33: 1.
---------------. 2003. “South Korea in 2002: Multiple Political Dilemmas.” Asian Survey
43: 1.
Lee, Jae-chul. 2005. Deepening and Improving Democracy: Association in South Korea.
Ph. D. Dissertation: University of Missouri at Columbia.
Lee, Kap-yoon, 1998. Hangukeui Seonkeowa Jiyeokjuui (Korean Elections and
Regionalism). Seoul: Orum Press.
Lee, Pong. 1972. “An Estimate of North Korea’s National Income.” Asian Survey 12: 6.
Lee, Su-hoon. 1993. “Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil
Society.” Pacific Affair 66: 3.
Lee, Wei-chin, and T. Y. Wang, eds. 2003. Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in
Taiwan, 1988-2000. New York: University Press of America.
310
Lee, Yong-ho. 1975. “The Politics of Democratic Experiment: 1948-1974,” in Edward R.
Wright, ed. Korean Politics in Transition. Seattle: University of Washington
Press.
Legge, John, ed. 1994. Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s. Clayton: Centre for
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University (Monash Papers on Southeast Asia
No. 31). 
 
Leng, Tse-kang. 1998. “Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations: The
Role of Private Firms. Asian Survey 38: 5.
Lev, Daniel S. 1966. “Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup.” Asian Survey 6: 2.
Liddle, R. William. 1992. “Indonesia’s Democratic Past and Future.” Comparative
Politics 24: 4.
---------------. 1999. “Indonesia’s Unexpected Failure of Leadership,” in Adam Schwarz
and Jonathan Paris, eds. The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia. New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press.
---------------. 2000. “Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored.” Asian Survey 40: 1.
---------------. 2001. “Indonesia in 2000: A Shaky Start for Democracy.” Asian Survey 41:
1.
Liddle, R. William, and Saiful Mujani. 2005. “Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo
Bambang Yudhyono.” Asian Survey 45: 1.
Linz, Juan. 1978. Crisis, Breakdown and Requilibration. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lissak, Moshe. 1976. Military Roles in Modernization: Civil-Military Relations in
Thailand and Burma. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Liu, Hong. 1991. “The Sino-South Korean Normalization: A Triangular Explanation.”
Asian Survey 33: 11.
Lo, Ching-cheng. 2001. “Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed.
Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
311
Long, Simon. 1991. Taiwan: China’s Last Frontier. Macmillan: Basingstone.
Lovell, John P. 1975. “The Military and Politics in Postwar Korea,” in Edward Reynolds
Wright, ed. Korean Politics in Transition. Seattle: University of Washington
Press.
Lowry, Robert. 1993. Indonesian Defense Policy and the Indonesian Armed Forces.
Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Center, Australian National University.
Luckham, Robin. 1991. “Introduction,” in Viberto Selochan, ed. The military, the State,
and Development in Asia and the Pacific. Boulder: Westview Press.
Mackie, Jamie A. C. 1974. Konfrontasi: The Indonesian-Malaysian Dispute, 1963-1966.
London: Oxford University Press.
Maguire, Keith. 1998. The Rise of Modern Taiwan. Sydney: Ashgate.
Mainland Affairs Council Data. February 28, 1998. Taipei.
Malin, Herbert S. 1985. “The Philippines in 1984: Grappling with Crisis.” Asian Survey
25: 2.
Malley, Michael S. 2002. “Indonesia in 2001: Restoring Stability in Jakarta.” Asian
Survey 42: 1.
Manlapaz, Romeo. 1986. The Mathematics of Deception: A Study of the 1986
Presidential Election Tallies. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center,
University of the Philippines.
McBeth, John. 1993. “Internal Contradictions: Support for Communists Wanes as Party
Splits.” Far Eastern Economic Review (August 26).
McBeth, John, and Oren Murphy. 2000. “Bloodbath.” Far Eastern Economic Review
(July 6). 
 
McDougall, Derek. 1997. The International Politics of the New Asia Pacific. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
McKeown, Timothy J. 2004. “Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative
Worldview,” in Henry Brady and David Collier, eds. Rethinking Social Inquiry:
Diverse Tools, Shard Standards. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Merrill, John. 1980. “The Cheju-do Rebellion.” Journal of Korean Studies 2.
312
Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, and Randolph Siverson. 1995. “War and the Survival of
Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political
Accountability.” American Political Science Review 89: 4.
Miranda, Felipe B., and Ruben F. Ciron. 1988. “Development and the Military in the
Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis,” in J. Soedjati
Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds. Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Molloy, Ivan. 1985. “Revolution in the Philippines: The Question of an Alliance Between
Islam and Communism.” Asian Survey 25: 8.
Montinola, Gabriella. 1999. “The Philippines in 1998: Opportunity and Crisis.” Asian
Survey 39: 1.
Moody, Peter R. 1992. Political Change on Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party
Adaptability. New York: Praeger.
Moon, Chung-in. 2000. “Between Ideals and Reality: An Interim Assessment of the
Sunshine Policy.” Pyonghwa Ronchong (On Peace) 4: 1.
---------------. 2000. “The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Summit: Assessments and
Prospects,” East Asian Review 12: 4.
---------------. 2001. “The Kim Dae Jung Government’s Peace Policy toward North
Korea.” Asian Perspective 25: 2.
Moon, Chung-in, and David Steinberg, ed. 1999. Kim Dae Jung Government and
Sunshine Policy. Seoul: Yonsei University Press.
Moon, Chung-in, and Jongryn Mo. 1999. “The Kim Young-Sam Government: Its
Legacies and Prospects for Governance in South Korea,” in Chung-in Moon and
Jongryn Mo, eds. Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and
Prospects. Seoul: Yonsei University Press.
Moon, Eric P. 1997. “Single Non-transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects
of an Electoral System.” Asian Survey 37: 7.
Mortimer, Rex. 1974. Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics,
1959-1965. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Muego, Benjamin. 1988. Spectator Society: The Philippine under Martial Rule. Athens:
Ohio University Center for International Studies.
Murphy, Marie. 1999. “Indonesia and Globalization.” Asian Perspective 23: 4.
313
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 1999. The 1999 Presidential
Election, MPR General Session and Post-Election Development in Indonesia.
Washington D.C.: National Democratic Institute.
Needler, Martin C. 1971. “Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin
America.” In John D. Martz, ed. The Dynamics of Change in Latin American
Politics. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Nelson, Joan M. 1990. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustments
in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Neumann, A. Lin. 2006. “Philippines: Military on the Move.” Asia Times (February 28). 
 
Niksch, Larry A. 1985. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines.
Washington D.C.: Library of Congress.
Noble, Lela G. 1976. “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.” Pacific
Affairs 49: 3.
---------------. 1981. “Muslim Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of a
Stalemate.” Asian Survey 21: 11.
Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
O’Donnell, Gullermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Office of the Minister of National Defense. 1987. OSND Statistical Data. Quezon City,
Philippines: Department of National Defense.
Office of the President, Republic of Korea. 1999. Government of the People: Selected
Speeches of President Kim Dae-jung, vols 1-2. Seoul: ROK Government.
Oh, Byung-hun. 1975. “Students and Politics,” in Edward R. Wright, ed. Korean Politics
in Transition. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Oh, Chang-heon. 2001. Yushin Chejewa Hanguk Jeongchi (Yushin and Korean Politics).
Seoul: Orum.
Oh, John Kie-chiang. 1999. Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and
Development. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
314
Oliver, Robert T. 1950. Why War Came in Korea. New York: Fordham University Press.
Pak, Won-sun. 1992. Gukga Boanbeop Yeongu (The Study of the National Security Law,
vol. 2. Seoul: Yoksa Bipyongsa.
Park, Jin. 1990. “Political Change in South Korea: The Challenge of the Conservative
Alliance.” Asian Survey 30: 12.
Park, Jung-hee. 1965. Uri Minjokeui Nagal Gil (Future of Our Nation). Seoul: Koryo Inc.
Park, Myung-lim. 1995. “Hangukeui Gukgahyungsung, 1945-1948 (State-building in
Korea, 1945-1948).” Korean Political Science Review 29: 1.
Park, Sang-sup, ed. 1996. “Segyehwarul Jihyanghanun Hanguk Jeongchi (Globalization
and Korean Politics). Seoul: Nanam.
Payne, Richard H. 1970. Military Intervention in the Politics of Developing Systems: The
African Case. Ph. D. Dissertation: University of Georgia.
Penders, C. L. M., and Ulf Sundhaussen. 1985. Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political
Biography. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
Peng, Ming-min. 1972. A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence
Leader. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston.
Perlmutter, Amos. 1969. “The Praetorian State and Praetorian Army: Toward a
Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Societies.” Comparative
Politics 1: 3.
---------------. 1977. The Military and Politics in Modern Times. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Perlmutter, Amos, and William M. LeoGrande. 1982. “The Party in Uniform: Toward a
Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems.” American
Political Science Review 76: 4.
Porter, Bruce C. 1994. War and the Rise of the Modern State: The Military Foundations
of Modern Politics. New York: Free Press.
Pzrezeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert. 2000. “Back to War in Mindanao: The Weaknesses of a Power-
based Approach in Conflict Resolution.” Philippine Political Science Journal 21:
44.
315
---------------. 2001. “Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in
the Southern Philippines.” Asian Survey 41: 2.
Rabassa, Angel, and John Haseman. 2002. The Military and Democracy in Indonesia:
Challenges, Politics, and Power. RAND: National Security Research Division.
Reeve, David. 1985. Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System. London:
Oxford University Press.
Reeves, David W. 1963. The Republic of Korea. London: Oxford University Press.
Riedinger, Jeffrey. 1995. “The Philippines in 1994: Renew Growth and Contested
Reforms.” Asian Survey 35: 2.
Rigger, Shelley. 1999. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. New York: Routledge.
---------------. 2001. From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Rivera, Temario. 2005. “The Philippines in 2004: New Mandate, Daunting Problems.”
Asian Survey 45: 1.
Robinson, Geoffrey. 2001. “Indonesia: On a New Course?” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed.
Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Rocamora, Joel. 1994. Breaking Through: The Struggle within the Communist Party of
the Philippines. Manila: Anvil Press.
Roeder, Rudolf O. G. 1969. The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia.
Jakarta: Gunung Agung.
Ross, Edward W. 1986. “Taiwan’s Armed Forces,” in Edward A. Olson and Stephen
Jurika, Jr., eds. The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies. Boulder:
Westview Press.
Rubinstein, Murray A., ed. 1994. The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present. New York: M.
E. Sharpe.
Rubinstein, Murray A., ed. 1996. Taiwan: A New History. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
Ruhl, J. Mark. “Changing Civil-Military Relations in Latin America.” Latin American
Research Review 33.
316
Rutten, Rosanne. 2001. “Revolutionary Specialists, Strongmen, and the State: Post-
Movement Careers of CCP-NPA Cadres in a Philippine Province, 1990s-2001.”
South East Asia Research 9: 3.
Ryu, Byong-yong, ed. 1997. Hanguk Hyondae Jeongchisa (History of Korean Politics).
Seoul: Jipmoondang.
Said, Salim. 1998. “Suharto’s Armed Forces: Building a Power Base in New Order in
Indonesia, 1966-1998.” Asian Survey 38: 6.
Sanger, David. 2001. “Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won’t Resume Now.” New
York Times, March 8.
Saxer, Carl J. 2004. “Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic
Control in South Korea.” Armed Forces and Society 30: 3.
Scalapino, Robert. 1962. “Which Route for Korea?” Asian Survey 2: 7.
Schulzinger, Robert D. 1989. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Schwarz, Adam, and Jonathan Paris, eds. 1999. The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia.
New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.
Scott, Peter D. 1985. “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno.” Pacific Affairs
58: 2.
Secretariat, House of Representatives, Republic of Korea. 1948. The National Security
Law (December 1).
Secretariat. The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. 1961. Military Revolution
in Korea.
Selochan, Viberto, ed. 1991. The Military, the State and Development in Asia and the
Pacific. Boulder: Westview Press.
Seo, Kyung-kyo. 1993. Military Involvement in Politics and the Prospects for
Democracy: Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea in Comparative
Perspective. Ph. D. Dissertation: University of Southern Illinois at Carbondale.
Seymour, James D. 1989. “Taiwan in 1988: No More Bandits.” Asian Survey 29: 1.
Shaw, Yu-ming, ed. 1984. Building Democracy in the Republic of China. Taipei: The
Asia and World Institute.
317
Shin, Doh-chull. 1999. Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Shin, Gi-wook. 1995. “Marxism, Anti-Americanism, and Democracy in South Korea: An
Examination of Nationalist Intellectual Discourse.” Positions: East Asian
Cultures Critique 3.
Shiraishi, Takashi. 1999. “The Indonesian Military in Politics,” in Adam Schwarz and
Jonathan Paris, eds. The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia. New York: Council
on Foreign Relations Press.
Sidel, John T. 1999. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines.
California: Stanford University Press.
Sidwell, Thomas E. 1995. The Indonesian Military: Dwi Fungsi and Territorial
Operations. Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office.
Siliman, G. Sidney. 1984. “The Philippines in 1983: Authoritarianism Beleaguered.”
Asian Survey 24: 2.
Simons, Lewis M. 1987. Worth Dying For. New York: William Morrow.
Sinaga, Kastorius. 1993. “Number of Local NGO’s Mushrooming.” Jakarta Post,
November 2.
Soesastro, Hadi, Anthony L. Smith, and Han Mui Ling, eds. 2003. Governance in
Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency. Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies.
Sohn, Ho-chul. “Hanguk Jeonjaeng-gua Ideology Jihyung (The Korean War and the
Ideological Terrain).” Hangukgua Gukjejeongchi (Korea and International
Politics) 6: 2.
Song, Eui-sop. 1993. ‘Documentary Hanahoe.” Jugan Hanguk (Weekly Korea), June 1.
Steinberg, David J. 1990. The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place, 2nd ed.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Stepan, Alfred C. 1973. Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
---------------. 1976. “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role
Expansion.” In Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed. Armies and Politics in Latin America.
New York: Holmes & Meier.
318
---------------. 1988. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Snyder, Jack. 1984. “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and
1984.” International Security 9.
Stepan, Alfred, ed. 1973. Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
-------------. 1988. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Suh, Byong-cho. 1964. Junwonjaeui Jeungon: Hanguk Daeoi Jeongchisa (A Testimony
by a Sovereign: A History of a Representative Government). Seoul: Moum-sa.
Sundhaussen, Ulf. 1982. The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967.
New York: Oxford University Press.
---------------. 1989. “Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with Democracy,” in Larry
Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. Democracy in
Developing Countries, Vol. 3: Asia. London: Adamantine Press Limited.
Sutter, John O. 1966. “Two Faces of Konfrontasi: “Crush Malaysia” and the Gestapu.”
Asian Survey 6: 10.
Sutter, Robert G. 1986. Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments after Mao. New York:
Praeger.
Taciana, Marie, and Leila Fernandez Stembridge, eds. 2003. China Today: Economic
Reforms, Social Conflict, and Collective Identities. London: RoutledgeCurzon
Press.
Taiwan Affairs Office. 2000. “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.” People’s
Daily Online, Feburary 21. <web: http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/>
Tang, Tsou. 1959. The Embroilment over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles. Salt Lake:
University of Utah Press.
Task-Force Detainees. 1989. Philippine Human Rights Update. Manila.
Tasker, Rodney. 1985. “The Hidden Hand.” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1.
Thomson, Mark R. 1995. The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic
Transition in the Philippines. New Haven: Yale University Press.
319
---------------. 1998. “The Decline of Philippine Communism: A Review Essay.” South
East Asia Research 6: 2.
Thomson, William R. 1975. “Explanation of the Military Coup.” Comparative Politics 7:
4.
Tien, Hung-mao. 1972. Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
---------------. 1988. “Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan,” in Harvey
Feldman, Michael Y. M. Kau, and Ilpyong J. Kim, eds. Taiwan in a Time of
Transition. New York: Paragon House.
---------------. 1989. “The Transformation of an Authoritarian Part-State: Taiwan’s
Development Experiences.” Issues and Studies 25: 7.
Tien, Hung-mao, ed. 1983. Mainland China, Taiwan, the US Policy. Cambridge:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain.
Tien, Hung-mao, and Tun-jen Cheng. 1997. “Crafting Democratic Institution in Taiwan.”
The China Journal 37.
Tien, Hung-mao, and Yun-han Chu. 1994. “Taiwan’s Domestic Political Reforms:
Institutional Change and Power Realignment,” in Gary Klintworth, ed. Taiwan in
the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s. St. Leonards: Allin & Unwin.
Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War Making and the State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter
B. Evans, ed. Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Timberman, David G. 1991. “The Philippines in 1990: On Shaky Ground.” Asian Survey
31: 2.
Tong, Hollington K. 1953. Chiang Kai-shek. Taipei: China Publishing Company.
Tsang, Steve. 1993. “Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang’s Policy to Reconquer the
Chinese Mainland, 1949-1958,” in Steve Tsang, ed. In the Shadow of China.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Uhlin, Anders. 1997. Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization”: The
Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World. Richmond: Curzon
Press.
United Nations Document, A/936, Add. I, Vol. II, Annexes.
United States Department of State. 1950. Department of State Bulletin. January 23.
320
Vatikiotis, Michael R. J. 1993. Indonesian Politics under Suharto. London: Routledge.
Velasco, Renato S. 1997. “Philippine Democracy: Promise and Performance.” In Anek
Laothamatas, ed. Democratization in Southeast and East Asia. New York: St.
Martin’s Press.
Villegas, Bernardo. 1986. “The Economic Crisis,” in John Bresnan, ed. Crisis in the
Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
---------------. 1987. “The Philippines in 1986: Democratic Reconstruction in the Post-
Marcos Era.” Asian Survey 27: 2
Wachman, Alan M. 1994. Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. New York:
M.E. Sharpe.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Wanandi, Jusuf. 2003. “Challenge of the TNI and Its Role in Indonesia’s Future,” in Hadi
Soesastro, Anthony L. Smith, and Han Mui Ling, eds. Governance in Indonesia:
Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency. Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies.
Wang, T. Y. 2001. “Cross-Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan: Changing
Tactics in a New Reality.” Asian Survey 41: 5.
Weekley, Kathleen. 2001. The Communist Party of the Philippines 1968-1993: A Story of
Its Theory and Practice. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
Weiner, Myron, and Joseph LaPalombara, eds. 1966. Political Parties and Political
Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Welch, Claude E., ed. 1976. Civilian Control of the Military: Theories and Cases from
Developing Countries. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Welch, Claude E., and Arthur K. Smith. 1974. Military Role and Military Rule:
Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations. North Scituate: Dexbury Press.
White House, The. 2002. 2002 State of the Union Address, January 29. (web:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/7672.htm)
Wolgan Choson (Monthly Choson).
Woodward, Cathleen E. 2002. Violent Masses, Elites and Democratization: The
Indonesian Case. Ph. D. Dissertation: The Ohio State University.
321
World Bank. 1994. World Tables 1993. Washington DC: World Bank.
Wright, Teresa. 1999. “Student Mobilization in Taiwan: Civil Society and Its
Discontents.” Asian Survey 39: 6.
Wu, Jausheih Joseph. 1995. Taiwan’s Democratization: Forces behind the New
Momentum. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wu, Yu-shan. 2001. “Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer.”
Asian Survey 41: 1.
Wurfel, David. 1988. Filipino Politics: Development and Decay. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Wynia, Gary W. 1978. The Politics of Latin American Development. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Yahooda, Micahel B. 1978. China’s Role in World Affairs. London: Croom Helm.
Yang, Chin-lin. 1996. Military Politics in the Transition to Democracy: Changing Civil-
Military Relations in the Republic of China (Taiwan), 1949-1994. Ph. D.
Dissertation: State University of New York at Albany.
Yang, Sung-chul. 1994. The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative
Analysis. Boulder: Westview Press.
Yeo, Hyon-deok. 1996. ‘Shingunbu Gwonuijueui Chejeeui Deungjanggwa Jeongchi
Galdeung (Emergence of the New Military Authoritarianism and Political
Conflicts),” in Heung-su Han, ed. Hanguk Jeongchi Dongtaeron (Korean
Political Behavior). Seoul: Orum.
Yoon, Young-kwan. 2000. “South Korea in 1999: Overcoming Cold War Legacies.”
Asian Survey 40: 1.
Youngblood, Robert L. 1990. Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and
Political Repression in the Philippines. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Yun, Seong-yi. 1997. “Democratization in South Korea: Social Movements and Their
Political Opportunity Structures.” Asian Perspective 21: 3.
322
Vita
Jongseok Woo, the last son of Sunok Choi and the late Chunmyung Woo, was born in
South Korea, on May 5, 1971. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political
Science and International Relations from the University of Incheon, South Korea in 1999,
and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Texas at Austin in 2004. In the
Fall of 2007, he will join the faculty of the University of West Florida at Pensacola, FL,
as an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government.
Jongseok has his lovely wife, Eunjung Choi, who holds a Ph. D degree and will be an
Assistant Professor of the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the
University of South Florida from Fall 2007.
Permanent address: 937-8 Mansu 1-Dong Namdong-Gu, Incheon, South Korea
This dissertation was typed by Jongseok Woo.
